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Abstract
Over six chapters, this thesis explores how to estimate risk-sharing when output is
not exogenous. The thesis starts with a survey of the current literature and how it
estimates risk-sharing. This survey is then followed by risk-sharing estimations based
on a panel of 24 countries over the period of 1970-2007. The estimation approaches
applied include the literature’s Classical and Level approaches, as well as alternative
estimation approaches that provide robust parameter estimates when the literature
commonly assumed output exogeneity is dropped. These alternative estimators
consist of procedures using instrumental variables ranging from first differenced two-
stage least squares, a dynamic generalized method of moments estimation, and an
instrumental variables estimation using an instrument derived from a structural
vector autoregressive model. Also, a Monte Carlo Simulation is undertaken to show
the severity of the bias inherent in the Classical estimation method, as well as
to show the performance of the proposed alternative methods. When output is
endogenous, the Classical estimation method is found to underestimate risk-sharing,
while the best performing alternative approaches are concluded to be the Level
approach and the instrumental variables estimation approach using an instrument
derived from a structural vector autoregressive model. This thesis contributes to the
risk-sharing literature by discussing and quantifying the bias the Classical estimation
approach suffers from due to output endogeneity. It also contributes by adapting
estimation methods from other fields that allow consistent estimations of risk-sharing
parameters in the presence of endogeneity bias, and by analyzing the performance
of these asymptotic panel estimators in the specific context of the panel dimensions
commonly found in the risk-sharing literature.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis looks at risk-sharing, which is the extent to which a country’s income
and thus consumption is subject to that country’s individual income shocks versus
an aggregate of income shocks across a group of countries. This is of interest to
any monetary union as the more harmonized consumption is, or rather the more
the member’s consumption is decoupled from the country’s idiosyncratic income
shock, the more appropriate the overarching monetary policy of the monetary union
becomes as it increasingly mimics the individual countries’ monetary policies when
they are not in a monetary union.
In essence, the risk-sharing aspect attempts to identify the extent to which it is a
sacrifice to abandon individual monetary policy in favor of one cohesive policy across
all member countries. The cost of monetary union by losing country individual
monetary policy diminishes the higher the risk-sharing is amongst the group of
countries.
The second chapter, provides a detailed introduction to the aspect of risk-sharing
and the associated literature, including an overview of the main approaches the
literature applies to estimate risk-sharing. This is followed in the third chapter by
an application of the common risk-sharing methodologies found in the literature to
a panel of 24 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries over the period 1970-2007.1 The results of these estimations form the
benchmark for the subsequent chapters.
The fourth chapter starts by discussing the feasibility of an assumption com-
monly employed by the literature when estimating risk-sharing: exogeneity of out-
put. The chapter then proceeds to discuss the impact of simultaneity bias on the
risk-sharing estimation when the assumption of output exogeneity fails. It proposes
1For the reader’s benefit a comprehensive list of abbreviations and symbols that are used in
this thesis can be found in appendix (A).
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a variety of alternative estimation methodologies that should provide consistent re-
sults in the presence of simultaneity bias.
The fifth chapter employs a Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) to analyze the im-
pact of simultaneity bias on the risk-sharing estimation methodologies in a controlled
environment. The MCS is then used to analyze the performance of the alternative
estimation methodologies presented in the fourth chapter and subjects them to vary-
ing assumptions. This both presents the strength and weakness of the alternative
approaches, as well as demonstrates under which conditions which approach per-
forms best in estimating the true extent of risk-sharing. The final chapter, the sixth
chapter, is a conclusion which briefly summarizes the key findings.
The main findings are that the Classical approach underestimate the true risk-
sharing by ignoring the endogeneity bias. Also, following the application of various
Instrumental Variables (IV)-estimation procedures and a MCS, it can be concluded
that the IV-estimation utilizing a Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) derived
instrument provides the most robust instrument and consequently it provides con-
siderably more reliable risk-sharing estimations than the Anderson and Hsiao (1981,
1982) First-Difference Two Stage Least Square (FD2SLS) or Holtz-Eakin et al.
(1988) dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (dGMM) approaches.
The thesis contributes to the literature in several ways. The two main contribu-
tions are: i) the explicit discussion of the presence of simultaneity bias that affects
the risk-sharing estimation approach as commonly applied in the literature, and
accordingly the presentation of alternative approaches that should provide robust
estimates, as well as ii) quantifying the bias inherent in the literature’s commonly
applied risk-sharing estimation approach and investigating the performance of the
proposed alternative approaches in estimating the risk-sharing. Amongst the var-
ious alternative approaches, the most novel and a contribution in and of itself, as
well as one of the best performing approach for consistent risk-sharing estimation
in the presence of simultaneity bias, is an instrumental variables estimation that
employs an instrument that is derived from a SVAR model.
The identification of a robust estimation methodology allows the appropriate
quantification of the extent of risk-sharing of a group of countries and hence con-
tributes to the appropriate identification of a monetary union under the Optimal
Currency Area theory based on risk-sharing. More precisely, by ignoring the endon-
geneity bias the literature, in particular the Classical literature, has over-estimated
unshared risk which in turns signaled to, for example, Euro-zone countries that
there was a higher cost associated when joining the European Monetary Union than
was actually the case. Greater risk-sharing minimizes the cost of monetary union.
However, the exact quantification of the optimal level of risk-sharing for a monetary
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union is beyond the scope of this thesis, which attempts to provide a consistent
risk-sharing estimation methodology in the presence of output endogeneity.
Additionally, the thesis attempts to look at whether risk-sharing has risen. This
topic is commonly discussed in the literature and relates to whether or not risk-
sharing expanded in the wake of globalization and increased cross-country financial
flows. However, the alternative estimation approaches prove to be too imprecise to
make any conclusive statement on whether risk-sharing expanded. Future research
could establish an estimation approach or enhance the alternative approaches pre-
sented here to allow for consistent and more precise estimates, making it possible to
identify a shift in risk-sharing that is robust in the presence of endogeneity.
Moreover, although the results of the MCS in this thesis are tailored to the
international risk-sharing specific panel dimensions and data characteristics, they
have implications for wider empirical research on OECD data. More specifically,
the results are informative for estimations concerning a fairly balanced panel con-
sisting of a small cross-section of countries and a small time series. The overall
results show that although the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations provide
inconsistent estimates when simultaneity bias is present, these estimates have small
dispersion, as well as have small standard errors despite the application of a range of
variance-covariance estimation procedures that are robust to varying forms of het-
eroskedasticity and serial correlation. However, the alternative estimators, which
have primarily an asymptotic justification, provide consistent estimate but have
wide dispersion, especially in the case of FD2SLS and dGMM. Furthermore, while
both the FD2SLS and IV-estimations using instruments derived from a Bayoumi
and Eichengreen (1993) style SVAR (SVAR-IV) are exactly identified, the FD2SLS
suffers extensively from finite sample bias in comparison to the SVAR-IV. These
results reinforce established findings and demonstrate this in the context of a small
balanced macro-economic sample. Nonetheless, future research could enhance the
MCS by further varying the assumptions and panel dimensions to provide a more
comprehensive contribution around more general behaviours of these estimators be-
yond the restricted risk-sharing estimation environment.
Overall, the results suggest that because the literature, particularly the Classical
literature, ignores output’s endogeneity bias, its risk-sharing findings will need to be
reassessed. That is, this thesis establishes that, in comparison to robust estimates,
the traditional Classical estimation procedures are likely to find lower risk-sharing
than is actually the case.
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Chapter 2
An introduction to the literature
on international risk-sharing
2.1 Introduction
The basic theoretical principle of risk-sharing rests on the idea that people may be
able to improve their ability to smooth their consumption over time, and thereby
raise their utility, by sharing their risks of time varying consumption. In an in-
ternational context, the opportunities for risk-sharing by different sets of national
households come from idiosyncratic country output shocks. Those opportunities
can be exploited either by state-contingent claims on foreigners’ output, or cross-
government transfers, or international borrowing and lending. Efforts to test the
idea that countries will exploit their opportunities for risk-sharing have led to two
different empirical approaches in the literature. The first stipulates that consump-
tion patterns should be equal across countries if perfect risk-sharing exists. Therefore
it tests for consumption correlation across countries. In this strand Backus et al.
(1992) have proposed the consumption correlation puzzle, since they found that,
contrary to the hypothesis of risk-sharing, cross-country consumption correlation is
lower than the underlying output risk. Papers that found consumption to be less
correlated than output, through various methods, include Devereux et al. (1992),
Tesar (1993, 1995), Obstfeld (1994), and Stockman and Tesar (1995). Stockman
and Tesar (1995) proposed that the difference in correlation can be explained by a
preference shock, or taste shock, despite perfect risk-sharing. If countries are subject
to country specific taste shocks, they stipulated, then the consumption correlation
will naturally be lower than the initial correlation of output shocks.
The second empirical test stipulates that if perfect risk-sharing exists then con-
sumption growth should be independent of country specific, idiosyncratic, output
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Ex ante Ex post
Consumption Domestic insurance against Domestic smoothing of
smoothing idiosyncratic output shocks consumption through saving
behavior (Private,
Corporate, Government saving)
Risk-sharing Cross-country engagement Cross-country (income) flows after
to share output shock, output shocks, to counter output
e.g., cross-ownership of assets shocks. E.g. international net
and international net transfers and international
income flows borrowing through net exports
Table 2.1: The difference between risk-sharing and consumption smoothing
movement and instead should be dependent on the aggregate output growth. It is
this second empirical test of risk-sharing, which assumes a complete financial market,
that this chapter and the following chapters are concerned with. When preforming
this test however, one should be aware that a fine differences exist between four
aspects of the empirical application. Table (2.1) presents these aspects in relation
to one another.
The fundamental difference lies in two aspects. The first is consumption smooth-
ing which involves no cross-country activity (flow) and is effectively an intertempo-
ral smoothing using domestic savings and reflects the equalization of intertemporal
marginal utility. The second is risk-sharing and encompasses cross-country activi-
ties to offset idiosyncratic output shocks to income. This can be achieved through
trading state contingent assets such as claims on foreign output (and the associ-
ated international income flows), prior to observing an output shock, or by flows
such as international borrowing and lending through net exports or international
net transfers, after the shock has been observed.
In the model presented in the following section, independence from idiosyncratic
output shock is achieved for the consumption pattern by trading state contingent
assets (claims on foreign output) prior to observing any output shocks and therefore
committing to share idiosyncratic output shock risk. To this extent, the model below
demonstrates the results of the ex-ante channel, also referred to as consumption
insurance.1
The first empirical investigations that tested the independence of consump-
tion from idiosyncratic output shock were by Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991), and
Townsend (1994). They attempted to test for perfect risk-sharing. This was done
by regressing consumption shock on output shocks and testing the statistical signif-
icance of the coefficient. In the presence of full risk-sharing, the coefficient would
1See Sørensen and Yosha (1998) for a brief explanation of the difference between full risk-sharing
and full consumption-smoothing and how in the case of complete financial markets, they are the
same.
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be statistically insignificant, which would imply that there is no statistical rela-
tionship between country-specific consumption and output movements.2 However,
subsequent work showed that this did not test for perfect risk-sharing but rather a
composite of risk-sharing and consumption-smoothing.3 Baxter and Crucini (1995)
presented a possible scenario in the short run where perfect consumption smoothing
through borrowing and lending served exclusively after the shock has been observed
to mimic the ex-ante perfect risk-sharing outcome and thus rendering consumption
independent of idiosyncratic output shock. Subsequently, it has become common
to recognize that independence of consumption from country specific output shocks
reflects a combination of ex ante risk-sharing and ex post consumption smoothing.
This thesis follows the concept in the literature, which has now become common,
that risk-sharing encompasses both ex ante risk-sharing and ex post consumption
smoothing.
There are two strands to this post-Baxter-Crucini conception in the literature:
the first, Classical method, in my terminology, utilizes first differences of variables,
and the second, Level method, utilizes levels of variables. The former can be fur-
ther categorized into two sub-strands: the Classical method based on consumption-
output relationship a la Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991), and Townsend (1994), and
the second, the Asdrubali et al. (1996)4 method based on variance decomposition.
The Classical or ASY method has found (as standard) relatively low international
risk-sharing with little improvement over the years, even after the recent period of
globalization and the associated rise in financial flows. On the contrary, the Level ap-
proach literature has found that international risk-sharing is relatively high, though
not as high as apparent domestic inter-regional risk-sharing. Besides finding higher
risk-sharing, the level literature also finds a rise in risk-sharing shortly after the
beginning of globalization.
This chapter presents a survey of the literature on the topic of risk-sharing and it
is structured as follows: Section (2.2) presents a risk-sharing model upon which the
empirical literature rests. Section (2.3) presents the Classical and ASY estimation
method literature, section (2.4) presents the Level estimation approach literature.
2The test conducted by Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991), and Townsend (1994) did not find that
perfect risk-sharing was taking place as the coefficient was found to be different from zero.
3The methods of Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991), and Townsend (1994) for full risk-sharing,
assumes, as will be discussed at length later, that all the shocks originate from output. In other
words, the estimation does not suffer from simultaneity bias as output is assumed to be exogenous.
Although the assumption of output exogeneity has been discussed in the literature, see for example
Sørensen and Yosha (1998) page 231, Qiao (2010) pages 9-10, Artis and Hoffmann (2007a) pages
8-9, or Artis and Hoffmann (2008) page 453, the literature has not formally tested for output
exogeneity as it has commonly assumed this to be the case. Following the literature, the exogeneity
assumption will be adopted for the duration of this and the following chapter. However, for chapter
four and five, this assumption will be loosened.
4From this point forward, when referring to the work from Asdrubali et al. (1996) the citation
will be shortened to the surname initial of the authors Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (ASY).
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Finally, section (2.5) will conclude by summarizing the chapter.
2.2 The theoretical foundation of international risk-
sharing
This section presents a model that illustrates the theoretical foundation for the
empirical application of risk-sharing.5 This model assumes that there are a total of
N countries with identical representative agents in a two period framework. The
output of a specific country n in period one is exogenously given, Y n1 , while period
two output, Y n2 (s), is subject to an exogenous shock s, where there are % possible
shocks, with each shock having a pi(s) probability of happening.6 The model allows
for the trade of two assets in the first period. The first, a riskless bond, Bn1 , has a
guaranteed return of (1+r) in the second period. This type of risk-free bond reflects
consumption smoothing in the model. The other asset is a claim on period two shock
contingent output of country n, V n1 .
7 Specifically, V n1 is the period one market value
of the second period state contingent output of country n.8 The representative
consumer of country n attempts to maximize her lifetime utility in respect to first
and second period consumption Cn1 and C
n
2 (s). The utility function has a CRRA
functional form of u(Ct) =
C
(1−ρ)
t
(1−ρ) , where ρ is the relative risk aversion coefficient.
This yields the following maximization problem:
max
Cn1 ,C
n
2 (s)
Un = u(Cn1 ) + ι
%∑
s=1
pi(s)u(Cn2 (s)) (2.1)
where ι is a standard time preference factor. The maximization in (2.1) is subject
to the first period budget constraint:
Y n1 + V
n
1 = C
n
1 +B
n
1 +
N∑
m=1
xnmV
m
1 (2.2)
and the second period budget constraint:
Cn2 (s) = (1 + r)B
n
1 +
N∑
m=1
xnmY
m
2 (s) (2.3)
5The model is a general risk-sharing model. It is taken from Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) Ch.5.3.
and is presented here for the reader’s benefit with some additional steps shown.
6Where the possible shocks range from −∞ to ∞.
7V n1 being perpetual claims on a country’s future output is in fact reminiscent of the assets
proposed by Shiller (1993), which are also referred to in the literature as Shiller securities.
8This implies a complete financial market in the sense that we have N possible shocks each
period, due to having N countries experiencing shocks each period, and N assets, as N countries
sell their claims of state contingent period two output.
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where xnm is country n’s share of country m’s future output. Rewriting (2.3) in
respect to Bn1 and substituting the resulting expression of B
n
1 in (2.2), one obtains
the following new budget constraint:
Cn1 = Y
n
1 + V
n
1 −
( 1
(1 + r)
(Cn2 (s)−
N∑
m=1
xnmY
m
2 (s)) +
N∑
m=1
xnmV
m
1
)
(2.4)
Next, after substituting (2.4) into (2.1), one obtains the following first order condi-
tions by maximizing with respect to xnm and C
n
2 (s):
∂Un
∂Cn2 (s)
= − 1
(1 + r)
u′(Cn1 ) + ιpi(s)u
′(Cn2 (s)) = 0 (2.5)
∂Un
∂xnm
= u′(Cn1 )
( 1
(1 + r)
Y m2 (s)− V m1
)
= 0 (2.6)
Rewriting (2.5) to include the expression of the utility function, one obtains:
1
1 + r
C
n(−ρ)
1 = ιpi(s)C
n
2 (s)
(−ρ) (2.7)
The ratio of consumption in one period to the other is therefore:
Cn2 (s)
Cn1
=
( 1
(1 + r)(ιpi(s))
)−ρ
(2.8)
Since it is assumed that the representative agents of each country are iden-
tical, (2.8) holds for all countries. When summing (2.8) across countries, where∑N
m C
m
2 (s) = C
W
2 (s) = Y
W
2 (s), one obtains the equivalent aggregate (global) condi-
tion:
Y W2 (s)
Y W1
=
( 1
(1 + r)(ιpi(s))
)−ρ
(2.9)
Since the right hand sides of (2.9) and (2.8) are equal, the following expression holds:
Y W2 (s)
Y W1
=
Cn2 (s)
Cn1
=
Cm2 (s)
Cm1
(2.10)
Eq.(2.10) represents the concept of perfect risk-sharing to which we referred to in
the previous section: consumption growth is identical across countries and follows
global output growth rather than country specific output growth.
Although the model as presented here has only two periods, the model can be ex-
tended to multi- or infinite time periods with continued shocks to output. Nonethe-
less, the conclusion would be the same as in (2.10); the optimal consumption path
would be subject to global output growth rather than the country’s idiosyncratic
output shocks. In essence risk-sharing refers to the extent a country has hedged
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itself against its own idiosyncratic output shocks. This means a country has shared
the risk of its negative or positive idiosyncratic output shocks with the rest of the
world. Perfect risk-sharing, as characterized in (2.10), would be when all risk has
been shared to the fullest extent at which point consumption would be subject to
global output growth. The empirical risk-sharing literature, including this thesis,
attempts to investigate whether this optimal consumption path is followed. More
precisely, the literature looks at whether risk-sharing is taking place and to what
extent, or rather how far it is from perfect risk-sharing.
However, before proceeding to the empirical approaches derived from (2.10),
several steps remain in order to validate the model. Following the principal idea
of (2.10), by extension, consumption of country n is a proportion of aggregate out-
put, so that consumption for first period is Cn1 = µ
nY W1 and for second period
Cn2 (s) = µ
nY W2 (s). It remains to be shown that these proportional characteriza-
tions of consumption in period one and two represents an equilibrium that maxi-
mizes utility. For this, it needs to be shown that the proportional consumption does
not violate the budget constraints, and the associated prices of both assets need to
be presented (i.e. the prices of the bonds and state contingent claims).
The associated bond price follows from (2.8) and shown in (2.11) below with
consumption expressed as a proportion of world output and summed across shocks.
( Y W1∑%
s=1 ιpi(s)Y
W
2 (s)
)−ρ
= (1 + r) (2.11)
The associated share price V m1 is obtained from (2.6), summed across shocks in
the following way:
%∑
s=1
u′(Cn1 )
1
(1 + r)
Y m2 (s) = u
′(Cn1 )V
m
1 (2.12)
where u′(Cn1 ) = (1 + r)ιpi(s)u
′(Cn2 (s)), so that
ι
%∑
s=1
pi(s)u′(Cn2 (s))Y
m
2 (s) = u
′(Cn1 )V
m
1 (2.13)
After inserting the proportion of world output for consumption, we get:
V m1 = ι
%∑
s=1
pi(s)(
Y W2 (s)
Y W1
)−ρY m2 (s) (2.14)
It still remains to be verified that the budget constraints are not violated when
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consumption is a proportion of world output. The second period budget constraint
µnY W2 (s) = (1 + r)B
n
1 +
N∑
m=1
xnmY
m
2 (s) (2.15)
is not violated if the agents hold no bonds, Bn1 = 0, and if the proportion of the
various countries in the pool of claims on a country’s future output is equivalent to
the consumption proportion of world output of the various countries, xnm = µ
n. The
first period budget constraint
Y n1 + V
n
1 = µ
nY W2 +
N∑
m=1
xnmV
m
1 (2.16)
holds when µn =
Y n1 +V
n
1∑N
m=1(Y
m
2 (s)+V
m
1 )
.
2.3 The Classical empirical framework literature
Eq.(2.10) above has spawned two different methodologies in the empirical risk-
sharing literature. The first assumes that the consumption pattern of any country
should be identical to that in any other country belonging to the aggregate area.
Subsequently, the first approach derives the following from (2.10) as basis for empir-
ical investigation: log( Cn,t
Cn,t−1
) = log(
YW,t
YW,t−1
) = log( Cm,t
Cm,t−1
) , ∀ m 6= n. In other words
perfect risk-sharing is when the consumption correlation between any two countries
of the same integrated area is one.9 The second empirical approach is based on the
idea that, in the case of perfect risk-sharing (and possibly because of perfect con-
sumption smoothing), a country’s consumption should be independent of its idiosyn-
cratic output shocks. As distinct to the first approach, the second approach converts
(2.10) into the statement: log( Cn,t
Cn,t−1
) = log(
YW,t
YW,t−1
) 6= log( Yn,t
Yn,t−1
)− log( YW,t
YW,t−1
). The
first empirical test utilizing the second approach of consumption-output correlation,
presented by Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), and Townsend (1994), was a test for
perfect risk sharing and was formulated as a regression of consumption on output.
The regression had the following functional form:
∆log(Ci,t) = ηt + βu∆log(Yi,t) + νi,t (2.17)
where C stands for total consumption per capita, ηt are time dummies to extract the
aggregate shocks each period, and Y is Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP)
as a measure of output.
9Or for the sake of simplicity, in the case of perfect risk-sharing, any country part of the
aggregate area should have consumption correlation to an aggregate measure of consumption of
one.
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The risk-sharing test of Eq.(2.17) tests βu = 0 under the assumption of perfect
risk-sharing. This is true because perfect risk-sharing would render consumption
independent of idiosyncratic output movement. Asdrubali et al. (1996) proposed
that even if βu 6= 0 and the hypothesis of perfect risk sharing can be rejected, βu can
serve as an indication of the extent of risk-sharing. That is, 1−βu yields the amount
of the output shock being shared.10 Furthermore Asdrubali et al. (1996) (ASY) pro-
posed using an output variance decomposition (derived from an accounting identity)
to develop a framework for testing various channels through which risk-sharing can
take place. Therefore to some extent, they also proposed an approach for separating
risk-sharing from consumption smoothing. The ASY-method will be discussed in
greater detail later on, but one should be aware that the Classical method is nested
in the ASY-method in the sense that the estimations of unshared risk are equivalent
between the Classical and the ASY-method.
Various other formulations derived from Eq.(2.10) serve in the literature. A more
commonly used formulation of Eq.(2.10) is:11
∆(log(Ci,t)− log(Ct)) = βu∆(log(Yi,t)− log(Yt) + ∆(νi,t − νt) (2.18)
Where log(Ct), log(Yt) and νt are cross-sectional averages, used to demean the re-
spective variables and obtain idiosyncratic terms.
At this point it is necessary to discuss the concept and existence of two-way Fixed
Effects, time and cross-section fixed effects, in relation to the above panel estimation,
Eq.(2.18). If we start with the following estimation equation as the Data Generating
Process (DGP) precursor to Eq.(2.18), that is before first difference and demeaning
is applied:
log(Ci,t) = $ + log(Yi,t)βu + νi,t + ξi + ηt (2.19)
then the time fixed effect, ηt, exists as the aggregate area every year is subject to
a common (aggregate) shock. This is reflected in Eq.(2.10) as the rise (or fall) in
world output. These common shocks need to be filtered to obtain the idiosyncratic
shock and thus test for risk-sharing. In Eq.(2.18), time fixed-effects are extracted, by
demeaning using the weighted sum, where the weights are derived from the country’s
relative importance to the overall level of GDP each year. The Eq.(2.18) is equivalent
to Eq.(2.17) in that they filter out the common shock and apply first differences.
The difference only lies in how the filtering is achieved. While in Eq.(2.17) the
filtering is done through the use of time dummies, in Eq.(2.18) it is done through
cross-sectional demeaning.
10It follows that βu reflects the proportion of output shocks that are not shared.
11The equation has no constant as the constant drops out when taking first difference unless a
time trend is present. Thus, a constant is included in the estimations which in all cases, as should
be the case if no time trend is present, is not different from zero.
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Time dummies were originally used in the methods applied by Asdrubali et al.
(1996), as well as, Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991), and Townsend (1994). Martin and
Sachs (1991) proposed using cross-sectional demeaning, and this method is used by,
among others, Me´litz and Zumer (1999), Bayoumi and Masson (1995) and Becker
and Hoffmann (2006). The cross-section (panel) fixed-effect, ξi, on the other hand
are nested in the panel data due to countries having unique features that affect
consumption and are potentially correlated with output. If untreated, the panel
fixed-effects would cause endogeneity. Therefore these effects need to be extracted
to avoid bias issues. The extraction of the cross-section fixed effect is achieved,
through using first differences. As a result of filtering out the fixed effects, when
one estimates Eq.(2.18), one has to be aware of the serial correlation, introduced by
the first difference, and the contemporaneous correlation, introduced through the
cross-section demeaning, in the error variance-covariance structure.12
Nonetheless, independent of which formulation is chosen, be it Eq.(2.17) or
(2.18), 1− βu captures risk-sharing and consumption smoothing, aka the consump-
tion independence of idiosyncratic output shocks.
For the sake of clarity, the use of lower case letters from here onwards indicates
variables which have been demeaned using a weighted sum, with weights being
derived from a country’s contribution to the overall level of GDP.
2.3.1 ASY-method
Asdrubali et al. (1996) extended the framework of perfect risk-sharing testing. They
argue that the coefficient in a estimation of consumption on output also provides an
indication of the extent of risk-sharing in the absence of perfect risk-sharing. Addi-
tionally, Asdrubali et al. (1996) proposed a variance decomposition that allows for
testing risk-sharing taking place through several channels: insurance channels (also
referred to as income smoothing), consumption smoothing, and federal government
transfers. This is done by using an accounting identity. The original objective of
the Asdrubali et al. (1996) paper was to look at risk-sharing amongst US-sates. For
this purpose Asdrubali et al. (1996) proposed an accounting identity based on re-
gional risk-sharing. The accounting identity Eq.(2.20) is based on the international
risk-sharing application of Sørensen and Yosha (1998) and Me´litz and Zumer (1999)
and follows in principle Asdrubali et al. (1996) proposed regional risk-sharing ac-
counting identity and variance decomposition.13 Y is Gross Domestic Product, GNI
12Please see the appendix for a formal discussion on the topic of the presence of a two-way
fixed-effects model.
13Risk-sharing estimation approaches based on an accounting identity and variance decomposi-
tion are clustered into one category and are referred to as ASY-method – regardless whether it is
for international or regional risk-sharing estimation. This is due to Asdrubali et al. (1996) being
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is Gross National Income, GNDI is Gross National Disposable Income, HA is home
absorption, and C is total consumption.
Y ≡ Y
GNI
GNI
GNDI
GNDI
HA
HA
C
C (2.20)
What follows are the steps for obtaining the separation of risk-sharing into chan-
nels through the use of variance decomposition of output. The first step is to take
logs:
log(Y ) ≡[log(Y )− log(GNI)] + [log(GNI)− log(GNDI)]
+ [log(GNDI)− log(HA)] + [log(HA)− log(C)] + log(C) (2.21)
where the difference between Y and GNI is international net income, between GNI
and GNDI is international net transfers, between GNDI and HA is net exports
(effectively capturing international borrowing), and the difference between HA and
C is changes in domestic savings – but also includes among other factors, capital
depreciation.
The next step is to take first difference on both sides obtaining the change, or
rather shock, between periods for international net income, international transfers,
international borrowing transfers, and domestic savings. By multiplying both sides
by ∆log(Y ), subtracting the means on both sides and taking expectation, one ob-
tains the variance of ∆log(Y ) on the left hand side and the covariance terms on the
right hand side:
V ar(∆log(Y )) ≡Cov([∆log(Y )−∆log(GNI)],∆log(Y ))
+ Cov([∆log(GNI)−∆log(GNDI)],∆log(Y ))
+ Cov([∆log(GNDI)−∆log(HA)],∆log(Y ))
+ Cov([∆log(HA)−∆log(C)],∆log(Y ))
+ Cov(∆log(C),∆log(Y )) (2.22)
where the left hand side is the total variance of output and the right hand side
decomposes the variance of output based on the accounting identity. Effectively, the
right hand side measures the buffering of consumption against output fluctuation
through various factors, with the last term showing the extent to which there is a
lack of risk-sharing. That is, the last term shows the covariance of consumption
with output.
the first to propose such an approach to risk-sharing estimation.
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When one divides by the variance of V ar(∆log(Y )) on both sides, one obtains
the following accounting identity, which forms the core of the empirical application
of Asdrubali et al. (1996):
1 ≡ βk1 + βk2 + βc + βs + βu (2.23)
These βs are the proportional decomposition of output’s variance into covariances
with a variety of income sources and consumption. They in essence capture the
risk-sharing channels that buffer consumption against output fluctuations. βk1 cap-
tures the covariance of the international net income from abroad with output as a
proportion of the overall variance of output and signifies the ex-ante income insur-
ance channel. βk2 captures the covariance of international net transfers with output
and measures the international country equivalent of federal government transfer
payments.14 In this case, the international net transfers are, for the purpose of
risk-sharing analysis, countering output fluctuations. Thus the βk2 captures within
variation, that is variation over time, and it follows the methodology of Bayoumi
and Masson (1995) and Me´litz and Zumer (2002) for regional government transfers,
and the international application of Sørensen and Yosha (1998) for capturing the
stabilization effect.15 βc reflects the covariance of foreign borrowing and lending, or
the use of the trade balance, with output to buffer consumption. βs reflects the co-
variance of domestic savings behaviour with output capturing domestic movement in
savings to buffer consumption against idiosyncratic output shocks. The savings con-
sist of domestic savings and investment, including capital depreciation, by agents,
firms, and government. Finally, βu reflects the covariance of consumption and out-
put as a proportion of overall output variance and accounts for unshared risk. In
other words, βu, reflects the extent to which output are not shared, with all other
β’s being risk-sharing channels, measuring a variety of source of income that buffer
consumption from being affected by output fluctuations.
These risk-sharing channels are commonly estimated using the following mod-
els:16
∆log(yi,t)−∆log(gnii,t) = $k1 + βk1∆log(yi,t) + νk1i,t (2.24)
14Sørensen and Yosha (1998) denote βk2 as βτ .
15Hagen (1998) provides an overview of the empirical findings for the US-states when one does
not differentiate between stabilization of consumption and redistribution of income. The paper
concludes from various empirical findings that the US federal government uses the transfer amongst
state primarily for redistribution and to some extent consumption stabilization, so that when one
does not separate redistribution and stabilization, one obtains an over estimate of the transfer
channel as a risk-sharing channel. Additionally Hagen (1998) discusses the extent of symmetry in
the transmission effect of transfers between regions and the potential negative effect this can have
on the desirability of a fiscal transfer channel.
16For clarity, the nature of the error term has been kept simple here, and is extensively discussed
in the following chapters. The nature of the econometric approaches to estimating these models
and thus equations are also discussed later on.
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∆log(gnii,t)−∆log(gndii,t) = $k2 + βk2∆log(yi,t) + νk2i,t (2.25)
∆log(gndii,t)−∆log(hai,t) = $c + βc∆log(yi,t) + νci,t (2.26)
∆log(hai,t)−∆log(ci,t) = $s + βs∆log(yi,t) + νsi,t (2.27)
∆log(ci,t) = $u + βu∆log(yi,t) + ν
u
i,t (2.28)
To reiterate, the Classical framework of testing for risk-sharing is nested in the
ASY method. That is, the Classical Eq.(2.18) is the same as ASY’s unshared risk
channel estimation, Eq.(2.28), and in large use the same DGP process. This is
the reason why the ASY and the Classical approaches are considered together. In
essence, ASY further developed the Classical literature approach of testing for risk-
sharing to also incorporate the identification of how the risk-sharing is achieved.
2.3.2 Classical literature findings
Before proceeding with the presentation of the literature’s findings, it is worth high-
lighting again that the literature commonly assumes that output is exogenous. Al-
though some in the literature acknowledge that this assumptions might not hold,
see for example Sørensen and Yosha (1998) page 231, Qiao (2010) pages 9-10, Artis
and Hoffmann (2007a) pages 8-9, or Artis and Hoffmann (2008) page 453, this has
not been formally tested. This is an important assumption in that if it is not the
case, the resulting risk-sharing estimate would be biased due to simultaneity bias.
This output endogeneity is at the heart of this thesis and will be extensively dis-
cussed in the fourth and fifth chapters, including discussion of how risk-sharing can
be consistently estimated in the presence of output endogeneity. For the duration of
this and the following chapter, however, we will forgo further discussion of output
endogeneity and follow the literature in assuming that output is exogenous.
To enhance the exposition of the literature review, all results are shown in terms
of risk shared. This means that in the case of unshared risk parameter estimates
the linear transformation of subtracting the unshared risk coefficient from one is
applied; 1− βu. This is done so that all numbers shown are in terms of either total
risk-sharing achieved or risk-sharing achieved through specific channels. Nonethe-
less for completeness, where applicable the unshared risk estimates, standard errors,
and a 95% confidence interval are shown in parentheses after the results, e.g. 40%
risk-sharing (βu=0.6, S.E.=0.0503,[0.401, 0.598]). The standard errors and the con-
fidence intervals are shown to give the reader a sense of significance and precision
of estimates, although all referenced results are significant unless explicitly stated
otherwise. Moreover, as will become evident, most estimates are fairly precisely
estimated.
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In their paper, Asdrubali et al. (1996) find that the US-states shared on aver-
age a total of 75% (βu=0.25, S.E.=0.06, [0.132, 0.368]) of their idiosyncratic output
during 1963-1990, of which 39% (S.E.=0.03, [0.331, 0.449]) percent was through
cross-ownership of assets, 23% (S.E.=0.06, [0.112, 0.348]) through intertemporal
consumption smoothing, and 13% (S.E.=0.01, [0.110, 0.150]) through federal gov-
ernment transfer payments.17 However, these results have been criticized for over-
estimating the risk-sharing between US-States, since the estimated risk-sharing co-
efficients capture not only between-state, but also within-state shock smoothing,
and this is consumption smoothing, not risk-sharing. Still, the literature has widely
taken their findings as a benchmark by which to compare international risk-sharing
and risk-sharing among monetary union members. Me´litz and Zumer (1999) find
similar results, in terms of channel proportion to each other, for US-states between
1964-1990. Their results show an overall risk-sharing of 61% (βu=0.39, S.E.=-, [-
, -]),18 of which 34% (S.E.=0.013, [0.314, 0.366]) was through income smoothing,
18% (S.E.=0.014, [0.153, 0.207]) through intertemporal consumption smoothing,
and 10% (S.E.=0.006, [0.088, 0.112]) through federal government transfers.19 A
similar result of 11% (S.E.=0.006, [0.106, 0.130]) through the federal transfer chan-
nel was presented again in another later paper by Me´litz and Zumer (2002).
However, some of the problems with the optimistic results obtained by Asdrubali
et al. (1996) can be traced back to limited data available between US-states. Fortu-
nately, for international applications, the current account balances provide detailed
data for the application of the output variance decomposition used by Asdrubali
et al. (1996) for US-state risk-sharing.20
Such an international application has been provided by Sørensen and Yosha
(1998). They test for international risk sharing through: 1) net factor income flow,
2) capital depreciation (theoretically providing dis-smoothing), 3) net international
transfers, and 4) domestic consumption smoothing (through international borrow-
ing and domestic savings). Beside investigating general risk-sharing internationally,
17Me´litz and Zumer (2002) provide an overview of the empirical literature and the difference
in accounting used for estimating the federal transfer system within countries as a stabilization
tool for the US, Canada, France and the UK. They find when using the personal income approach
that the US government provided 20% (S.E.=0.012, [0.176, 0.224]) stabilization. When using the
gross product approach, which is similar to the approach of Asdrubali et al. (1996), they find that
the US federal government channels account for 11% (S.E.=0.006, [0.106, 0.130]). Hagen (1998)
provides an overview of the literature on fiscal transfer for US states and some other countries,
and concludes that the literature finds about 10% of federal transfers consumption stabilization
for US states.
18Note that hyphens in the S.E. and 95% CI indicate numbers that are not available because
either the authors did not provide them, or they are compound measurements.
19These results are from Table 1 column (4) on p.160 in Me´litz and Zumer (1999). Similar results
were found for Canadian regional risk-sharing.
20Since we are interested in international risk-sharing, that is risk-sharing across countries, a
deeper discussion of regional risk-sharing findings is omitted. What follows concentrates on risk-
sharing in an international context.
16
they also investigate in more detail the extent to which various components of do-
mestic consumption smoothing through domestic savings (private, corporate and
government savings) contribute to risk-sharing. This is done to shed light on insti-
tutional barriers. Such an institutional barrier could be a legislation that limits the
size of a deficit and thus limits the ability of government to use government deficits
for consumption smoothing, which in turn shift the burden from government sav-
ings to private or corporate savings. For corporate savings, consumption smoothing
is achieved by retaining dividend payments during booms and paying larger divi-
dend ratios during recessions. However, this pattern can be identified and offset by
shareholders through counter-movements in private savings.
Sørensen and Yosha (1998) find that for 27 OECD countries during 1966-1990,
35% of output shocks at one year difference are shared, more precisely between
1966-1980 34% (βu=0.66, S.E.=0.03, [0.601, 0.719]) of output shocks are shared
and 35% (βu=0.65, S.E.=0.04, [0.572, 0.728]) between 1981-1990, with both esti-
mates being significant and fairly precisely estimated. Of the risk-sharing about
half is achieved through government savings and half through corporate savings.
On the other hand, the net factor income flow channel does not contribute to risk-
sharing. This means that risk-sharing is almost exclusively achieved through do-
mestic consumption smoothing for OECD countries. However, from 1966-1980 the
EU-8 achieved 43% output shock smoothing (βu=0.57, S.E.=0.06, [0.451, 0.689])
almost exclusively through savings, while from 1980-1990 output shock buffering
dropped to about 22% (βu=0.78, S.E.=0.07, [0.640, 0.920]) as reflected by a drop
in the savings channel.21 As for the international transfer channel, during 1981-
1990 3% (S.E.=0.010, [0.010, 0.050]) to 7% (S.E.=0.03, [0.010, 0.130]) of output
shock was smoothed through international transfer flows amongst OECD and EU-8
countries, but during 1966-1980 the international transfer did not provide any sig-
nificant output buffering to consumption. On the other hand, when using 3 year
differences, only 25% (βu=0.75, s.e.=0.10, [0.554, 0.946]) of risk-sharing takes place
almost exclusively through government savings in OECD countries. Given the po-
tential existence of Ricardian equivalence, Sørensen and Yosha (1998) test for full
and immediate Ricardian equivalence and find no conclusive evidence for or against
the hypothesis.
Sørensen and Yosha (1998) take their findings as evidence that corporate sav-
ing does not provide long run smoothing, but governments provide short and long
run consumption smoothing. Subsequently, given the lack of evidence for Ricar-
dian equivalence, they argue for relaxing the Maastricht treaty to allow government
debt to accumulate. This would in turn allow for government savings to continue
21EU-8 includes to Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and
United Kingdom. Also commonly used through the thesis is the abbreviation EU-15 which refers
to the pre-2004 15 European Union members (excluding the EU enlargement countries).
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to provide consumption smoothing until such a time as when financial and capital
markets in the EU have developed and integrated to provide risk-sharing through
private consumer channels or until European institutions are in a position to provide
extensive risk-sharing through international transfers. Furthermore, they examine
consumption smoothing behavior through net exports (also referred to as interna-
tional borrowing) and domestic net physical investment (domestic savings), and find
that little private saving consumption smoothing is done through net exports, but
is instead mostly done through domestic investment. Finally, they look at the effect
of real exchange rate movement on risk sharing and consumption patterns, and find
that there is a relatively small effect on the cross-sectional consumption patterns,
since consumption has a relatively low elasticity response to PPP movements.
Arreaza et al. (1998), while finding similar results as Sørensen and Yosha (1998),
additionally look at the different government deficit aspects that contribute to do-
mestic consumption smoothing. They find that for EU-8 countries during 1971-1993,
13% (S.E.=0.020, [0.091, 0.169]) of consumption smoothing was through govern-
ment consumption, 18% (S.E.=0.020, [0.151, 0.229]) through government domestic
transfers, 5% (S.E.=0.01, [0.020, 0.060]) through government subsidies, and no con-
sumption smoothing occurred through taxes, that is the estimate is not significantly
different from zero. Similar results were found for OECD countries, with the ex-
ception that the taxes provided dis-smoothing, since they rose by less than output.
Additionally, Arreaza et al. (1998) investigate whether these government channels
provide equal or more smoothing for a negative or positive output shock. They
find that positive and negative shocks are equally shared in the OECD for all fiscal
factors. On the other hand, EU-8 domestic government transfers provide greater
smoothing during negative shocks, which potentially generate larger deficits in the
EU-8 since greater transfers are not easily reversed during booms. They interpret
this observation as a sign of a stronger commitment by the EU-8 to social insurance.
Arreaza et al. (1998) also investigate whether the level of deficit has an impact
on consumption smoothing ability. This investigation was prompted by the idea
that: i) if during a recession a country is generous with spending and low taxation,
it might find it hard to reverse its policy during a boom and will thus accrue a
large deficit and provide low consumption smoothing, ii) the country’s government
borrowing crowds out private borrowing, and iii) if a country has a large deficit,
it might find it hard to borrow. They find no evidence that large deficits have an
impact on smoothing through government saving or private saving channels.
Arreaza et al. (1998) also investigate whether smoothing through deficits differ
according to the type of fiscal budgetary institution that determines government fis-
cal policy. They find that delegation (e.g. a strong finance minister) and targeting
(successful agreement by coalition members on fiscal targets) have higher consump-
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tion smoothing via government consumption and government transfers, but lower
smoothing through government subsidies. They interpret these findings as “ev-
idence that effective budgetary institutions can accomplish efficient consumption
smoothing via government deficit spending and lower average deficits.” However,
these gains of consumption smoothing are to a certain extent offset by lower private
sector consumption smoothing.
Me´litz and Zumer (1999) find an overall risk-sharing of 20% (βu=0.8, S.E.=-,
[-, -]) for OECD countries and 23% (βu=0.77, S.E.=-, [-, -]) between 1960-1994 for
EU-15 countries. For OECD countries 5% (S.E.=0.005, [0.040, 0.060]) was through
income smoothing, while 14% was through consumption smoothing.22 For EU-15
countries, 8% (S.E.=0.017, [0.047, 0.113]) was through income smoothing and 15%
was through consumption smoothing.23
Asdrubali and Kim (2000) look at similar risk-sharing channels structure as
Sørensen and Yosha (1998), with the exception that Asdrubali and Kim (2000) do
not look at the capital depreciation effect. However unlike Sørensen and Yosha
(1998), Asdrubali and Kim (2000) look at the risk-sharing effects of nominal ex-
change rate and relative commodity prices. Their empirical investigation is done in
a structural panel VAR framework, which allows for feedback between output and
the risk-sharing channels. They find, for a sample of 23 OECD countries (and 15
EU-countries) that over the period 1960-1990 most risk-sharing took place through
domestic consumption smoothing (domestic saving/credit channel). Furthermore,
they find that real exchange rate, through nominal exchange rate and relative price
adjustment, has a negative smoothing effect, or at least does not affect risk-sharing.
From this negative risk-sharing effect they concluded that the Monetary Authority
of Euro-zone countries did not lose a tool (exchange rate control) for shock stabi-
lization when they formed the Euro-zone.24
Afonso and Furceri (2007) investigate risk-sharing in the EU-25 through net
factor income flows from abroad, depreciation of capital, international government
transfers, and foreign and domestic savings for the period 1980 to 2005. They
find that between 1980-2005, the EMU and EU-15 shared about 43% (βu=0.568,
S.E.=0.049, [0.473, 0.664]) and 39% (βu=0.611, S.E.=0.043, [0.526, 0.696]) of out-
put shocks. Most was through the savings channels, with 39% (S.E.=0.060, [0.272,
0.508]) for EMU and 37% (S.E.=0.053, [0.265, 0.472]) for EU-15, and a minor
22No standard error and confidence interval for consumption smoothing are shown as it is a
compound measure of two estimates, one of which is insignificant βc=0.01 (S.E.=0.007, [-0.003,
0.023]) and one of which is significant βk2=0.13 (S.E.=0.007, [0.115, 0.145])
23Again no standard error and confidence interval for consumption smoothing are shown as it
is a compound measure of two estimates, one of which is insignificant βc=0.02 (S.E.=0.028,[-
0.035;0.075]) and one of which is significant βk2=0.13 (S.E.=0.021, [0.089, 0.171])
24Asdrubali and Kim (2000) also look at regional risk-sharing in the United States. However,
these findings are not discussed here since this thesis is interested in international risk-sharing.
19
amount was through the international government transfer and income insurance
channels, while capital depreciation had a dis-smoothing effect. Risk-sharing in-
creases when they use the sample period from 1992 to 2005. For this period, risk-
sharing rose to about 50% for both EMU (βu=0.499, S.E.=0.047, [0.405, 0.593])
and EU-15 countries (βu=0.502, S.E.=0.046, [0.412, 0.592]) , with 7% (S.E.=0.029,
[0.009, 0.124]) risk-sharing for EMU and insignificant 5% (S.E.=0.026, [-0.002, 0.102])
risk-sharing for EU-15 countries achieved through income insurance and govern-
ment transfer channels. When narrowing the sample period to 1998-2005, risk shar-
ing droped to 37% for EMU (βu=0.6343, S.E.=0.056, [0.522, 0.747]) and EU-15
(βu=0.6272, S.E.=0.060, [0.508, 0.746]), with consumption smoothing accounting
for about 25% of it, and there was a significant rise in income insurance to 14%
(S.E.=0.048, [0.041, 0.232]) for EMU and 12% (S.E.=0.046, [0.027, 0.208]) for EU-
15. For the EU-25 between 1992-2005 and 1998-2005, Afonso and Furceri (2007)
find a significant and fairly precisely estimated 36% (βu=0.6397, S.E.=0.108, [0.427,
0.852]) and 31% (βu=0.6937, S.E.=0.044, [0.606, 0.781]) respectively for risk-sharing
of output shocks, with risk sharing taking place almost exclusively through consump-
tion smoothing.
Demyanyk et al. (2008) investigate risk-sharing among the Euro-zone countries
and the Accession countries for the periods 1995-1999 and 2000-2006. In particular,
they investigate the effect of diversified financial asset holdings on income insurance
channel and the banking consolidation on debt lending behavior. They find that
for Euro-zone countries during 1995-1999, the income insurance channel was not
significantly different from zero and that in 2000-2006, 15.7% (S.E.=0.078, [0.001,
0.313]) of shocks were smoothed through net factor income flows. For the larger
economies of the EU-15 countries, income insurance fell from 11.2% (S.E.=0.044,
[0.023, 0.201]) in 1995-1999 to 5.1% (S.E.=0.062, [-0.073, 0.175]) in 2000-2006, which
is not significantly different from zero. Demyanyk et al. (2008) believe that reces-
sions have caused this decline even though the underlying income smoothing has
increased. They see this increasing difference in income insurance between EU15
and Euro-zone countries as evidence that the EMU has increased risk sharing for
Euro-zone members through promoting financial integration. The Accession coun-
tries show a positive rise in income insurance risk-sharing from an insignificant 7.7%
(S.E.=0.053, [-0.031, 0.185]) in 1995-1999 to a significant 12.6% (S.E.=0.053, [0.019,
0.233]) in 2000-2006. They also found that overall risk-sharing has risen for the EMU
from 42.3% (βu=0.577, S.E.=0.106, [0.361, 0.793]) in 1995-1999 to 52.9% (βu=0.471,
S.E.=0.071, [0.329, 0.613]) in 2000-2006. For the EU-15 countries, risk-sharing fell
slightly from 40.5% (βu=0.595, S.E.=0.056, [0.482, 0.708]) in 1995-1999 to 38.6%
(βu=0.614, S.E.=0.053, [0.508, 0.720]) in 2000-2006. The Accession countries to-
tal risk-sharing of 25.1% (βu=0.749, S.E.=0.087, [0.571, 0.927]) in 1995-1999 fell
to 11.5% (βu=0.885, S.E.=0.064, [0.756, 1.014]) in 2000-2006. Given the drop, to-
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tal risk-sharing for Accession countries is lower than the income insurance channel.
They believe that this implies that some channels, namely savings, have a negative
impact on risk-sharing and cause dis-smoothing. Furthermore, they find that the
EMU and the EU have an increased international portfolio diversification, with an
increased holding of foreign assets, both of which are associated with increased in-
come smoothing. However, in regard to the effectiveness of investment into assets
and liabilities for providing risk sharing, they found that investing outside of the
EU provides more risk-sharing, potentially due to the returns on those assets being
more disassociated from EU output shocks.
For banking sector consolidation, Demyanyk et al. (2008) find no significant effect
of foreign banking consolidation for income smoothing or consumption smoothing.
Domestic banking consolidation has a positive impact of 10.9% (S.E.=0.046, [0.017,
0.201]) on income smoothing for EMU, 8.3% (S.E.=0.041, [0.001, 0.165]) for EU-15
countries, and 6.8% (S.E.=0.061, [-0.055, 0.191]) for Accession countries, but is only
significantly different from zero for EMU and EU-15 countries. Demyanyk et al.
(2008) conclude that EMU countries have experienced benefits from entering into
a monetary union and the subsequent financial integration, especially in regard to
risk-sharing through income smoothing.
Kose et al. (2009), using a sample of 69 countries over the period from 1969-
2004 and applying first difference estimation, do not find a substantial improvement
for risk sharing during the years of globalization (1984-2004) for the entire sample.
While industrial countries seem to have experienced a rise in risk sharing due to
a rise in financial openness/integration, developing and emerging countries did not
experience such an increase, despite increased financial integration. Kose et al.
(2009) propose that the difference in risk sharing effect during 1984-2004 can be
traced to the difference in the composition of financial flows. Risk-sharing increased
in industrial countries due to having FDI flows, (portfolio) equity stock, and some
debt stock. On the other hand, the emerging markets experienced lower risk sharing
due to their financial flow being until recently, mainly in debt stock.
Bai and Zhang (2012) find that, for a sample of 43 countries using first differ-
ences estimation, risk-sharing declined from a significant and fairly precisely esti-
mated 24% (βu=0.760, S.E.=0.030, [0.701, 0.819]) between 1970-1986 to a significant
and fairly precisely estimated 16% (βu=0.840, S.E.=0.020, [0.801, 0.879]) between
1987-2004. For a sample of 21 OECD countries, they find an insignificant increase
in risk-sharing from 38% (βu=0.620, S.E.=0.040, [0.542, 0.698]) between 1970-1986
to 40% (βu=0.600, S.E.=0.030, [0.541, 0.659]) between 1987-2004. Bai and Zhang
(2012) estimate international risk-sharing in the context of increased financial inte-
gration. They conclude that liberalized financial markets did not lead to increased
international risk-sharing as the finical market integration is limited by incomplete
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markets and as sovereign debt repayment cannot be perfectly enforced.
More recently, Balli and Pierucci (2015) investigate risk-sharing for OECD and
EMU countries over the period 1970-2010 using first differences.25 They find that
risk-sharing for OECD countries rose from a significant and fairly precisely esti-
mated 18% (βu=0.822, S.E.=0.033, [0.757, 0.886]) between 1970-1989 to a significant
and fairly precisely estimated 28% (βu=0.723, S.E.=0.030, [0.664, 0.782]) between
1990-2010, while risk-sharing for EMU countries declined from 31% (βu=0.688,
S.E.=0.058, [0.574, 0.802]) to 25% (βu=0.748, S.E.=0.056, [0.638, 0.858]).
26 Addi-
tionally, they also investigate the extent of risk-sharing driven by social and political
globalization effects and find that the social and political integration had a positive
effect for both OECD and EMU countries.
In short, the majority in the classical literature (including ASY variance decom-
position) has commonly found that risk-sharing is lower internationally than between
regions within countries and that international risk-sharing did not increase during
the early 1990s.27 Several theoretical reasons have been brought forward to explain
the difference between international and regional risk-sharing. One suggestion is
that consumption is subject to country specific shocks that are non-diversifiable due
to the consumption of non-traded goods. Other reasons that have been brought
forward include state-verification, moral hazard, and enforceability. These reasons,
affecting strictly ex-post channels, imply that it is hard to determine the kind and
the severity of a shock, and that once a positive shock occurs, countries might not
be willing to transfer funds abroad. The theoretical stipulations would explain the
lower international risk-sharing relative to regional risk-sharing. However, they do
not explain why the classical approach literature does not find increased risk-sharing
during the period of globalization. As found by Milesi-Ferretti and Lane (2003, 2005,
2006), this period saw an increase in cross-country trade in state contingent assets in
the form of higher international capital flows, and therefore a theoretical associated
rise in risk-sharing should have occurred.
25Balli and Pierucci (2015) also look at risk-sharing for low and middle income economies.
However, for brevity, we forgo to summarizing their findings for these two groups here.
26Balli and Pierucci (2015) findings are sensitive to the inclusion of the real exchange rate impact.
Again for brevity, Balli and Pierucci (2015) results as presented here are restricted to the findings
that exclude the real exchange rate effect, on the grounds that the sample seize is bigger when
excluding the real exchange rate effect.
27Nonetheless there is a minority which do find a rise in risk-sharing. For example Sørensen
et al. (2007) find a rise in risk-sharing in conjunction with a decline in home bias during the late
90’s for industrial countries. Kose et al. (2009) reinforce this finding as they find a similar results
for industrial countries, while failing to find similar improvement in risk-sharing for developing
countries. Additionally, Demyanyk et al. (2008) find tentative results that indicate that EMU
countries experienced a rise in income risk-sharing but a decline in consumption smoothing as a
result of the EMU-membership. Furthermore, Balli and Pierucci (2015) find rising risk-sharing for
OECD countries but not for EMU countries.
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2.4 The Level empirical framework literature
To overcome some of the above mentioned shortcomings, a different approach to the
Classical estimation method is becoming increasingly widespread in the literature.
This new approach proposes using the level of variables rather than first differences.
One of the first Level method estimation was by Becker and Hoffmann (2006)28
but Artis and Hoffmann (2007a,b, 2008) (AH) have done more to promote it. AH
propose to use this alternative method, the Level method, as they argue that inter-
national ex-ante risk-sharing via state contingent assets is in relation to long horizon,
or rather via trends in output such as permanent, or highly persistent output shocks.
Moreover, they argue that ex-ante risk-sharing has increased in the early 1990’s in
response to the rise in international state contingent asset trade, as was found by
Milesi-Ferretti and Lane (2003) in the late 1980’s, but that the Classical and ASY
approaches do not find a rise since they relate consumption to the elements of out-
put driven by business cycles, such as short run or transitory output shocks. These
shocks can be smoothed using ex-post channels such as borrowing and lending.29
Thus, AH advocate the estimation of risk-sharing using the level rather than first
difference of variables, as it provides an estimate of risk-sharing that captures the
long-run relationship between consumption and output, capturing the full extent of
international ex-ante risk-sharing that is derived from trade in international state
contingent assets.
In other words, while the level estimation is designed to investigate risk-sharing
of highly persistent to permanent shocks and therefore capture long run risk-sharing,
the Classical and ASY first differences approach investigates shocks without distin-
guishing between permanent or transitory, subsequently capturing the short run
risk-sharing aspect. AH demonstrate in one of their papers, that instead of using
levels of variables, a similar result can be achieved by applying trend filter to as-
28Theirs was an estimation of a structural VAR which allowed for differences and level estimation,
short run and long run estimation in one approach.
29More precisely, in Artis and Hoffmann (2008), AH set out that, as consumption is correlated
to permanent output movements, when estimating risk-sharing in first difference the correlation
of consumption to output might not show improvements in risk-sharing as volatility of transitory
versus permanent output shocks have fallen more dramatically. That is Artis and Hoffmann (2008)
on page 449 write “Specifically, we argue that [first difference] risk-sharing regressions have not
picked up the effect of financial globalization because the short term volatility of output growth
has dropped by more than has its long-term volatility[...]. Since, as we show consumption reacts
primarily to permanent changes in relative output, the volatility of relative consumption conditional
on current relative output growth has not decreased as financial globalization has progressed.”
supplemented by “We argue that this pattern of decline in volatility indicates a more gradual
adjustment of output to permanent idiosyncratic shocks: for a permanent shock of a given size,
output today reacts less strongly. Since consumption adjusts directly to the shock in permanent
income, it therefore appears more volatile in relation to current output.” on page 450. For a more
comprehensive derivation and explanation of the permanent versus transitory output impacts on
risk-sharing estimation please see Artis and Hoffmann (2008) pages 454-458.
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certain the same long run (permanent) consumption-output (income) relationship
estimation. But, as AH mention, the use of trend-filters to filter out the permanent
effect requires sufficient variation in the trend, as otherwise no within-group esti-
mates would be possible because of the lack of within variation, even if there was
enough variation across the cross-section.
The level estimation commonly rests on the following model:
log(ci,t) = $ + β
LR
u log(yi,t) + ν
LR
i,t (2.29)
Eq.(2.29) is similar to Eq.(2.19), differing in that no first differences is taken and νLRi,t
contain any short term dynamics of ci,t that are stationary and thus not correlated
with non-stationary yi,t.
30 The estimation of the Eq.(2.29) by AH is based on Kao
and Chiang (2001) (pooled) Dynamic OLS:
log(ci,t) = $ + β
LR
u log(yi,t) +
P∑
p=0
(
βp,1∆log(yi,t−p) + βp,0∆log(yi,t+p)
)
+ νLRi,t (2.30)
Eq.(2.30) is the same as (2.29) apart from the fact that (2.30) is enhanced with leads
and lags of first differenced log(yi,t). This is done to account for bias arising in finite
samples. That is, while an OLS estimation of Eq.(2.29) should asymptotically yield
superconsistent estimates of βLRu when output and consumption are non-stationary,
in a small sample, due to potential serial correlation between the log(yi,t) with
νLRi,t , estimation of β
LR
u can be biased. Leads and lags are included in Eq.(2.30) to
avoid this bias. The resulting estimate of βLRu should have an approximate normal
distribution and thus standard t-statics should be applicable as the associated t-
value should be asymptotically N(0, 1). The appropriate length of the included leads
and lags is determined by using information criteria such as Akaike’s or Schwarz’s
Bayesian information criteria.
2.4.1 Level literature findings
Artis and Hoffmann (2007a) find for 23 OECD countries between 1960 to 2004,
that long-term risk-sharing has increased from less than 10% to between 30% and
40% after 1990.31 This increase is associated with a particular growth in cross-
country asset holdings during the 1990s. Additionally they found that debt asset
30We leave for the fourth chapter the issue of unit-root and co-integration surrounding Eq.(2.29).
31The unshared risk coefficients and the associated standard errors, as well as the confidence
intervals can not be provided in a comprehensive and accessible manner due to the numbers
referring to several estimation shown by Artis and Hoffmann (2007a) in Table 1. Nonetheless,
the quoted result is based on Artis and Hoffmann (2007a) page 3 “[...] the fraction of long-
term idiosyncratic output risk that gets shared internationally by the average OECD country has
increased from less than 10 to more than 30 percent.”
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holdings have a positive impact on medium-run risk-sharing through consumption
smoothing, while cross-holdings of equity have a positive impact on medium-run
income smoothing.32
Artis and Hoffmann (2007b) find using level estimation that risk-sharing has in-
creased for 23 OECD countries, especially during the 1990s. Furthermore, the EMU
countries’ main driving force for the increased risk-sharing was insurance channels,
which has subsequently gained importance as a risk-sharing channel. During the
1990s the EMU had a 10% increase in risk sharing through the ex-ante channel. For
the remaining OECD countries, the main channels and driving force for improvement
was the ex-post channel of borrowing and lending.
Artis and Hoffmann (2008) take a different approach by applying a Beveridge-
Nelson-type decomposition to output, separating into permanent and transitory out-
put, and then running a standard FD estimation.33 They find that full risk-sharing
of transitory idiosyncratic output shock occurred amongst 22 OECD countries be-
tween 1960-2000. On the other hand, they find that risk-sharing for permanent
output shock was imperfect. However, risk sharing increased during the period of
globalization in the 1980s, and even more so during the period of increased gross
international asset positions in the 1990s, from about 30% (βLRu =0.7, S.E.=0.03,
[0.641, 0.759]) –which is significant and fairly precisely estimated, to 60% (βLRu =0.39,
S.E.=0.05, [0.291, 0.489]) –which is still significant but less precise, due to a rise in
risk-sharing for permanent idiosyncratic output shocks.
Leibrecht and Scharler (2008) use a different estimation approach than AH with
the same objective in mind. What they use is a one and two step error-correction
model, which allows them to quantify the risk-sharing in short and long run and
gives them the opportunity to obtain the speed of adjustment of short run risk-
sharing to the long run. In other words, if risk-sharing increases with time, the
speed of adjustment will indicate how long it will take to achieve the higher long
run risk-sharing.
Leibrecht and Scharler (2008) investigate the risk-sharing amongst 21 OECD
countries over the period of 1951 to 2000. The paper sets out to test the cointegration
between consumption and output. To this end both Leibrecht and Scharler (2008)
and Pierucci and Ventura (2009) take the existence of cointegration as evidence of
imperfect risk-sharing in the long run, for if there was perfect risk-sharing, then
idiosyncratic consumption and idiosyncratic output should not be cointegrated.
32AH make a finer point about when one explicitly includes country fixed effect when estimating
Eq.2.29 that it doesn’t reflect permanent shock risk-sharing and thus term such estimation as
medium term risk-sharing estimation. This concept of medium term is presented in the third
chapter.
33The Beveridge-Nelson-type filter is used instead of standard trend filters in order to obtain a
higher variation in the permanent component.
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Leibrecht and Scharler (2008) find that 30% (βu=0.71, S.E.=0.04, [0.632, 0.788])
of risk was shared in the short run, while only 10% (βLRu =0.91, S.E.=-, [-, -]) was
shared in the long run. Furthermore, they investigate whether risk sharing depends
on the extent to which there is international diversification represented by foreign
assets and liability position. On this point they find that countries with above av-
erage holdings of foreign assets and liability positions are less exposed to shock in
the short and long run. Specifically, they find that countries with greater diversi-
fied portfolios achieved both higher long run (34%, βLRu =0.66, S.E.=0.06, [0.542,
0.778]) and short run (46%, βu=0.54, S.E.=0.08, [0.383, 0.697]) risk-sharing, while
countries with below average portfolios had short run risk-sharing of 21% (βu=0.79,
S.E.=0.04, [0.712, 0.868]) and long run of 2% (βLRu =0.98, S.E.=0.04, [0.902, 1.058]).
Furthermore, the delay of consumption to idiosyncratic shock varies from 1.7 years
for a country with below average holdings of foreign assets and liability position to
5.7 years for above average countries, until the shock fully hits in terms of final stage
of consumption co-movement level. They interpret this result as evidence for the
lack of long run risk-sharing due to the binding constraint of ex-post consumption
smoothing channels and limited set of state-contingent assets available, which the
financial market can not readily provide.
In common with Leibrecht and Scharler (2008), Pierucci and Ventura (2009) use
a two-step Engle-Granger approach for 21 OECD countries between 1951 to 2000,
and find that the risk-sharing coefficient for long run (36%, βLRu =0.64, S.E.=0.06,
[0.522, 0.758]) and short run (36%, βu=0.64, S.E.=0.03, [0.581, 0.699]) were equiv-
alent. They also find that the adjustment coefficient of -0.04 (S.E.=0.01, [-0.060,
-0.020]), while being significant, is close to zero and ”...suggests that the short run
dynamics of idiosyncratic consumption are fairly independent of those of long run
idiosyncratic consumption”, (Pierucci and Ventura (2009), p.12). Overall, they find
that globalization did not increase risk-sharing in both the long run and short run,
since most risk-sharing improvement was achieved prior to the 1990s and actually
deteriorated some during the 1990s. In effect, these results are in contradiction with
AH. Furthermore, the Pierucci and Ventura (2009) finding that risk-sharing is the
same in the long run as in the short run is in contradiction with the Leibrecht and
Scharler (2008) findings.
Qiao (2010) looks at non-stationary panel estimation of risk-sharing for 26 OECD
and 22 emerging countries over the period 1950-2008.34 He finds that while over
the entire sample period nearly 14% of the long run risk is shared by both the
OECD countries (βLRu =0.88, S.E.=0.01, [0.861, 0.899]) and the emerging countries
34While Qiao (2010) follows the general Level-approach, the precise econometric framework is
based on Pedroni (2001)’s Group-mean DOLS, which is a minor deviation of the more general
pooled DOLS shown in Eq.(2.29). For an explanation of GDOLS and the difference between the
DOLS, as well as an application of GDOLS please see the third chapter.
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(βLRu =0.86, S.E.=0.01, [0.84, 0.880]), during the period of financial globalization
long run risk-sharing rises for the OECD countries to 34% (βLRu =0.66, S.E.=0.009,
[0.643, 0.677]) and for the emerging countries to 23% (βLRu =0.77, S.E.=0.009, [0.751,
0.789]).35 Furthermore, he finds that countries with higher financial flow also have
higher risk-sharing. However, the positive effect is decreasing with the amount of
financial flows.
More recently, Fuleky et al. (2015a) used Pesaran (2006) common correlated
effects mean group estimators to estimate short and long run risk-sharing for 158
countries over the period of 1970-2010.36 They find that for the entire sample the
short run risk-sharing with 29% (βu=0.71, S.E.=0.03, [0.651, 0.769]) was higher
than the long run risk-sharing with 17% (βLRu =0.83, S.E.=0.03, [0.651, 0.769]).
They find a similar disparity between short and long run risk-sharing for OECD
countries with 32% (βu=0.68, S.E.=0.04, [0.602, 0.758]) short run risk-sharing and
20% (βLRu =0.80, S.E.=0.05, [0.702, 0.898]) long run risk-sharing. Furthermore,
when applying the estimation to the sub-periods 1970-1989 and 1990-2010 they
do not find a significant rise in risk-sharing with short run risk-sharing for the
entire cross-section being 30% (βu=0.70, S.E.=0.03, [0.641, 0.759]) between 1970-
1989 and 32% (βu=0.68, S.E.=0.04, [0.602, 0.758]) between 1990-2010 and the the
long run risk-sharing being 18% (βLRu =0.82, S.E.=0.03, [0.761, 0.879]) and 15%
(βLRu =0.85, S.E.=0.04, [0.772, 0.928]). For the OECD sub-sample they find 32%
(βu=0.68, S.E.=0.02, [0.641, 0.719]) short run risk-sharing between 1970-1990 and
36% (βu=0.64, S.E.=0.02, [0.601, 0.679]) for 1990-2010 and long run risk-sharing be-
ing 20% (βLRu =0.8, S.E.=0.05, [0.702, 0.898]) in both sub-periods. Overall, Fuleky
et al. (2015a) estimates are significant and fairly precisely estimated.
2.5 Conclusion
In summary, risk-sharing is about consumption hedging against country specific id-
iosyncratic shocks such as output shocks. This is based on the theoretical model
presented in section (2.2) which in Eq.(2.10) shows that when perfect risk-sharing is
taking place, a country’s consumption growth is independent of idiosyncratic output
shocks and instead is identical to consumption in other countries, more specifically
it is correlated to the global output movement. This has spawned two empirical
methodologies to test risk-sharing: i) the first which tests consumption correlation
across countries and ii) the second that investigates the correlation of idiosyncratic
consumption with idiosyncratic output. It is this latter that this thesis is interested
35All four estimates are both significant and fairly precisely estimated.
36Common correlated effects and Pesaran (2006)’s common correlated effects mean group esti-
mators will be explained and discussed at length in the next chapter.
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in. It stipulates that if perfect risk-sharing was taking place, the correlation of id-
iosyncratic consumption with output would be zero. Moreover, if perfect risk-sharing
does not take place, a regression of idiosyncratic consumption on idiosyncratic out-
put should yield an unshared risk coefficient that if subtracted from 1 should provide
the extent to which risk-sharing is taking place.
To study the correlation of idiosyncratic consumption with output, two dis-
tinct empirical approaches have been developed in the literature; the Classical (and
ASY) approach and the Level approach. The former, the Classical approach, uses
the first difference estimation of idiosyncratic consumption and idiosyncratic out-
put to estimate unshared risk, while the latter, the Level approach, uses the level
of idiosyncratic consumption and idiosyncratic output in a regression, labeling the
results as medium or long run risk-sharing. The Classical approach literature com-
monly finds international risk-sharing amongst OECD countries to be around 30%
with estimates ranging from around 20% to 40% risk-sharing. Moreover, unshared
risk appears to be precisely estimated with a standard error commonly of around
0.03 to 0.04. This is prevalent when comparing estimates undertaken in chapter 4
which have much higher standard errors and thus wider confidence intervals.
Meanwhile, the Level approach literature finds OECD medium and long run
risk-sharing to be initially low with values of around 10% to 30%, rising to 20% to
60% post 1990.37 Again the estimates tend to be fairly precisely estimated with
most standard errors being between 0.03 to 0.04.
However, the empirical tests of risk-sharing as commonly employed in the litera-
ture, in particular for the Classical literature, rely on output being exogenous. And
while at times the exogeneity is discussed, it is commonly assumed, without for-
mal testing, that the assumption of output exogeneity holds. This is an important
assumption in that if it is not the case, the resulting risk-sharing estimate would
be biased due to simultaneity bias. This output endogeneity is at the heart of this
thesis and will be extensively discussed in Chapter 4 and 5, though for now we will
follow the literature in assuming that output is exogenous.
Thus, the literature applies two distinctly different approaches to estimating the
correlation between consumption and output: first difference and level estimation.
The literature finds a varying degree of risk-sharing taking place that ranges from
10% to 40% and tends to be precisely estimated. Moreover, the estimation of the
variance-covariance is commonly done to be robust to various forms of heteroskedas-
ticity and serial correlation. Nonetheless, the literature appears to forgo extensive
discussion or even testing of simultaneity bias, but rather assumes that all explana-
37The Level literature’s first difference risk-sharing estimates range from 30% to 40%, which is
similar to the Classical approach. That is the Level approach, akin to the Error Correction Model,
in some instances employs both first differences and levels of variables in an estimation.
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tory variables are exogenous. It is this lack of consideration and discussion of the
presence of exogeneity bias which is at the heart of this thesis, including suggestions
of how to robustly estimate risk-sharing in the presence of the output endogeneity.
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Chapter 3
Empirical applications of
risk-sharing estimation
methodologies
This chapter presents risk-sharing estimations based on the Classical and Level
approaches presented in the second chapter. The estimation results in this chapter
form the anchor to the literature and are the benchmark for the subsequent chapters.
That is, the results in this chapter show that the results in the literature can be
reproduced with the data set used in this and the following chapters. Therefore,
any difference in results in comparison to the literature in the subsequent chapters
are driven by the methods employed.
In addition to the standard Classical feasible GLS with AR(1) correction es-
timation a variety of other estimators are presented. These follow the Classical
principal of estimating first-differenced unshared-risk based on the models Eq.(2.18)
or Eq.(2.28), but they have varying small sample performance properties. Also, in
addition to the Classical first differences and Level estimation approaches, the Pe-
saran et al. (1997, 1999) Pooled Mean Group estimator is presented. This combines
the level and first differences methodology into an error correction model using coun-
try individual estimations that are averaged to provide a panel parameter estimate.
This is similar to the Pedroni (2001) Group-Mean Dynamic OLS estimation which
is also applied as part of the Level estimation.
Presenting the Pooled Mean Group estimator is part of a larger discussion tying
the risk-sharing literature to the common correlated effects literature.1 As discussed
below, although the risk-sharing literature implicitly corrects for common correlated
1See for example Pesaran et al. (1997, 1999), Pesaran (2006, 2015), or Pesaran and Tosetti
(2011).
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effects, it does so by imposing strong restrictions on the form the common correlated
effects take.
3.1 Data
The data used in the estimation is taken from OECD statistics and is for 24 OECD
countries over the period of 1970-2007.2 The data is deflated with 2000 as the base
year, is in per capita terms, and in US dollars using the 2000 market exchange
rate. This largely ignores the potential effect of the real exchange rate on risk-
sharing, which may be important. For example, both Sørensen and Yosha (1998)
and Hoffmann (2008) explore how real exchange rate movements provide some form
of risk-sharing. While Sørensen and Yosha (1998) find the real exchange rate to
have relatively little impact on risk-sharing, Hoffmann (2008) finds that exchange
rate movements provide extensive risk-sharing. Here we will follow most of the
literature and the results of Sørensen and Yosha (1998) in supposing that the real
exchange movements can be ignored.3
The period from 2008 onward is deliberately excluded so as to line up with the
majority of the time-horizons analyzed in the existing literature, against which this
chapter’s estimation results are compared. Also, the selected time horizon avoids
having to make an assumption on whether the financial crisis that started in 2008
was caused by a structural or temporal economic shock, something that is important
from a monetary policy perspective and thus for monetary union and risk-sharing.
The estimation is applied to the entire sample period as well as two sub-samples,
1970-1990 and 1991-2007. Amongst other reasons, the use of sub-periods is based on
the attempt to analyze the small sample performance of the estimators in estimating
risk-sharing. This is because the properties of some of the estimators lend themselves
to use with shorter time periods. It also enables us to investigate whether risk-
sharing expanded with the rise in global financial market integration and increased
trade of equity found in the late 80s early 90s. Finally, the selected sub-sample
periods follow commonly used sub-samples in the literature, allowing us to more
easily compare the estimations with the literature.
2The 24 OECD countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
3Please note that Sørensen et al. (2007) used PPP adjustment to account for the real exchange
rate effect on risk-sharing.
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3.2 Empirical applications of the Classical approach
The classical empirical framework follows the model of unshared risk as laid out
in Eq.(2.18) and Eq.(2.28). No attempt is made to estimate risk-sharing channels,
as the interest is limited to overall risk-sharing. Amongst other reasons, ignoring
the estimation of separate channels facilitates comparison of performance across
estimation methods in estimating risk-sharing, which is the underlying interest in
this and following chapters.
In the pursuit of estimating risk-sharing based on the Classical method, a variety
of estimators are employed. While they all differ in the approach to the variance-
covariance matrix, the estimators use the same risk-sharing estimation equation.
Driving the need for using a variety of econometric techniques is the presence of
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelated errors, and each estimator has its respective
strengths and weaknesses in correcting for the presence of both.4
Period OLS OLS(HAC) OLS(cluster) FGLS PCSE DK
1970 to 2007
βu 0.7369
∗∗∗ 0.7369∗∗∗ 0.7369∗∗∗ 0.7234∗∗∗ 0.7204∗∗∗ 0.7369∗∗∗
SE() (0.0212) (0.0335) (0.0620) (0.0110) (0.0293) (0.0312)
95% CI [0.695, 0.779] [0.671, 0.803] [0.609, 0.865] [0.702, 0.745] [0.663, 0.778] [0.674, 0.800]
R2 0.5762 0.5762 0.5762 – 0.5552 0.576
1970 to 1990
βu 0.7291
∗∗∗ 0.7291∗∗∗ 0.7291∗∗∗ 0.7030∗∗∗ 0.7080∗∗∗ 0.7291∗∗∗
SE() (0.0295) (0.0391) (0.0745) (0.0058) (0.0395) (0.0450)
95% CI [0.671, 0.787] [0.652, 0.806] [0.575, 0.883] [0.692, 0.714] [0.631, 0.785] [0.635, 0.823]
R2 0.5604 0.5604 0.5604 – 0.5365 0.5604
1991 to 2007
βu 0.7665
∗∗∗ 0.7665∗∗∗ 0.7665∗∗∗ 0.7656∗∗∗ 0.7722∗∗∗ 0.7665∗∗∗
SE() (0.0302) (0.0629) (0.0911) (0.0115) (0.0449) (0.0342)
95% CI [0.707, 0.826] [0.643, 0.890] [0.578, 0.955] [0.743, 0.788] [0.684, 0.860] [0.694, 0.839]
R2 0.6140 0.6140 0.6140 – 0.6235 0.6140
Significance levels: ∗ denotes 10%, ∗∗ 5%, and ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%. Please note that no R2 is reported for
GLS due to the nature that R2 for GLS is not bound between zero and one and that the R2 for
GLS would not reflect solely the explained total sum of squared. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses in rows labeled as SE() and 95% confidence intervals are shown in square brackets in
rows labeled as 95% CI.
Table 3.1: FD unshared risk parameter estimates.
The first estimator in Table (3.1) is a standard OLS estimation with no adjust-
ment for heteroskedasticity or serial correlation.5 The second is an OLS estimation
4The various estimators do not correct or even consider the possibility of endogeneity. The
topic of risk-sharing and endogeneity is at the heart of the fourth and fifth chapters.
5Using the White, Durbin-Watson and the Breusch-Godfrey LM tests, it was found that het-
eroskedasticity and serial correlation are present. However, the validity of the tests hinges on
output being exogenous, something that is extensively discussed in the next chapter.
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with standard errors corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
using a Bartlet kernel with a bandwidth of 2. The third estimator is a cluster-robust
OLS estimation, with the clusters being countries and assumed to be independent
across clusters. To account for contemporaneous cross-cluster correlation, the Parks
(1967) FGLS cluster robust estimation (also referred to as the Parks method), Beck
and Katz (1995) Panel-Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE), and Driscoll and Kraay
(1998) standard errors correction (DK) are in columns four, five and six respectively.
Beck and Katz (1995) argue that the PCSE is better than FGLS for hypothesis tests,
as FGLS standard errors are too optimistic. Furthermore, Beck and Katz (1995)
point out that the FGLS estimator requires the time dimension of the data to be
relatively large compared to the cross-section, which is hardly the case in the annual
macro-economic data used in the risk-sharing literature, and indeed is not the case
for the data set employed here. Additionally, Beck and Katz (1995) show that the
PCSE, which relies on large T-asymptotics, has good finite-sample performance.
However, the PCSE small sample performance, as argued by Hoechle (2007), de-
clines when the cross-section (N) becomes large relative to the time dimension (T),
or rather, when the division of the time dimension by cross-section becomes small
( T
N
). The Driscoll and Kraay (1998) method on the other hand does not suffer from
the negative effect of a relatively large N compared to T, as the consistency does not
rely on large N, but rather on large T-asymptotics. Furthermore, Driscoll and Kraay
(1998) allow for errors that are heteroskedastic, autocorrelated, and correlated be-
tween cross-sections up to some specified lag – in our case three. Hoechle (2007)
and Driscoll and Kraay (1998) show that when one ignores the existence of cross-
sectional dependence in the error term it can lead to a severe bias in the standard
error estimates. Furthermore, they find that the DK standard errors outperforms
various alternatives, even though to some extent it is biased as well. These different
methods are different ways of calculating standard errors under different assump-
tions and reflect advances in econometric techniques that go beyond, for example,
the Asdrubali et al. (1996) application of feasible GLS with an AR(1) correction.
Table (3.1) shows the unshared risk estimation results obtained from the various
estimation methods. The DGP behind the regression model shown in Table (3.1)
is still given by Eq.(2.19) and (2.28). The first column is the standard OLS esti-
mation with no adjustment for heteroskedasticity or serial correlation, the second
column shows the OLS estimation with standard errors corrected for arbitrary het-
eroskedasticity and serial correlation, the third column contains the cluster-robust
OLS estimation where clusters are defined as the cross-sections with the assump-
tion of independent clusters, the fourth column shows FGLS cluster-robust estima-
tion, column five shows the Beck and Katz (1995) Panel-Corrected Standard Errors
(PSCE), and column six shows the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors cor-
rection (DK).
33
The estimates in Table (3.1) are in line with what is generally found in the
literature, which is about 27% risk-sharing in the OECD. Moreover, all estimates are
significant; more precisely they are significantly different from zero at 1% significance
level, which is in line with the literature and suggests that no perfect risk-sharing
is taking place. Also, the estimates are fairly precisely estimated with estimated
standard errors of similar magnitude as those found in the literature. Furthermore,
while the point estimates show that risk-sharing has dropped, the 95% confidence
intervals allow for the possibility that risk-sharing has stayed the same between 1970-
1990 and 1991-2007 which is also in line with the general findings of the literature.6
To this extent, one can see that when using a different data set the general findings
of the literature can be reproduced. Therefore we can conclude that any different
results in the analysis of the subsequent chapters based on the same data are not
driven by the particular data set but derived from approaches that are employed.
3.3 Empirical application of the Level approach
The empirical framework for the Level approach is laid out in Eq.(2.29), which
differs from Eq.(2.18) in that the levels rather than first differences of consumption
and output are used.
Before proceeding to the presentation of the Level application it is important
to highlight, as briefly observed in the second chapter, that the Level estimation is
inherently analyzing a different shock structure than the Classical approach. The
Level estimation is predominantly used to investigate risk-sharing of permanent
or highly persistent shocks. The focus of the Classical approach is on transitory
shocks and their impact on risk-sharing. The ASY approach has been used to
investigate persistent shocks by expanding the difference interval. Asdrubali et al.
(1996) looked at US-state risk-sharing over larger differences, Sørensen and Yosha
(1998) looked at international risk sharing over a differencing span of three years,
while Arreaza et al. (1998) looked at the impact of different fiscal components on
domestic risk sharing, also over a differencing span of three years. Finally, Me´litz and
Zumer (1999) investigated the effect of persistent shocks on risk-sharing by using the
Campbell-Mankiw persistence index. Nonetheless, although the permanent output
shocks are considered in the Classical literature, by filtering them out using first
differences they are treated in the same way as a transitory shocks. So if one wants
to estimate the effect of persistent or permanent shocks the level estimation should
be used, while if one is interested in transitory shocks or believes relatively few
6As suggested, the reason for the conclusion of no fall in risk-sharing comes from the 95%
confidence intervals around the 1991-2007 estimates overlapping with the 95% confidence interval
around the 1970-1990 estimates.
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permanent shocks occur, then the classical approach should be used.7
Also, two different applications of Level estimation with different interpretations
exists. The difference is based on the treatment of the country-specific effects that
are no longer automatically filtered out when applying first differences. This is part
of the larger discussion on the estimation of channels through which risk-sharing
can take place in connection with permanent and transitory output shocks. That
is, permanent shocks can only be risk-shared using an ex-ante insurance channel
(diversification channel), as borrowing is not well adapted in response to offset the
permanent shock. On the other hand, transitory shocks can be shared through di-
versification channels or consumption smoothing channels.8 In light of the exclusive
use of insurance for risk-sharing of permanent output shocks, AH argue that the in-
terpretation of the risk-sharing parameters depends on whether country-fixed effects
are explicitly estimated or not. More precisely, AH argue that the estimation which
explicitly includes country fixed effects allows risk-sharing through non-net factor
income from abroad and thus does not exclusively reflect risk-sharing against per-
manent output shocks. On the other hand, AH argue that the estimation excluding
country fixed effects solely captures the risk-sharing through net factor income from
abroad and thus capture the long run risk-sharing of permanent output. Therefore,
AH term the Level estimation which includes country fixed effects as ‘medium run’
and the estimation without cross-section fixed effect as ‘long run’.
The table (3.2) shows the estimation of unshared output shocks for the period
1970-2007 in the first row, 1970-1990 in the second and 1991-2007 in the third.
Meanwhile, the first column shows the estimation with country fixed effects, that
is, the medium run risk-sharing, while second column shows the risk-sharing esti-
mation without country fixed effects, that is, the long run risk-sharing estimates.
All estimates in Table (3.2) are significantly different from zero at a 1% significance
level. Moreover, the estimates are fairly precisely estimated with consequently fairly
tight confidence intervals. Also, standard errors are in line with the literature which
has an average standard error for the level estimate of around 0.03 (ranging from
approximately 0.008 to 0.06). Given the estimates in Table (3.2), it becomes ap-
parent that when looking at the long run that risk sharing between 1970-1990 and
1991-2007 remained essentially zero. On the other hand, though not shown in this
table, the inclusion of a time-trend did lead to an increase in risk-sharing from 4%
(or 96% unshared) in 1970-1990 to 5% (or 95% unshared) in 1991-2007. However,
when looking at the medium run risk-sharing results, an increase in risk-sharing
occurs from about 20% in 1970-1990 to 37% in 1991-2007, which is an increase in
7When pursuing the empirical investigation in respect to an Optimal Currency Area on the
basis of risk-sharing, one should consider more transitory shocks since monetary policy is primarily
applicable as a smoothing tool for temporary shocks.
8This is supported by Me´litz and Zumer (1999)’s finding that for US-States, the more persistent
a shock is, the more income smoothing rises relative to consumption smoothing.
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medium run long run
1970 till 2007
βLRu 0.8017
∗∗∗ 0.9774∗∗∗
SE() (0.0121) (0.0029)
95% CI [0.7779, 0.8255] [0.9717, 0.9831]
1970 till 1990
βLRu 0.8061
∗∗∗ 0.9720∗∗∗
SE() (0.067) (0.0032)
95% CI [0.7928, 0.8193] [0.9657, 0.9784]
1991 till 2007
βLRu 0.6304
∗∗∗ 1.0007∗∗∗
SE() (.0114) (0.0049)
95% CI [0.6082, 0.6527] [0.9911, 1.010]
Dummy estimation
βLRu,D1 0.7916
∗∗∗ 0.9559∗∗∗
SE() (0.0137) (0.0038)
95% CI [0.7648, 0.8185] [0.9485, 0.9634]
βLRu,D2 -0.1212
∗∗∗ -0.0068∗∗∗
SE() (0.0240) (0.0025)
95% CI [-0.1683, -0.0742] [-0.0117, -0.0018]
Significance levels: ∗ denotes 10%, ∗∗ 5%, and ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses and 95% confidence intervals in square brackets.
Table 3.2: Level unshared risk parameter estimates.
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risk-sharing of 17 percentage points.9
The significance of the expansion in the medium run risk-sharing was tested
using an enhanced version of Eq.(2.29) applied to the entire sample:
log(ci,t) = $ + β
LR
u,D1log(yi,t) + β
LR
u,D2Dlog(yi,t) + ξi + νi,t (3.1)
where Dlog(yi,t) is an interactive dummy term with D being equal to 0 prior to
and including 1990 and 1 thereafter. The rise in risk-sharing is significant if βLRu,D2
is found to be different from 0 and if βLRu,D2 < 0, with the null hypothesis being
H0 : β
LR
u,D2 = 0 versus the alternative that HA : β
LR
u,D2 6= 0. Eq. (3.1) allows for
differing unshared risk coefficients between the two periods, as is the case in the
unshared risk estimations of two separate sub-periods 1970-1990 and 1991-2007 in
Table (3.2). However, unlike the separate sub-period estimations shown in Table
(3.2) as 1970-1990 and 1991-2007, Eq. (3.1) does account for the joint distribution of
βLRu,D1log(yi,t) and β
LR
u,D2Dlog(yi,t) when estimating the variance-covariance estimation
of the error matrix.10 Nonetheless, since we are primarily interested in testing
H0 : β
LR
u,D2 = 0, the restriction on the error variance is of no direct concern. Also,
if the level of consumption and output in Eq. (3.1) are non-stationary the mean
of the error in Eq. (3.1) is not constant and thus the significance test is invalid.
Whether consumption and output are non-stationary is extensively discussed in the
following chapter as part of the discussion around endogeneity bias. Assuming that
consumption and output are stationary, Table (3.2) presents, in the last row, the
coefficient, standard error, and 95% confidence interval for both βLRu,D1 and β
LR
u,D2.
The H0 : β
LR
u,D2 = 0 is rejected for a two-sided t-test with 5% significance level,
with a p-value of 0.000 in both the long and medium run estimation. Thus it can be
concluded that the rise in medium-run risk-sharing, assuming that consumption and
output are stationary, is found to be both economically significant and significantly
different from zero.
One of the reasons why there seems to be a increase in the risk-sharing could
be that the estimation with country fixed effects, allows for country specific risk-
sharing. For example, the risk-sharing through state contingent asset portfolios
becomes dependent on country-specific factors such as the extent of diversification.
An additional reason for the medium-run rise in risk-sharing, as argued by AH,
9The estimation with country FE used country-specific dummies, ξi, to capture the country
FE, that is ci,t − ct = βu(yi,t − yt) + ξi where ct is the aggregate shock in each period (filtering
out the time FE). However, an equivalent but alternative method, which is computationally not
as heavy in the use of parameters, is to demean with average time effect and average cross-section
effect, so that ci,t − ci − ct + c = βu(yi,t − yi − yt + y). For a more detailed explanation please see
Smith and Fuertes (2010) page 16.
10Since the estimation of Eq. (3.1) is done using cluster robust standard errors the variance-
covariance matrix does not require the errors to be homoskedastic. If, however, the estimation
were done using simple OLS the untested assumption of homoskedasticity would be imposed.
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could be that the estimation captures country specific consumption smoothing on
top of long-run risk-sharing. These conclusions are drawn from contrasting the
results of the estimations with and without explicit modeling of country fixed effects.
When combining these two arguments it can be postulated that the risk-sharing of
permanent shocks through the holding of the common, or rather average, state
contingent assets portfolio is low and shows little improvement when compared to
country-specific risk-sharing or consumption smoothing.11 It should be mentioned
that consumption-smoothing is more important in the medium run while portfolio
diversification remains the same, depends on making the assumption that permanent
and transitory shocks are of similar structure, or that the way permanent shocks
and transitory shocks are risk-shared through state contingent assets is the same.
However, these assumptions need not hold, in which case the difference in the extent
of risk-sharing between the medium run and long run can be explained by transitory
shocks being more efficiently risk-shared through state contingent assets (insurance)
than permanent shocks, without implying that consumption smoothing takes place.
In short, the difference found between medium- and long-run risk-sharing esti-
mates can be driven by: i) country specific consumption smoothing, which provide
substantial risk-sharing for transitory shock in the medium run, or ii) the way that a
portfolio of state contingent assets (insurance) provides risk-sharing differs between
permanent and less permanent output, or iii) countries are widely dispersed in terms
of the extent of risk-sharing gained through diverse state contingent asset portfolios.
Regardless of what drives the difference between medium- and long-run risk-
sharing, the extent of risk-sharing and the fact that it is rising in the medium run,
while being in line with the Level literature, is in contradiction to the Classical
literature.
3.3.1 Group mean dynamic OLS estimation
An alternative approach to the pooled Dynamic OLS (DOLS) of Eq.(2.29) used by
Artis and Hoffmann (2007a,b, 2008) to estimate the Level approach is the proce-
dure proposed by Pedroni (2001) (Group-mean DOLS or short GDOLS) used in
the risk-sharing estimation by Qiao (2010).12 Whereas AH apply (pooled) DOLS,
which does not explicitly account for a country’s individual risk-sharing parameter,
the Group-mean DOLS is an estimator which allows for a country individual risk-
11This would indicate either that consumption smoothing is highly important relative to the
state contingent assets risk-sharing factor, which is in line with Classical literature findings when
using the ASY decomposition, or that countries vary in the extent of risk-sharing gained through
state contingent asset risk-sharing factor as mentioned above.
12An application of Pedroni (2001) GDOLS procedure beyond risk-sharing can be found in Chong
et al. (2010) and Carlson et al. (2008).
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sharing parameter.13 However, assuming similar risk-sharing amongst the countries
in the sample, the DOLS risk-sharing parameter is the average of the time series pa-
rameters for individual countries and therefore should be similar to the Group-mean
counterpart.
The Pedroni (2001) GDOLS estimator is presented in addition to the pooled
DOLS estimator, as it allows for heterogeneous co-integrating relationships by es-
timating the co-integrating relationship separately for each country and averaging
the coefficients and standard errors in order to obtain a mean estimate.14 Implicitly,
the GDOLS includes country-specific fixed effects since each country’s estimation
includes a constant that should capture the country-specific effect of a pooled DOLS
estimation and thus according to Artis and Hoffmann (2007a,b, 2008) is more akin
to medium-run risk-sharing.15
Variable 1970-2007 1970-1990 1991-2007
βu 0.9988 1.0241 0.5607
SE() (0.1161) (0.1912) (0.2207)
95% CI [0.7712, 1.2264] [0.6492, 1.3989] [0.1860, 0.5955]
Significance levels: ∗ denotes 10%, ∗∗ 5%, and ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses and 95% confidence intervals using the mean estimates and standard errors are
shown in square brackets.
Table 3.3: GDOLS mean unshared risk parameter estimates.
Table (3.3) shows the mean parameter estimates of the country’s individual esti-
mates of unshared risk. Besides having a higher value in 1970-2007 and 1970-1990,
the GDOLS estimates show a similar result as the medium run estimation in Table
(3.2); risk-sharing was relatively low in 1970-2007, but a large rise in risk-sharing
occurred in 1991-2007. Moreover, estimates are less precisely estimated as standard
errors are considerably larger leading to wider 95% confidence intervals. Nonethe-
less, all estimates in Table (3.3) are significantly different from zero.
13An alternative estimation method to the DOLS is the Fully Modified OLS, originally proposes
by Phillips and Hansen (1990), which (panel) Groups-mean counter part (GFMOLS) was proposed
by Pedroni (2000).
14The parameters, as well as, variance-covariance matrix of each country’s individuals estimations
are T consistent. However, the averaged estimate of the joint risk-sharing parameter and variance-
covariance matrix are N consistent. See Pedroni (2001) and Qiao (2010) for a more detailed
explanation of the asymptotic properties and consistency of the estimator.
15For completeness, each country’s individual parameter estimates, which are used in the GDOLS
to construct the mean panel estimates, can be found in Table (C.1) in the appendix (C.1).
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3.4 Heterogeneous slope and spatial common cor-
related effects.
Two aspects which the risk-sharing literature has not explicitly considered, apart
from Fuleky et al. (2015a), are heterogeneous slopes and (spatial) common correlated
effects (CCE). Let us enhance Eq.(2.19) to the following form:16
Ci,t = βiYi,t + %i,t + ξi (3.2)
where %i,t = γift + νi,t. νi,t is equivalent to the error in Eq.(2.19) and is assumed to
be ∼ i.i.d. (0, V (νi,t)). Eq.(3.2) raises two issues that are largely ignored in the risk-
sharing literature: heterogeneous slopes, βu,i = β + κi, and common (cross-section)
correlated effects, γift. γift is a more flexible version of the ηt in Eq.(2.18) and
(2.19). The structure of the common correlated effects as presented in Eq.(3.2) is
based on Pesaran (2006).
The risk-sharing literature, driven by the desire to test idiosyncratic consump-
tion’s relation with idiosyncratic output, implicitly corrects for CCE.17 However,
unlike the CCE literature, the risk-sharing literature imposes a variety of restriction
on the structure the CCE takes.18 These restrictions arise because of the way the
risk-sharing literature corrects for the common shocks to get an estimation of the
correlation between idiosyncratic consumption and output. The risk-sharing liter-
ature defines the common shock as the shock experienced by all countries in the
sample if every country had a perfect portfolio of state contingent assets, i.e. the
aggregate shock experienced by all country in the sample if perfect risk-sharing is
taking place.
For one, the risk-sharing literature imposes the restriction that there are no
heterogeneous slopes, βu,i = βu = βu,j. Also, by the virtue of how the risk-sharing
literature demeans consumption and output, a certain structure is imposed on the
term γift. Following the CCE literature, ft is defined as:
ft = [C¯t, Y¯t] (3.3)
16For clarity the log notation has been dropped, with all variables, unless stated otherwise, being
in logs. Also, as in the previous chapters, lower case letters indicates variables which have been
demeaned using weighted average.
17GDOLS as presented above should also be robust in the presence of heterogeneous panel as the
GDOLS is the mean of country individual estimations which allow for country individual slopes.
18For the interested reader, the following is a non-exhaustively list of papers of the CCE liter-
ature: Pesaran (2006, 2015), Pesaran and Tosetti (2011), Chudik et al. (2011), and Bailey et al.
(2012).
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The CCE literature defines the weighted mean of consumption and production as:
C¯t =
n∑
i=1
wiCi,t (3.4)
and
Y¯t =
n∑
i=1
wiYi,t (3.5)
where the CCE literature requires several conditions for the weights, wi, to be valid,
including that
∑N
i=1wi = 1. In addition, the CCE literature has been defined for
use with constant weighting matrix. However, the risk-sharing literature differs to
the CCE literature by using time varying weights that reflect the relative economic
size (in effect, the economic distance from each other) in each period:
wi,t =
Yi,t∑N
i=1 Yi,t
(3.6)
It is important to note that the time-varying nature of the weighting matrix, as
used in the risk-sharing literature, does not make the weighting matrix invalid. For
example, by design, the risk-sharing literature employs weights that in each period
adds to 1. Moreover, the variance of the weights for country i over time is fairly low
making it in a practical sense similar to a time-invariant weight. Driving the choice
of the weights in the risk-sharing literature is the desire to filter out the common
effect of holding a perfectly balanced portfolio of state contingent assets against
which further risk-sharing is not possible. This state contingent portfolio is subject
to the relative economic size of a country to the aggregate. However, given that the
weights are output, if output is endogenous, which is at the heart of the next two
chapters, then the instruments are invalid.
The risk-sharing literature also assumes that the CCE parameter is symmetric
across the cross-section, i.e. γi = γ = γj. Moreover, since the risk-sharing literature
subtracts the C¯t on the LHS sides from Eq.(3.2) to get idiosyncratic consumption
and subtracts Y¯t on the RHS to get idiosyncratic output, γi is assumed by the
risk-sharing literature to have the following structure:
γ = [1,−β]′ (3.7)
Putting this all back into Eq.(3.2) it becomes:
Ci,t = βYi,t + C¯t − βY¯t + νi,t + ξi (3.8)
which is equivalent to Eq.(2.18), the traditional risk-sharing estimation equation,
and is the same as a CCE structure with restrictions. In essence the C¯t and Y¯t
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are the common shocks which the risk-sharing literature would like to extract so as
to be able to test the remaining idiosyncratic consumption and output correlation.
That is, if perfect risk-sharing existed, there would be no remaining idiosyncratic
consumption movement and the correlation between idiosyncratic consumption and
output, as captured by βu, would be zero.
To summarize, the risk-sharing literature applies a CCE structure with strong
restrictions on the weighting matrix and on the CCE coefficients. Imposing these
restrictions, if false, could lead to the risk-sharing application estimating parameters
inconsistently when compared to a CCE estimation with no restriction.
We are able to test whether there is strong spatial dependence caused by CCE is
present or even if the risk-sharing imposed CCE structure is correct, using the Pe-
saran (2015) Cross-section Dependence test (CD).19 In its most basic interpretation
the CD test tests the null hypothesis of weak (spatial) dependence versus the alter-
native that there is strong spatial dependence caused by common correlated effects
(latent factors). More precisely, under the assumption that the cross-section and
time dimension (N and T) increase to infinity at the same rate, the null hypothesis
interpretation is that the most spatially correlated cross-section has no more than
a certain degree of cross-sectional dependence; specifically, pair-wise cross-sectional
correlations are less than 1
4
. However, it has been argued, amongst others by Pe-
saran, that this limit could be extended to 1
2
as the bias disappears with expanding
sample at the rate of N.20
Table (3.4) below, shows the p-value for the CD test employed for three models:
the first is a simple mean group estimation that does not correct for spatial common
correlated effects (MG), the second is a standard risk-sharing estimation that im-
plicitly corrects for restricted spatial common correlated effects (RS), and the last is
a standard CCE estimation which does not impose a structure on the spatial CCE.
The MG estimation is based on the Pesaran and Smith (1995) MG estimator and is
given by the following Eq.:
∆Ci,t = βi∆Yi,t + ∆νi,t (3.9)
The risk-sharing estimation with the restricted CCE in Table (3.4) is based on
Eq.(3.11) in first difference. Finally, the unrestricted CCE estimation follows the
Pesaran (2006) CCE estimation and is given by :
∆Ci,t = βi∆Yi,t + γ
c
i∆C¯t + γ
y
i ∆Y¯t + ∆νi,t (3.10)
19De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006) have a brief exposition of the CD test and related tests of
cross-section effects.
20See for example Bailey et al. (2012) and Pesaran (2015), p. 1091, pp. 1195-1104.
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with no restriction on γci and γ
y
i and with the weights being the average calculated
relative GDP share of of the aggregate output over the entire period, i.e. time-
invariant weights.
p-values MG RS CCE
2.776e-15 0 .96179298
Table 3.4: Pesaran (2015) CD test
In the case of the MG estimation in Table (3.4), the null hypothesis is rejected,
suggesting that there is at least one cross-section pair with strong spatial correlation.
This is not surprising if any risk-sharing takes place. However, in the case of the
RS estimation the null is rejected too; this means the model is misspecified, and
as a result does not filter out all common correlated effects. This appears to be
confirmed when looking at the last estimation, the unrestricted CCE estimation,
where the null of weak dependence is not rejected. Combining the CD test results
for the ME, the RS and the CCE estimations, one interpretation is that risk-sharing
does take place but it is not perfect risk-sharing, which the standard RS estimation
corrects for. This could, for example, be that the risk-sharing taking place is not
based on the optimal portfolio of state contingent assets for the sample, as specified
by the risk-sharing literature, but based on some less than optimal make up of the
portfolio. That is, the European countries might have stronger spatial correlations
(strong risk-sharing) amongst themselves than with the US. However, given the data
set used, the US state contingent asset would dominate the risk-sharing propagated
weighted portfolio of state contingent assets and thus the US would dominate the
risk-sharing propagated common shock for which it would corrects for. Finding that
the risk-sharing literature’s demeaned variables does not fully capture the CCE is
in line with Fuleky et al. (2015a).21
The finding of common correlated effects which the traditional risk-sharing ap-
plication of weighted demeaning might not capture appropriately makes it necessary
to employ an estimation approach that is robust to heterogeneous slope parameters
and common correlated effects, such as Pesaran et al. (1997, 1999)’s Pooled Mean
Group estimator (PMG). The PMG’s foundation is Eq.(3.2), and the PMG should
therefore be robust to both heterogeneous slopes and spatial common correlated ef-
fects. Before proceeding with the estimation, Eq.(3.2) is commonly re-parameterized
into an error correction model:
∆ci,t = λi(ci,t−1 − βLRu yi,t) + βSRu,i ∆yi,t + νi,t (3.11)
where βLRu and β
SR
u,i are the parameters of interest; the long-run and short-run un-
21The CD test as applied by Fuleky et al. (2015a) is based on Pesaran (2004) which had some
short-comings and since has been replaced by Pesaran (2015), which is the CD statistic used here.
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shared risk coefficient, λi is the speed of transition from a short- to a long-run
risk-sharing relationship. If λ = 0 then there is no long-run relationship between
idiosyncratic consumption and output, and by extension no unshared risk i.e. per-
fect risk-sharing. In essence, the PMG combines the Classical short run and Level
long run estimation principles. Estimates are obtained for each country and a mean
taken to ascertain the average risk-sharing effect. Given that the mean effect is
taken, which allows for country individual effects, the level estimate is more akin to
the medium run risk-sharing.
To test whether risk-sharing expanded over time, similar to the Level estimation,
Eq. (3.11) is enhanced with a interactive dummy term:
∆ci,t = λi,D(ci,t−1−βLRu,D1yi,t−βLRu,D2D∗yi,t)+βSRu,D1,i∆yi,t+βSRu,D2,iD∗∆yi,t+νi,t (3.12)
where D = 0 prior to and including 1990 and 1 thereafter. To test the significance
of an expansion in risk-sharing, we test the H0 : β
SR
u,D2,i = 0, which if not rejected
means that the parameter is equal to zero or rather that no change in risk-sharing
occurred, versus HA : β
SR
u,D2,i 6= 0, that a change occurred.
separate estimation of Eq. (3.11) dummy estimation of Eq. (3.12)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
βSRu β
LR
u λ
LR βSRu,D1 β
LR
u,D1 β
SR
u,D2 β
LR
u,D2 λ
LR
D
SE() SE() SE() SE() SE() SE() SE() SE()
95% CI 95% CI 95% CI 95% CI 95% CI 95% CI 95% CI 95% CI
1970 till 2007 1970 till 2007
0.5264∗∗∗ 0.7900∗∗∗ -0.1004∗∗∗ 0.4492∗∗∗ 0.8691∗∗∗ -0.0392 0.1530∗∗∗ -0.1712∗∗∗
(.0504) (.0157) (.0177) (.0487) (.0232) (.0615) (.0383) (.0210)
[0.428, 0.625] [0.759, 0.821] [-0.135, -0.066] [0.354, 0.545] [0.824, 0.915] [-0.160, 0.081] [0.078, 0.228] [-0.212, -0.130]
1970 till 1990
0.4236∗∗∗ 0.8510∗∗∗ -0.2162∗∗∗
(.0556) (.0156) (.0389)
[0.315, 0.533] [0.820, 0.882] [-0.292, -0.140]
1991 till 2007
0.3527∗∗∗ 1.0774∗∗∗ -0.1857∗∗∗
(0.0599) (0.0148) (0.0440)
[0.235, 0.470] [1.048, 1.106] [-0.272, -0.099]
Significance levels: ∗ denotes 10%, ∗∗ 5%, and ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses while 95% confidence intervals are in square brackets.
Table 3.5: PMG unshared risk estimates
Table (3.5) presents the unshared risk estimation results for the PMG estimation.
Column (I) contains the short run parameter coefficients, βSRu , for the estimation
of the unshared risk over the entire sample and the two separate sub-samples 1970-
1990 and 1991-2007, column (II) contains the long run unshared risk estimates, βLRu ,
and column (III) contains the estimate of the speed of transition, λLR , from the
short to the long run unshared risk level. Columns (IV)-(VIII) contain the short-
run, long-run, and transition parameter estimates for the estimation on the entire
44
sample with an interactive dummy term, specifically the estimates of Eq. (3.12).
The PMG estimation finds short-run risk-sharing over the entire period to be
47% which is well above the Classical finding of 27% (FGLS) in Table (3.1). And
although the PMG shows a expansion in risk-sharing from 58% in 1970-1990 to
65% in 1991-2007, one should be cautious of this finding since the the growth in
risk-sharing was not found to be significant. The significance of the change in risk-
sharing was tested, similar to the case of the Level estimation, by enhancing Eq.
(3.11) with a interactive dummy term and running the estimation on the entire
time period. The H0 : β
SR
u,D2 = 0 using a two-sided t-test with 5% significance level
could not be rejected, with a p-value of 0.913. Apart from βSRu,D2, however, all other
estimates in Table (3.5) are found to be significantly different from zero and fairly
precisely estimated with fairly narrow 95% confidence intervals and standard errors
that are of similar magnitude to those found in the literature. While the PMG
estimation found much higher short-run risk-sharing than the Classical method, in
terms of long-run risk-sharing the PMG estimates are not only just at or above the
medium-run Level results in Table(3.2), but also show falling risk-sharing from 15%
over the period 1970-1990 to essentially zero or negative risk-sharing during 1991-
2007. Although not impossible, this is highly improbable as it would mean that
idiosyncratic consumption would overreact to idiosyncratic output shocks to the
extent that it is counter cyclical. For example, as a country experiences a positive
idiosyncratic output shock, idiosyncratic consumption would contract. Also, but of
less interest, is that the conversion to a long-run relationship is faster for the period
1970-1990 than for 1991-2007. The finding that short-run risk-sharing is higher than
long-run is line with Fuleky et al. (2015a).
A variety of factors could cause the difference in results between the PMG es-
timation and the Classical and Level estimations, but one possibility could be the
method by which the estimators correct for the common correlated effects, with
PMG imposing no structure while the Classical and Level estimations impose a
structure across the common correlated effects.
3.5 Conclusion
The preceding chapter introduced the reader to the risk-sharing literature and the
two dominant estimation approaches; the Classical and the Level approach. This
chapter applied these two estimation approaches to a panel consisting of 24 OECD
countries over the period 1970-2007. The Classical and Level approach as applied
here find analogous results to the standard findings of the Classical and Level em-
pirical literature. These estimations were undertaken as a stepping stone for the
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fourth chapter where the same data will be used to show the impact of endogeneity
bias on risk-sharing estimation. Thus it was necessary to show that similar results
to those found in the literature can be obtained with the data, and therefore any
difference in results in the following chapters are due to the employed estimation
approaches and not driven by the data.
Moreover, this chapter supports Fuleky et al. (2015a) in connecting the risk-
sharing literature and the common correlated effects literature. The importance of
the common correlated effects literature for risk-sharing was reinforced by finding
that spatial common correlated effects are present and the standard risk-sharing
approaches does not fully capture the common correlated effects. Accordingly, the
PMG estimator was applied, which combines the Classical and Level methodologies,
and which should be robust in the presence of heterogeneous slopes and common
correlated effects. The PMG estimation found two contradictions, firstly, PMG short
run finding suggests higher short run risk-sharing than the Classical literature, and
secondly the PMG medium run risk-sharing estimates find little to no risk-sharing
which is in contradiction with the Level literature.
However, all the estimations and tests, including the CD test and the PMG
estimation are invalid in the presence of output endogeneity, which is the focus
of the subsequent chapters. To allow for a clear comparison with the risk-sharing
literature, the subsequent chapters will follow the prevailing risk-sharing literature
in assuming that there are no heterogeneous slopes and that the restricted CCE
structure (as outlined above in section 3.4) is correct.
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Chapter 4
Risk-sharing and exogeneity
4.1 Introduction
Chapter three applied the estimation framework used in the literature: the Classical
framework and the Level framework. It followed the literature in the assumption
that output is exogenous and provided risk-sharing estimates using a panel data
set consisting of 24 OECD countries over the period of 1970-2007. The assumption
in the literature that output is exogenous in a risk-sharing estimation framework
is by no means a trivial one. That is, a shift in output can be caused by shifts
in Aggregate Supply (AS) or Aggregate Demand (AD). This in turn would suggest
that in an estimation with consumption as regressand, output can be driven by
consumption factors, such as taste shocks, and therefore would cause a reciprocal
effect in the estimation and an endogeneity issue would arise. This chapter will
loosen the assumption that output is driven strictly by supply in a risk-sharing
estimation.
Demand shocks can be risk-shared, but demand shocks cause output to be en-
dogenous in a standard risk-sharing estimation, while supply shocks can be risk-
shared and are exogenous in a risk-sharing estimation. Supply shock exogeneity is
based on the assumption that the causality runs via a change in output to a change
in consumption without a reciprocal effect from consumption on output. To deter-
mine the extent to which demand shocks can be risk-shared requires an approach to
address the endogeneity problem, for instance an instrumental variables estimation
with a valid instrument.
This chapter will present a number of alternative estimators to estimate robust
risk-sharing parameters. One of these estimators is the Level approach, introduced
in chapter two, as this approach should not be subject to endogeneity bias, under
the condition of cointegration and associated superconsistency. Superconsistency
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implies that a variable with a higher order of integration cannot be correlated with
an error that has a lower order of integration. Three alternative estimators that
are used in this chapter are based on Instrumental Variable estimation: Anderson
and Hsiao (1981, 1982) first difference two stage least square estimator (FD2SLS),
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) difference General Method of Moment (dGMM) and an
IV estimation using instruments derived from a Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993)
style Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR-IV). These alternative estimators are
subsequently used to estimate risk-sharing parameters for the same data set used in
chapter three and compared against the Classical results.
This chapter finds that the alternative estimation methods used in order to deal
with endogeneity yield different risk-sharing point estimates to the Classical method:
the estimated risk-sharing is strong and increasing over time. These alternative
parameter estimates are line with the estimates of the Level approach in chapter
three, and validate the hypothesis that conventional risk-sharing estimation is biased
because it ignores the output endogeneity.
4.2 Endogeneity and feedback
In this chapter, we loosen the assumption of output being exogenously determined.
First we discuss the impact on parameter estimates of a violation of the assumed
exogeneity. For simplicity we will only present the risk-sharing model for the un-
shared output shocks. All variables are in logs. The estimation of unshared risk in
the previous chapter rested on the following model:
ci,t = $ + βyi,t + ηt + δi + υi,t (4.1)
where the ci,t is log consumption of country i in period t, yi,t is log output, $
is a constant, ηt is a time fixed effect, δi is a country fixed effect, and υi,t is the
idiosyncratic error term which is assumed not to be serially correlated. It was than
transformed into the subsequent model Eq.(2.18) used for estimation
∆c˜i,t = β∆y˜i,t + ∆υ˜i,t (4.2)
Two transformations have been applied: i) first differencing, indicated by a ∆ sign,
to remove the cross-section fixed effect and ii) cross-sectional demeaning, indicated
by x˜i,t such that x˜i,t ≡ xi,t − xt where xt =
∑N
i=1 xi,t
N
, to remove the time fixed effect.
For clarity of exposition, the demeaning notations, like the log notation, is
dropped from this point onwards and all variables are both logged and cross-sectionally
demeaned unless stated otherwise. Eq.(4.2) is the linear form of the model, while
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(4.3) below is the matrix notation of model (4.2), (4.4) is the cross-section sub-
matrix notation of (4.2), and (4.5) is the sub-matrix notation across time. These
model notations will be used interchangeably. Matrices are denoted by bold letters,
such that c is a (NT × 1) vector of which ci and ct are sub-matrices with (T × 1)
and (N × 1) dimensions respectively.
∆c = ∆yβ + ∆υ (4.3)
∆ci = ∆yiβ + ∆υi (4.4)
∆ct = ∆ytβ + ∆υt (4.5)
The Classical risk-sharing literature imposes a key assumption on the model
(4.2): output is assumed to be exogenous. More precisely, the assumption is that
the output of a country is orthogonal to errors including those that originate from
the country’s consumption, such as demand shocks or taste shocks, as well as in
relation to the errors of all other countries.
Given Eq.(4.2), this assumption can be stated as:
A1 E(υi,tyj,t) = 0 (i,j=1,...,N)
A1 implies that the output of a country is not correlated with the contemporane-
ous errors of any country, including demand shocks. However, since the Classical
approach applies first difference, assumption A1 needs to be adjusted:
A2 E(∆υi,t∆yj,t) = 0 (i,j=1,...,N)
A2 augments A1 so that output is not only assumed not to be correlated with
contemporaneous errors of any country in the present but also previous period. A2
is sufficient in that the first difference and demeaning transforms the error term in
Eq.(4.1) into ∆υ˜i,t = υi,t + υi,t−1 − (υi,t−1 + υi,t). If A2 holds, as assumed by the
Classical risk-sharing literature, then the model in Eq. (4.2) can be consistently
estimated using FGLS with an AR(1) error structure. The AR(1) error structure
occurs due to taking first difference which imposes a known serially correlation
structure on the errors. More precisely, assuming that υi,t is not serial correlated
and given that ∆υi,t = υi,t − υi,t−1 then E(∆υi,t∆υi,t−1) = −1. In fact, as shown
by Arellano (2010) pp.14-17, the first differenced GLS estimation is equivalent to
a fixed effect estimation with time and cross-section fixed effects. So in terms of
estimation, the risk-sharing coefficient is given by the following equation:
βˆ =
(
1
NT
y′Qy
)−1
1
NT
y′Qc (4.6)
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where Q = D′(DD′)−1D and D is a ((T − 1) × T ) first difference operator ma-
trix. More precisely, as Arellano (2010) highlights on page 15, the Q matrix is also
known as the deviations-from-time-means or within-group operator as it is the stan-
dard symmetric and idempotent panel data transformation matrix that converts the
(NT × 1) consumption and output vectors into (NT × 1) vectors of deviations from
panel means. After substituting and taking probability limits Eq.(4.6) becomes
plimβˆ = β + plim
(
1
NT
y′Qy
)−1
∗ plim
(
1
NT
y′Qυ
)
(4.7)
in which the second term on the right hand side would be equal to zero if out-
put is exogenous. But, since we now no longer assume that output is exogenous,
the estimate of the coefficient will be inconsistent to the extent of plimβˆ − β =
V ar(∆yi,t)
−1Cov(∆yi,t,∆υi,t) 6= 0.
To expand, interpret Eq.(4.3) as a consumption function with ∆ci,t being the
change in consumption for country i at time t and ∆yi,t being the change in income
such that ∆yi,tβ is the income effect that drives consumption. Then ∆υi,t are all
the factors outside of income that have an impact on consumption. For simplicity,
∆υi,t is split into two factors: demand shocks ∆
D
i,t and other shocks ∆
S
i,t. The
other shocks, Si,t, for simplicity are assumed to be orthogonal to output such that
Cov(∆yi,t,∆
S
i,t) = 0. Demand shocks, 
D
i,t, includes changes in consumption behav-
iors such as choice between time spent accruing income versus leisure time, change
in taste etc. The bias arises due to Di,t also featuring as a driving factor in output.
The consumption factors impacting output include such things as how much time is
spent between working and consuming, or what is consumed, etc. The presence of
Di,t in output leads to simultaneity bias in Eq.(4.6). The unshared risk estimation
Eq.(4.6) is biased to the extent of the covariance of output and demand shocks:
plimβˆ − β = V ar(∆yi,t)−1Cov(∆yi,t,∆Di,t) (4.8)
where Eq.(4.8) is derived from (4.7) by expanding υ into D + S.
Assumption A2 implies that all output shocks originate from supply (output)
and not from demand (consumption), including demand shocks which have a de-
layed or cross-country impact on output. Those are strong assumptions, which
can be brought into question simply by looking at a standard AS-AD framework
where a change in output, measured by GDP, can be due to a shift in aggregate de-
mand or aggregate supply. Consequently, if an output shift originates in a demand
shock, reflecting movement such as a taste shock or a change in saving habits, then
consumption drives output, causing output to be endogenous in the risk-sharing
estimation.
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Given that in Eq.(4.2) the variables were cross-sectionally demeaned and first
differencing was applied, bias arising due to ∆D encompasses bias arising in this
and the previous period, as well as across countries in both periods. The larger
is Cov(∆yi,t,∆
D
i,t), the greater the bias. Assuming Cov(∆yi,t,∆
D
i,t) > 0 then the
unshared risk would be overstated in estimation by least squares, and consequently
risk-sharing understated. An alternative estimator is required that is consistent in
the presence of endogeneity.
4.3 Level
The preceding potential bias is inherent in the Classical approach. On the other
hand, the Level estimation, which utilizes an I(1) assumption, and thus is poten-
tially a cointegration estimation, benefits from superconsistency: an I(1) variable
cannot be correlated with an I(0) error. However, for superconsistency to hold, the
demeaned consumption and output series must be shown to be co-integrated. Since
consumption and output are correlated it is sufficient to show that both consump-
tion and output are integrated to the order of 1. And only if this is the case does
the Level-approach benefit from superconsistency and thus leads to risk-sharing es-
timates that are consistent in the presence of output endogeneity. However, the
Level approach and thus the results rely on asymptotics and given the short time
series used, finite-sample bias could still be a concern.
4.3.1 Unit-Root Test
Following the influential paper by Nelson and Plosser (1982) and subsequent papers
refining the findings, it has been widely accepted that GDP is characterized by a
unit root process. But nonetheless it is necessary to show that this is the case here,
especially since a unit-root process is not necessarily a given, since consumption
and output are expressed on a per capita basis and as a ratio to the cross-sectional
mean.1
But one should also be cautious when interpreting unit-root test results, as it
is well documented in the literature that unit-root tests have low power, and that
1For example, based on the two growth theories of unconditional and conditional growth con-
vergence, relative output can be stationary for countries above or below the steady, equilibrium
growth rate. A textbook discussion of the unconditional and conditional growth theories and their
implications can be found in Romer (2006). See also, for example, Baumol (1986), DeLong (1988),
Dowrick and Nguyen (1989), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), and
Mankiw et al. (1992). However, in this chapter growth convergence is not investigated and is only
mentioned as a cautionary example, to show that one should not assume that relative country
output and consumption is a unit-root driven process.
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various unit-root tests can sometimes have poor finite-sample performance. Several
different unit-root tests have been applied below to avoid relying too strongly on the
finite-sample performance of one test. The tests employed are: Levin et al. (2002)
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test (LLC), Im et al. (2003) Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root
test (IPS), Maddala and Wu (1999) unit-root test (MW), Hadri (2000) Lagrange
Multiplier unit-root test (HLM), and Pesaran (2007) cross-sectionally augmented
Dickey Fuller unit roost test (PCADF).
The LLC test null hypothesis is that all panels are I(1) with the unit root pa-
rameter being the same for all panels; if the null hypothesis is rejected, the test
assumes that all panels are stationary. The test also assumes that the idiosyncratic
errors υ are independently distributed across the cross-sections, for examples, that
the idiosyncratic errors υi,t and υj,t are independent of each other. The test’s prop-
erties are based on T going to infinity faster than N and is proposed for a sample of
N 10-250 and T 25-250.2 IPS tests heterogeneous panels, for the null hypothesis of
all panels being I(1) against the alternative hypothesis of some being I(1). That is,
the IPS test allows for different AR(1) coefficients for each country. MW tests the
null hypothesis of I(1) for all i, by testing individual countries. The test does not
require a balanced panel, and the alternative hypothesis is that at least one country
is I(1). HLM tests the H0 : ϕi = 0 for all i = 1, 2, 3, .., N with the alternative hy-
pothesis being that at least one panel contains a unit root. The HLM test allows for
heterogeneous panels and country specific deterministic elements. Additionally, the
HLM test can be performed for assumed homoskedastic, heteroskedastic, or serially
dependent disturbances. However, it does not allow for cross-sectional correlated
errors.3 The HLM is based on asymptotics that T goes to infinity followed by N
going to infinity, with Hadri (2000) recommending the test for panels consisting of
large T and in comparison moderate seized N. Finally, PCADF tests for H0 : ϕi = 1
for all i = 1, 2, 3, .., N , while allowing for cross-sectional correlation for heterogenous
panels, with the alternative hypothesis being that some panels are stationary.
For clarity and cross-comparison, all unit-root tests results presented in Table
(4.1) are p-values for a restricted uniform functional form: one lag and a determin-
istic trend.
When looking at Table (4.1), all tests, apart from the LLC test, conclude that
relative output and consumption are unit-root processes when using the entire time
set of 1970 to 2007.4 The LLC test rejects the null hypothesis of unit root at the
2The Taylor and Sarno (1998) test, being a comparable test to LLC, was not employed, as it
requires the time dimension to be bigger than the cross-section, which is not necessarily the case
when testing sub-periods.
3The HLM test was run allowing for serial correlated disturbances, but the results for different
specifications are the same.
4It should be noted that the interpretation of the failures to reject of the null hypotheses is
subject to the specification used. Therefore, given the specification used in Table (4.1), rejecting
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Place holder c y
Test with H0: I(1)
LLC 0.209 0.019
H0 : ϕi = 1 ∀ i with ϕi = ϕj
IPS 0.855 0.872
H0 : ϕi = 1 ∀ i with ϕi 6= ϕj possible
MW 0.846 0.929
H0 : ϕi = 1 ∀ i with ϕi 6= ϕj possible
PCADF 0.980 0.297
H0 : ϕi = 1 ∀ i with ϕi 6= ϕj possible
Test with H0: I(0)
HLM 0.000 0.000
H0 : ϕi < 1 ∀ i with ϕi 6= ϕj possible
Table 4.1: Unit-Root tests for OECD 1970 till 2007
5% significance level, but fails to reject the null hypothesis at 1%. The HLM test,
unlike the other test, has a null hypothesis of no unit root which it rejects in favor
for the alternative of that some panels are I(1).
In addition to their application to the entire time series, the unit root tests have
been applied to two sub-samples following Perron (1989), who showed that unit root
tests might not reject the I(1) hypothesis over the entire time series when a trend
or level change occurs, as Artis and Hoffmann (2007a,b, 2008) (AH) stipulate is the
case in the early 90’s when a change in level occurred as a result of globalization.
Table (4.2) presents the results for the various unit-root tests when applied to the
sub-periods 1970-1990 and 1991-2007. In order to facilitate comparison across tests
and tables, once again, as in Table (4.1), a uniform specification of one lag and a
deterministic trend is applied for all the tests.
While the unit-root tests in Table (4.1), which apply to the entire time series,
give the impression of a non-stationary process, the results in Table (4.2), which
apply to the sub-periods 1970-1990 and 1991-2007, are less clear. In the case of
the sub-period 1970-1990, all tests, except the LLC unit-root test, fail to reject
the unit-root hypothesis. However, for the sample period 1991-2007, the unit root
hypothesis is rejected except for PCADF (and IPS and MW in the case of output).5
The rejection of the unit-root hypothesis for the period 1991-2007 suggests that the
Level estimation of that sub-period does not have superconsistency and therefore
suffers from endogeneity bias. Moreover, while consumption and output over the
the null hypothesis implies that the variable is potentially trend stationary.
5The IPS does not reject the null hypothesis in the case of consumption in the sub-period
1991-2007 when looking at a 1% significance level.
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Place holder c y
1970 till 1990
LLC 0.013 0.004
H0 : ϕi = 1 ∀ i with ϕi = ϕj
IPS 0.804 0.443
H0 : ϕi = 1 ∀ i with ϕi 6= ϕj possible
MW 0.583 0.238
H0 : ϕi = 1 ∀ i with ϕi 6= ϕj possible
PCADF 0.147 0.871
H0 : ϕi = 1 ∀ i with ϕi 6= ϕj possible
HLM 0.000 0.000
H0 : ϕi < 1 ∀ i with ϕi 6= ϕj possible
1991 till 2007
LLC 0.000 0.000
H0 : ϕi = 1 ∀ i with ϕi = ϕj
IPS 0.020 0.140
H0 : ϕi = 1 ∀ i with ϕi 6= ϕj possible
MW 0.000 0.069
H0 : ϕi = 1 ∀ i with ϕi 6= ϕj possible
PCDAF 0.843 0.956
H0 : ϕi = 1 ∀ i with ϕi 6= ϕj possible
HLM 0.000 0.000
H0 : ϕi < 1 ∀ i with ϕi 6= ϕj possible
Table 4.2: Unit-Root tests for OECD sub-periods
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entire time period might appear to be non-stationary processes, and while over the
sub-period they do not, due to a break in the time series as mentioned above, another
reason could be that the sub-periods 1970-90 with 21 years and 1991-2007 with 17
years are too short for the unit-root tests. That is, these unit-root tests – as well
as, by extension, superconsistency – rely on asymptotics for which the time series
might be too short, bringing into question the Level estimation results.
Meanwhile, Group-mean Dynamic OLS (GDOLS), which was briefly presented
in chapter three as part of the Level method, is also consistent as long as output and
consumption are non-stationary processes. However, unlike Dynamic OLS (DOLS),
one needs to test for country individual unit roots, as the method uses individual
risk-sharing estimations for individual countries. The results of the country-specific
unit-root tests can be found in the appendix (D.1) Tables (D.1) and (D.2). The
results of the panel unit-root tests in Tables (4.1) and (4.2) are confirmed, in that
not all countries display a unit root process in either the full or sub-periods. This
is especially the case in the sub-period 1991-2007 where the most frequent failure of
the unit-root hypothesis occurs.
Therefore, the difference found in chapter two and three between the Classical
method and the Level method, in addition to AH’s explanation, could be due to the
level estimation not suffering endogeneity bias. But, the results for the sub-periods
1970-1990 and 1991-2007 need to be interpreted with caution. The unit-root tests do
not clearly resolve the question of whether the sub-period 1991-2007 is an I(1) series
or whether the time series are even long enough to justify the asymptotic results and
therefore the Level method could also suffer from endogeneity bias.6 As a result, in
the sub-period 1991-2007 the risk-sharing parameter increases, which contradicts the
Classical finding, and which could be driven by the point estimate becoming subject
to endogeneity bias.7 However, this would not explain the difference between the
long-run and medium-run parameter estimate found in the 1st and 2nd column of
Table (3.2) in chapter three, as both would be suffering from bias.
Even though the Level method provides potentially robust parameter estimates,
as discussed in preceding chapter, there is a theoretical difference between the shocks
being investigated through the Classical and the Level methods. This is especially
important when we are interested in the monetary union aspect of risk-sharing of
transitory shocks, with the Level method looking at permanent shocks. Therefore,
regardless of the econometric validity of the Level method in the presence of endo-
6In chapter five we undertake a Monte Carlo Simulation that looks at the impact of the endo-
geneity bias on point estimates in a Level estimation environment in the case of close to unit-root
processes.
7The Level estimation presented in Table (3.2) chapter three estimated unshared risk at 0.8061
in 1970-1990 and 0.6304 for 1991-2007 which is equivalent to 19.39% risk-sharing in 1970-1990 and
36.96% in 1991-2007.
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geneity, a different estimator is needed when investigating the extent of risk-sharing
of transitory shocks.
4.4 FD2SLS and dGMM estimators
Two alternative estimators that could be used are the Anderson and Hsiao (1981,
1982) FD2SLS and the Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) dGMM estimator. Both estima-
tors are applications of the Instrumental Variable (IV) concept using transformed
endogenous regressors as instruments. The dGMM is a GMM estimator whose
asymptotics are based on fixed-T and large-N. The dGMM estimator utilizes lagged
levels of the endogenous regressors as instruments for the differenced endogenous
regressors, with the pool of instruments increasing as the number of time periods
available increases. In comparison, the FD2SLS uses the second period lagged level
or the second period lagged first differences of the endogenous regressors as instru-
ments in a IV regression, making it less efficient than the dGMM which uses more
moment conditions.
Assuming the instruments are valid, the key benefits of the FD2SLS and the
dGMM estimators are that, on one hand, they are robust to the presence of endo-
geneity, and on the other hand, they provide a framework for an IV estimation with
no need to obtain an instrument from outside the dataset that is already being used.
4.4.1 FD2SLS
To illustrate, the FD2LS runs the following risk sharing estimation:
∆c = ∆yβ + ∆ν (4.9)
which is identical to Eq.(4.3) except that y is instrumented by Z, a matrix of instru-
ments. These instruments can be considered exogenous if they fulfill the following
conditions:8
Cond.1 E(Zit∆νi,t) = 0
Cond.2 rank E(Zit∆yi,t) = K
where the first condition is the standard weak exogeneity condition, i.e. that the
instruments are unrelated with the error term, and the second condition is the stan-
8Z is the matrix containing all instruments for all countries over the entire period. Zi is a
subset matrix of Z containing the instrument for country i over the entire period and Zit denotes
the subset matrix that consists of the instruments for country i in period t.
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dard full rank condition for identification, i.e. that output is sufficiently correlated
with the instrument to be identified.9 Subsequently, given these conditions, the
FD2SLS defines Z as a vector consisting of either yt−2 or ∆yt−2. Due to the struc-
ture of the instruments we lose two time dimensions per country on all variables
when Z = yt−2 such that both c and y are both ((T − 2)N × 1) vectors. That is,
the first instrument is available in 1972 and consists of the 1970 output. When the
instrument is in first differences, we lose three time dimensions, with the vectors
being of ((T − 3)N × 1) dimension. Thus Z is the following ((T − 2)N × 1) or
((T − 3)N × 1) vector:
Zleveli = yt−2 =

yi,1972−2
...
yi,2007−2
...
yN,1972−2
...
yN,2007−2

=

yi,1970
...
yi,2005
...
yN,1970
...
yN,2005

(4.10)
or
Zfdi = ∆yt−2 =

∆yi,1973−2
...
∆yi,2007−2
...
∆yN,1972−2
...
∆yN,2007−2

=

∆yi,1971
...
∆yi,2005
...
∆yN,1971
...
∆yN,2005

(4.11)
The reason for going back two periods, t− 2, is to make sure that the instruments
are pre-determined relative to the errors, ∆νt = νt − νt−1, rendering yˆ orthogonal
to demand shock and thus exogenous in Eq. (4.9).
Table (4.3) presents the result for the FD2SLS estimation when using Zfd. The
estimated unshared risk coefficients are greater than one, implying negative risk-
sharing. This would mean that an output shock would lead to a stronger consump-
tion shift. Although not unfeasible, it is unlikely to be the case given the results of
the Level, Classical, and subsequent estimation. One possible explanation why the
FD2SLS finds negative risk-sharing, while non-IV estimation do not, is that that
instrumented output series covariance with consumption can be different to the non-
instrumented output used in the Classical or Level approach. Thus the risk-sharing
9Since all variables are demeaned the first condition also implies that E(Zit∆νj,t) = 0. Also,
K = 1 as there is only one endogenous regressor and is independent of how many instruments are
being used.
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Period 1970-2007 1970-1990 1991-2007
βu 1.0695
∗∗∗ 1.1923∗∗∗ 1.0418∗∗∗
SE() (.1842) (.4400) (.1694)
95% CI [0.708, 1.431] [0.330, 2.055] [0.710, 1.374]
U-ID KP LM χ2 10.678 2.741 9.105
U-ID KP p-value 0.0011 0.0978 0.0025
W-ID CD Wald F 25.468 4.535 32.788
W-ID KP Wald F 12.586 3.035 10.926
Significance levels: ∗ denotes 10%, ∗∗ 5%, and ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%. Standard errors shown are arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation- robust standard errors. The estimations were run using
the Stata command xtivreg2 by Schaffer (2010). The critical value for χ20.01 with 1 degree of
freedom is 6.635, for χ20.05 is 3.841, and for χ
2
0.1 is 2.706.
Table 4.3: FD2SLS estimation using Zfd
estimation using instrumented output might not be bound to 1, even though the
theoretical risk sharing aspect based on the relations of idiosyncratic output and
consumption is bound to 1. Moreover, the risk-sharing coefficient is not estimated
very precisely: the 95% confidence interval (labeled as 95% CI in Table (4.3)) is
wide and includes values below 1 which allows for the possibility that the true un-
shared risk is actually less than 1. Overall, it is not clear whether positive, negative,
or no risk-sharing is occurring according the FD2SLS in Table (4.3). Regardless,
the negative risk-sharing casts a shadow of doubt on the FD2SLS for risk-sharing
estimation purposes.
In addition to the point estimates and confidence intervals of unshared risk, Table
(4.3) presents a variety of tests that look at the correlation between the endogenous
variable, output growth, and the instrument, two period lagged output growth.
The correlation between endogenous variables and instruments is important for any
IV-estimation. For one thing, if the correlation between the endogenous variable
∆y and the instrument is Z is zero, the model would be underidentified and the
IV would lead to inconsistent estimates. A zero correlation between ∆y and Z
would be a violation of the second condition, the rank condition, which explicitly
formalizes that the correlation between ∆y and Z needs to be non-zero for Z to be
a valid instrument. In addition to the rank condition, however, for IV to perform
satisfactorily in finite samples, it is not enough that the correlation is nonzero; it
needs to be ”strong”. This has been formalized by Bound et al. (1995) and Staiger
and Stock (1997) who found that an IV estimation might still suffer from bias due to
weak correlation between the endogenous variable and instruments, even when the
correlation is found to be statistically significant at conventional significance levels.
The first test is an underidentification test that utilizes the Kleibergen and Paap
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(2006) (U-ID KP LM χ2) Lagrange Multiplier test. The test evaluates the rank
condition of the E(Z∆y) vector. With one endogenous variable and one excluded
instrument, the test assesses the correlation between the instrument and the endoge-
nous variables with the null hypothesis being that the two are not correlated versus
the alternative that they are correlated. The failure to reject the null hypothesis
would mean the IV estimation is inconsistent. The null hypothesis is rejected at
a 99% confidence level in two instances; when estimating using the entire sample
and when estimating using the sub-period 1991-2007. In the case of the estimation
utilizing the sub-period 1970-1990, the null hypothesis can only be rejected at a
90% confidence level. The rejection of the null hypothesis at a lower confidence
level is worrisome. In short, the underidentification test for the most part suggests
the endogenous variable and instrument are correlated. However, this correlation
between the two is surprising if output is actually a unit root process.
An issue with the FD2SLS employed instrument set arises due to the possibility
that output is a unit-root process, as discussed in the preceding section.10 This is
a problem due to the functional form of the GDP process and the construction of
instruments. For illustration, assume output is generated according to the following
functional form:
yi,t = yi,t−1 + εi,t (4.12)
such that output is an AR(1) process, or MA(∞) since the coefficient of yi,t−1 is 1,
subject to shocks. When formulated in first difference it becomes
∆yi,t = εi,t (4.13)
Thus an estimation of ∆yi,t on ∆yi,t−2 would yield an uncorrelated regression with
a coefficient of zero. This implies that even though the instruments are exogenous,
they are not correlated with the first differenced endogenous regressors and therefore
the estimator is inconsistent because the rank condition is not satisfied.
In addition to underidentification test, Table (4.3) also presents the results for
weak identification tests: the Cragg and Donald (1993) (W-ID CD) and Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) (Weak ID KP ) Wald F test statistics.11 The differences between the
weak identification tests and underidentification tests are not in the test statistics
used but the small sample correction, the null hypothesis and the critical values
employed. The null hypothesis of a weak identification test is that the endogenous
variables are weakly identified by the instrument versus the alternative hypothesis
that the estimator is not suffering from weak identification bias. In our case of one
10This problem applies also to the dGMM approach presented in the next section.
11In the special case of exactly identification and a single instrument, the Kleibergen and Paap
(2006) statistics and the Olea and Pflueger (2013) statistics are exactly the same as a standard
robust first-stage F statistic.
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endogenous variable and one instrument, Stock and Yogo (2005) suggest critical
values for weak identification tests at 95% confidence level of 16.38 for a rejection
rate of 10%, 8.96 for 15%, 6.66 for 20%, and 5.53 for a rejection rate of 25%.
The Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values for the Cragg-Donald statistic assume
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) errors. Alternatively, the Olea and
Pflueger (2013) critical values for the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) Wald F test
statistics allows for none-i.i.d. errors. Olea and Pflueger (2013) suggest at 95%
confidence level the following critical values; 37.418 for a Nagar bias threshold, τ ,
of 5%, 23.109 for τ = 10%, 15.062 for τ = 20%, and 12.039 for τ = 30%.12
Looking at Table (4.3), the test statistics of Cragg and Donald (1993) and
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) differ widely. When using the Stock and Yogo (2005)
suggested critical values with the Cragg and Donald (1993) test statistic, all esti-
mates, apart from the sub-period 1970-1990, in Table (4.3) reject the null hypothesis.
This would suggest that only the sub-period 1970-1990 suffers from weak instru-
ments. However, when looking at Olea and Pflueger (2013) critical values together
with the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) Wald F test statistics, the estimate fail to
reject the null hypothesis at a Nagar bias threshold of 5%, 10%, or 20% suggest-
ing that all three estimations suffer from weak identification bias. Finding weak
instrument bias is consistent with output being near I(1).
That is, while Eq. (4.12) and (4.13) highlighted the consequence when output
is a unit-root process, i.e. uncorrelated instruments, a potential problem also exists
if output is close to non-stationary. If we assume output is generated according to
the following functional form:
yi,t = κyi,t−1 + εi,t (4.14)
which when formulated in first difference becomes
∆yi,t = (κ − 1)yi,t−1 + εi,t (4.15)
and if we than substitute in for yi,t−1 we get
∆yi,t = (κ − 1)κyi,t−2 + εi,t + εi,t−1 (4.16)
If κ is for example 0.99 then the entire term (κ − 1)κ, which is equivalent to
the covariance between ∆yi,t and yi,t−2, is just −0.0099. That is, the FD2SLS
instruments become increasingly weakly correlated with the endogenous variable as
GDP approaches unit-root process.13 As such, given the finding of unit root (or
12For another application of these weak instrument critical values and test statistics please see,
for example, Kovandzic et al. (2015).
13Again, this is also a problem that dGMM faces in the next section.
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close to unit-root) in the sample period 1970-2007 and 1970-1990, the instrument
will be insignificantly correlated with the endogenous variable. But, for the period
1991-2007, for which unit-root was not found, the instruments will be significant but
potentially weakly correlated with the endogenous variables. However, the reader
should keep in mind that although most of the applied unit-root tests indicated
a unit root process for consumption and production, some tests did not come to
the same conclusion giving grounds for the possibility that neither consumption nor
production are I(1). Therefore, the FD2SLS method is presented on the basis that
GDP might not be a I(1) but close to a unit-root process, and might serve more
as a general method to avoid endogeneity bias in estimates in cases when output
is not exactly an I(1), in which case the Level estimation would be suffering from
inconsistency.
Period 1970-2007 1970-1990 1991-2007
95% Conf. Inter. [0.770, 1.719] [0.269, ...] [0.753, 1.679]
The Anderson and Rubin (1949) confidence intervals were constructed using the Stata command
weakiv by Finlay et al. (2013). A ‘...’ means that the limit, be it upper or lower, was not found
to be between -2 and 2.
Table 4.4: Anderson and Rubin (1949) 95% confidence interval for FD2SLS estima-
tion using Zfd
Given the findings that the estimates in Table (4.3) might suffer from weak iden-
tification bias, Tables (4.4) presents the Anderson and Rubin (1949) 95% confidence
interval (AR W-ID robust CI) associated with the FD2SLS using Zfd. In essence
the Anderson and Rubin (1949) statistic does not require the rank condition for
the Anderson and Rubin (1949) confidence interval to be valid. In addition, the
Anderson and Rubin (1949) statistic can be made to be robust in the presence of
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.14 Thus, the Anderson and Rubin (1949)
95% confidence interval provides a range in which the true coefficients could lie,
with the range being robust in the presence of weak identification. It is quite clear
from Tables (4.4) that all three Anderson and Rubin (1949) confidence intervals are
wide, and in the case of the estimation utilizing the sub-period 1970-1990, the upper
bound is not found to be below 2. The wide confidence interval makes it virtually
impossible to reach firm conclusions about the extent of risk-sharing and whether it
has increased.
Table (4.5) presents the FD2SLS results using Zlevel. Unlike the results in Table
(4.3), the estimated coefficients in Table (4.5) show a decline in risk-sharing from
25% between 1970-1990 to around 9% risk-sharing between 1991-2007. However, the
14For papers that have further evaluated the Anderson and Rubin (1949) statistic please see
for example Zivot et al. (1998), Stock and Wright (2000), Dufour and Jasiac (2001), Kleibergen
(2002), Moreira (2003), or Dufour and Taamouti (2005) to mention but a few. For a more detailed
discussion and survey of weak instrument tests including Anderson and Rubin (1949) please see
for example Stock et al. 2002, Andrews and Stock (2005), and Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005).
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1970-2007 1970-1990 1991-2007
βu 0.8059 0.7520 0.9124
SE() (.1466) (.1839) (.2227)
95% CI [0.519, 1.093] [0.392, 1.113] [0.476, 1.349]
U-ID KP LM χ2 9.812 5.555 5.012
U-ID KP LM p-value 0.0017 0.0184 0.0252
Weak ID CD Wald F 28.944 18.206 10.493
Weak ID KP Wald F 11.839 7.333 5.012
Significance levels: ∗ denotes 10%, ∗∗ 5%, and ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%. Standard errors shown are arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelated robust standard errors. The estimations were run using the
Stata command ivreg2 by Baum et al. (2010). The critical value for χ20.01 with 1 degree of
freedom is 6.635, for χ20.05 3.841, and for χ
2
0.1 2.706.
Table 4.5: FD2SLS estimation using Zlevel
confidence interval for each estimate is wide, making it hard to conclude whether
risk-sharing declined. In addition, the underidentification test fails to reject the
null hypothesis at a 99% confidence level for the both sub-period estimations. Also,
looking at Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test statistics for weak identification, the null
hypothesis is not rejected given the Olea and Pflueger (2013) critical values for a
30% Nagar bias threshold. The failures to reject the various null hypothesis together
with the decline in risk-sharing relative to other findings suggests that the results
of the FD2SLS when using the Zlevel as instrument provide inconsistent estimates
of unshared risk.
Period 1970-2007 1970-1990 1991-2007
95% Conf. Inter. [0.463, 1.183] [0.206, ...] [ -0.131, 1.679]
The Anderson and Rubin (1949) confidence intervals were constructed using the Stata command
weakiv by Finlay et al. (2013). A ‘...’ means that the limit, be it upper or lower, was not found
to be between -2 and 2.
Table 4.6: Anderson and Rubin (1949) 95% confidence interval for FD2SLS estima-
tion using Zlevel
For completeness Tables (4.6) presents the Anderson and Rubin (1949) 95%
confidence interval (AR W-ID robust CI) associated with the FD2SLS using Zlevel.
Much like in the case of Tables (4.4), the confidence intervals in Tables (4.6) are wide
and include values above one. In addition, this time, in the case of the sub-period
1991-2007, the confidence interval includes values below 0. Again the sub-period
1970-1990 upper bound is not found to be below 2. Thus, it is again virtually
impossible to reach firm conclusions about the extent of risk-sharing and whether it
has increased.
Overall, the unshared risk parameter estimates for both the FD2SLS using Zfd or
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Zlevel are dubious and probably suffer from underidentification or weak identification.
4.4.2 dGMM
The dGMM as applied in this chapter follows a standard GMM estimation given by
βˆ = argmin
βˆ
J(βˆ) = NT ∗ g¯(βˆ)′Wg¯(βˆ) (4.17)
where g¯(βˆ) is defined as
g¯(βˆ) =
1
NT
Z′(∆c−∆yβˆ) (4.18)
which yields the GMM estimate
βˆ = (
1
NT
∆y′ZWZ′∆y)−1
1
NT
∆y′ZWZ′∆c (4.19)
The GMM estimate collapses to the standard IV estimation as laid out in Eq. (4.9)
when the model is exactly identified, as the W matrix would collapse to an identity
matrix. However, in the case when the model is over identified, as is the case with
the dGMM, W 6= I, and the GMM estimation of Eq.(4.19) provides a consistent
estimate of βˆ for any symmetric positive-definite weighting matrix W. To obtain an
efficient GMM estimator, the residual vector ∆υˆ from the estimation of Eq.(4.19)
is used to construct the following matrix 15
Sˆ = Z′∆υˆ∆υˆ′Z (4.20)
with Sˆ−1 replacing W in an efficient second step GMM estimation:
βˆ = (
1
NT
∆y′ZSˆ−1Z
′
∆y)−1
1
NT
∆y′ZSˆ−1Z
′
∆c (4.21)
The dGMM proposes a set of instruments which consist of the lagged levels of the
endogenous variable, starting with the second lag and going as far back as possible.
This means that the Zi matrix is:
Zi =

yi,0 0 0 · · · 0 · · · 0
0 yi,0 yi,1 0 0
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 · · · yi,0 · · · yi,T−2
 (4.22)
Consequently, the set of instruments, Zi, consists of any periods prior to and in-
15For a more detailed discussion please see Baum et al. (2007)
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cluding t− 2; yi,t−2, yi,t−3, ..., yi,0. Of course, as the number of instruments increases
as time expands one could introduce a finite sample bias. Specifically, finite-sample
biases could arise due to two factors: firstly due to the IV estimator asymptotic
property derived finite sample performance leading to rising finite sample bias as
the pool of instruments increases with time to a relative large size compared to the
cross-section, and secondly due to the fact that as the lag goes back further, the
lagged instrument becomes progressively more weakly correlated with the endoge-
nous variable.
In short, to mitigate the risk of finite sample bias, the instrument set for the
dGMM is restricted to t− 2, which gives us one instrument for each time period or
a total of 36 instruments out of 665 possible instruments put forward by the dGMM
framework. Hence the Z matrix in Eq.(4.17) is a ((T −2)N×36) instrument matrix
consisting of two period lagged levels of output. We have 36 instruments as no
instrument is available in 1970 or 1971; the first time period with one instrument
available is 1972, where the instrumental variable is yi,1970, and thus we get 36 time
periods from 1972 up to and including 2007, where we have the two period lagged
output. The dGMM estimation is done using a two-step IV-GMM estimation, which
is consistent and efficient in the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Furthermore, a finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance error matrix is
also applied, as proposed by Windmeijer (2005).
Overall, the risk-sharing estimate results in Table (4.7) are similar to the find-
ing of the Level estimation, with an increase in the dGMM estimates from 24% in
1970-1990 to 43% risk-sharing in 1991-2007. However, caution should be taken when
interpreting this increase in risk-sharing as the increase was found to be insignifi-
cant.16 The similarity between the Level and dGMM estimations stems from the
use of levels as instruments (and with cross-section fixed effects being specifically
modeled). As such, the extent and rise in risk-sharing contradicts the finding of the
Classical method, which shows no increase and different point estimates. This lack
of increase and the difference of more than 10% in point estimates could amongst
other things be due to the Classical estimation set out in the third chapter suffer-
ing from bias caused by the violation of output exogeneity. The small difference of
about 6% between the Level and dGMM estimation could be due to the presence of
a unit-root and the validity of the instruments.
Additionally, the serial correlation test, proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991)
16Similar to the previous chapter, whether the extent of risk-sharing changed was tested by
running the estimation on the entire sample with an interactive dummy term where the dummy is
0 prior to and including 1990 and 1 thereafter. The results of this dummy estimation are in the
last column of Table (4.7). The test applies to the interactive dummy term’s coefficient βu,D2 and
tests H0 : βu,D2 = 0 using a two-sided t-test with 5% significance level. If we fail to reject H0 it
indicates that risk-sharing did not change. But if we reject H0 and βu,D2 < 0 then risk-sharing
did expand. We fail to reject the null hypothesis with the p-value being 0.291.
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1970-2007 1970-1990 1991-2007 Dummy:1970-2007
βu 0.7253
∗∗∗ 0.7642∗∗∗ 0.5719∗∗∗
βu SE() (0.1396) (0.2001) (0.0986)
βu 95% CI [0.452, 0.999] [0.372, 1.156] [0.379, 0.765]
βu,D1 0.6298
βu,D1 SE() (0.0884)
βu,D1 95% CI [0.456, 0.803]
βu,D2 -0.0198
βu,D2 SE() (0.0218)
βu,D2 95% CI [-0.063, 0.023]
N-dimension 24 24 24 24
T-dimension 37 20 17 37
IV-Count 36 19 17 36
AB-AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000
AB-AR(2) p-value 0.795 0.514 0.943 0.884
Hansen p-value 0.945 0.547 0.207 0.924
Sargan p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00
U-ID KP LM χ2 22.21 21.35
U-ID KP LM p-value 0.2738 0.2112
CLR Weak ID robust CI [..., ...] [..., ...] [..., ...]
Significance levels: ∗ denotes 10%, ∗∗ 5%, and ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%. Standard errors shown are arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelated robust standard errors. The dGMMs and the Moreira
(2003) CLR confidence intervals were constructed using the Stata commands xtabond2 and
weakiv by Roodman (2006) and Finlay et al. (2013). A ‘...’ means that the limit, be it upper or
lower, was not found to be between -2 and 2. Empty cell means the row is not applicable for the
respective column.
Table 4.7: dGMM with instrument pool restricted to two period lagged output
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–shown in Table (4.7) as AB-AR– shows, as expected, evidence of first-order but
not second-order serial correlation. Finding an AR(1) is expected because the first
differenced residuals of period t are correlated with t − 1 by −1. Consequently, as
there is no second-order serial correlation, it can be concluded that our instruments
of t − 2 are pre-determined relative to the error term. If there had been serial
correlation of a format of an MA(1) process, the IV set would need to start at
t − 3. Or if instead of an MA(1) process it was an AR(1) process in the error, the
possible IV would become subject to the autoregressive coefficient, and to how long
it takes for the process to approach zero. However, the test is constructed under
the assumption of no contemporaneous error correlation, which is not guaranteed
to be the case, nor is the assumption necessarily violated in the case of output
endogeneity.17
Furthermore, the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) underidentification test (U-ID KP
rk LM) fails to reject the null hypothesis of E(∆yi,tZi,t) not being full column rank
indicating that the dGMM estimations in Table (4.7) might suffer from underidenti-
fication and thus be inconsistent. Also, Table (4.7) presents the confidence interval
derived using the Moreira (2003) conditional likelihood ratio statistic (CLR).18 Like
the Anderson and Rubin (1949) statistic, the Moreira (2003) conditional likelihood
ratio statistic is robust in presence of weak instruments but more powerful when the
model is as much overidentified as is the case here. However, the confidence intervals
are so wide that the bounds are not found within -2 and 2, making it impossible
to reach a conclusion about the extent of risk-sharing and whether it has increased,
further casting doubt on the estimates.
Also, the bias that arises from applying too many instruments to the model needs
to be considered given that the dGMM’s instrument set expands with time. There
are three biases resulting from using too many instruments. Firstly, the number of
instruments can impact on the finite sample performance of the asymptotic dGMM
estimator. Secondly, using too many instruments can lead to a failure to properly
identify the exogenous versus endogenous elements of the endogenous variables,
which would lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. In the extreme case this
would provide estimates that are as biased as the estimates of a naive OLS regression.
And thirdly, using too many instruments impacts the Hansen test, leading it to
falsely fail to reject the null hypothesis of joint instruments validity. The general
tell-tale signs of using too many instruments, as argued by Roodman (2006) and
Windmeijer (2005), are a Hansen p-value very close to 1 and the instrument count
17For an explanation and derivation of dGMM and the AB-AR() test, see Roodman (2006).
Furthermore, the reader should be aware that the test is designed for large N, and ”large has no
precise definition, but applying it to panels with N = 20, for instance, seems worrisome.”(Roodman
(2006) p.36)
18In fact, the Table (4.7) presents the Kleibergen (2002, 2005) extension of the Moreira (2003)
CLR statistic to the non-i.i.d. case.
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being larger than the cross-section available.19 In the case of the estimation utilizing
the entire time period (1970-2007), the Hansen p-value is close to one and the
instrument count of 36 is larger than the cross-section of 24, suggesting that too
many instruments are used. Meanwhile, the value of the Hansen p-value for the
sub-period is considerably lower than one and the instrument set is smaller than
cross-section, giving some limited confidence that the instruments are valid and
that not too many instruments are being used in the sub-period. Since the same
IV set is used for the estimation with the entire time-sample, as well as for the
sub-samples, it to some extent indicates that the IV set might also be appropriate
for the entire time period.
Going beyond the Hansen test’s signal that too many instruments are used, both
the Hansen and Sargan methods test the joint null hypothesis that the instruments
are valid, in other words that the instruments are exogenous to the error term. The
Hansen and Sargan test come to opposite conclusions; the Hansen test fails to reject
that the instruments are valid, while the Sargan test rejects the null hypothesis.
Although the Sargan test has better finite sample performance than the Hansen
test, the Hansen test is robust and consistent in cases of heteroskedasticity and
serially correlated disturbances while the Sargan test is not. Together, the Hansen
signal that too many instruments are being used and the Sargan test’s rejection of
the instruments’ validity raise doubts about the validity of the dGMM estimation
results, which is not surprising given that the dGMM method is designed for panel
samples consisting of large N and small T. As such, the estimator lends itself to
being applied to smaller but more numerous sub-sample period estimations.20
Alternatively, to avoid instrument proliferation and potentially using too many
instruments, the dGMM instrument set can be collapsed such that each lag used is
collapsed into a single instrument, i.e. all instruments that are at the second lag level
of the endogenous variable are collapsed into on instrument of yt−2.21 Collapsing
the dGMM instrument when only using t-2 would make the dGMM equivalent to
the FD2SLS with Zlevel = yt−2 in Table (4.5). Accordingly, to gain efficiency, Table
(4.8) shows the estimation results when the collapsed instrument pool is limited to
the two and three period lagged level of output.22
19For completeness, the estimation was also done with up to t − 3 instruments, and the result
remained largely the same, except for the standard error being lower. The difference in the standard
error is due to the gains in efficiency through having more instruments. Meanwhile, given the tell-
tale signs of using too many instruments, they imply with Hansen p-value close to one that the IV
set utilizing up to t− 3 lags, rather than just t− 2, is an unwise choice.
20However, such sub-sample estimations are not of direct interest, as they are not commonly
done in the risk-sharing literature and thus they are not shown here.
21See Roodman (2009) for a more in depth discussion of the proliferation of instruments and the
appropriate use and implementation of collapsed instruments and limited lag length.
22For completeness, appendix (D.2) shows the result of dGMM using only collapsed two period
lagged output as instrument.
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1970-2007 1970-1990 1991-2007 Dummy:1990-2007
βu 0.7249
∗∗∗ 0.7951∗∗∗ 0.7815∗∗∗
βu SE() (.0979) (.2107) (.0447)
βu 95% CI [0.533, 0.917] [0.382, 1.208] [0.694, 0.869]
βu,D1 0.6794
∗∗∗
βu,D1 SE() (.0606)
βu,D1 95% CI [0.561, 0.798]
βu,D2 -0.0393
βu,D2 SE() (.0321)
βu,D2 95% CI [-0.102, 0.024]
IV-Count 2 2 2 2
AB-AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.001
AB-AR(2) p-value 0.796 0.431 0.822 0.554
Hansen p-value 0.421 0.633 0.052 0.078
Sargan p-value 0.493 0.650 0.000 0.402
U-ID KP LM χ2 2.24 1.67 3.85 7.72
U-ID KP LM p-value 0.3270 0.4337 0.1460 0.0522
AR Weak ID robust CI [..., ...] [..., ...] [0.693, 0.915]
Significance levels: ∗ denotes 10%, ∗∗ 5%, and ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%. Standard errors shown are arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelated robust standard errors. The critical value for χ20.01 with 2
degree of freedom is 9.210, for χ20.05 5.991, and for χ
2
0.1 4.605. The dGMMs and the Anderson
and Rubin (1949) confidence intervals were constructed using the Stata commands xtabond2 and
weakiv by Roodman (2006) and Finlay et al. (2013). A ‘...’ means that the limit, be it upper or
lower, was not found to be between -2 and 2. Empty cell means the row is not applicable for the
respective column.
Table 4.8: dGMM estimation with collapsed instrument set limited to two and three
period lagged output
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Contrary to Table (4.7), Table (4.8) appears to suggest that risk-sharing stayed
essentially flat. However, the 95% confidence interval for the unshared risk estimate
using the sub-period 1970-1990 ranges from 0.3820 to 1.2083, which is much wider
than the confidence interval for the estimates using the sub-period 1991-2007, which
ranges from 0.694 to 0.869.23 Thus there is a possibility that the actual risk-sharing
could also have expanded between the two sub-periods in the case of the dGMM
using a collapsed instrument set of t-2 and t-3. The estimations in Table (4.8) also
differ from the dGMM estimations in Table (4.7), in that the Hansen and Sargan
tests both fail to reject the null hypothesis of valid instruments, except for the es-
timation on sub-period 1991-2007 where only the Hansen test fails to reject null
hypothesis. Adding further doubt, the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) underidentifi-
cation test fails to reject the null hypothesis of E(∆yi,tZi,t) not being full column
rank, where Z = [yi,t−2 yi,t−3], bringing into question the estimates as they appear
to suffer from underidentification and consequently are potentially inconsistent.
As discussed in the case of FD2SLS, the dGMM estimator face an issue if output
is a unit-root process. That is, if output is a unit root process, the endogenous
variable and the instrument set would be uncorrelated. This implies that even
though the instruments are exogenous, they are not correlated with the endogenous
regressors and therefore the estimator is inconsistent because the rank condition
is not satisfied.24 Also, like in the case of the FD2SLS, the instruments become
weaker as output approaches a unit-root process. Thus again, as in the case of the
FD2SLS, the dGMM method is presented on the basis that GDP might not be a
I(1) but close to a unit-root process, and might serve more as a general method to
avoid endogeneity bias in estimates in cases when output is not exactly an I(1), in
which case the Level estimation would be suffering from inconsistency. Along this
line of thought, an interesting observation, given the finding of 1991-2007 not being
I(1) while 1970-1990 being I(1), is that the results of dGMM and Level are similar,
implying that to some extent the point estimates are valid, as at least one of the
estimators should be valid in each sub-period.
23Also, using the same approach as before for testing a change in risk-sharing between 1970-1990
and 1991-2007, we fail to reject the H0 : βu,D2 = 0 using a two-sided t-test with 5% significance
level, with the p-value being 0.221. This means risk-sharing did not increase nor decrease between
the two sub-period. The dGMM results for the interactive dummy estimation using collapsed
instruments set consisting out of two and thee period lagged output are shown in the last column
of Table (4.8).
24Alternative estimators which could be used and which are similar to the dGMM estimator
include the estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998),
referred to as system GMM. However, the system GMM, similar to dGMM, would also suffer
under the unit-root and it is more like to suffer under instrument proliferation and potential
weak identification than dGMM. Also, the system GMM employs a different methodology by
instrumenting a level estimation with first difference, bringing the system GMM closer to a Level
risk-sharing estimation. For a detailed discussion of the system GMM and its assumptions please
see Roodman (2006). Given these conditions, the system GMM will not be further discussed.
Nonetheless, for completeness the preliminary results of the system GMM estimator can be found
in the appendix.
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4.5 SVAR-IV approach
While not requiring the researcher to provide instruments beyond lags of the re-
gressor, the FD2SLS and the dGMM require the series to be stationary, which is
not necessarily the case as discussed above. In this case, while following the con-
cept of instrumenting endogenous output, one could construct an instrument on
the basis of identifying aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks. Bayoumi
and Eichengreen (1993) proposed an identification process, based on Blanchard and
Quah (1989) and Bayoumi (1992), for the separation of output’s aggregate supply
from aggregate demand shocks. This process is based on theoretical assumptions
derived from an AS-AD framework to separate output’s supply from demand shocks
using the information contained in prices and output. Whereas aggregate demand
shocks are driven by consumption shocks, and thus render an output series en-
dogenous in the regression of consumption on output, aggregate supply shock drive
output exogenously.
Although demand shocks can be risk-shared, they are driven by consumption
and thus render output series endogenous in a standard risk-sharing estimation of
consumption on output. On the other hand, aggregate supply shock drive output
exogenously and can be risk-shared in a similar way to demand shocks. This means
the identification of supply shocks will provide an exogenous instrument to esti-
mate consistently the overall risk-sharing of output shocks, especially when output
is mainly composed of supply shocks. The novelty of the approach used here is not
with the identification of the supply shock, which is wholly based on Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1993), but in using the derived supply shock as an exogenous instru-
ment in an IV estimation and in this particular context in estimating risk-sharing.
Figure 4.1: Aggregate Demand shift
The identification of aggregate demand shocks is derived from the effects on price
and output associated with a demand shock. These effects can be seen in Fig.(4.1),
where a positive demand shock, shifting aggregate demand from AD to AD′, causes
prices to rise to P ′ and output to Y ′ in the short run equilibrium in which AS equals
AD′. However, this shift reflects the short run and as the time span moves to the
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long run and the aggregate supply shifts to its long run vertical LRAS position, as
determined by the production possibility frontier, the price further rises to P” while
output shifts back to Y. This shows that a positive aggregate demand shock when
causing a positive price rise, also causes a temporary increase in output but not a
permanent rise in output. Of course, this impact separation assumes that shocks
that shift the AD curve to AD′ curve are permanent, an assumption that is also
held in the case of supply shocks shifting the AS curve below.
Figure 4.2: Aggregate Supply shift
Fig.(4.2) shows the argument used for the identification of aggregate supply
shocks. A positive supply shock shifts the aggregate supply AS to AS’ with an
associated drop in prices from P to P’ and a rise in output from Y to Y’. The
identification assumption further stipulates that the AS shock will have a permanent
output rise associated with a shift in the LRAS supply, or the production possibility
frontier, as well. This permanent effect implies that, unlike in the AD shock, output
has permanently increased and prices have permanently fallen.25 Of course, this
effect separation of impacts assumes that shocks that shift the AD and AS curve
are permanent.
4.5.1 Estimation method
This section presents the method used for the identification and separation of de-
mand and supply shocks via a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) approach.
It then goes on to describes the subsequent use of the derived supply shock to esti-
mate risk-sharing in an one step IV-GMM regression that is similar to the FD2SLS
and dGMM estimations except instead of using lagged output the derived supply
shocks are used as an instrument. The notation is different in this section as it
follows the general notation used in the SVAR estimation method presented by
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). For example, one of the difference in notation in
25Similar SVAR estimations have been done by Funke (1998) and Funke and Hall (1998), but for
the purpose of analyzing the importance of structural supply and demand shocks for UK regions
and German regions.
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this section (4.5.1) compared to others is that xt does not refer to a vector containing
all countries at time t, but a vector of variables at time t, e.g. xt = [x
1
i,tx
2
i,t]
′.
Before proceeding to the estimation, it is necessary to differentiate between the
SVAR and its risk-sharing use in this chapter and the SVAR application by Bay-
oumi and Eichengreen (1993) and Asdrubali and Kim (2000). Although the SVAR
estimation follows the SVAR as applied by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), the ap-
plication here goes beyond their original use by employing the derived supply shock
to instrument GDP in an IV-regression to estimate risk-sharing. Meanwhile, the
approach based on SVAR for the purpose of estimating risk-sharing presented here
differs from the SVAR presented in Asdrubali and Kim (2000), as here we explicitly
assume that GDP shocks are not exclusively exogenous but contain an endogenous
element, i.e. demand shocks. By contrast, the SVAR application by Asdrubali and
Kim (2000) allows for GDP to be endogenous, but assumes that GDP shocks are ex-
ogenous. Subsequently, the SVAR is used to extract the exogenous elements, which
are then used as IVs in a estimation which Asdrubali and Kim (2000) refer to as
static risk-sharing estimation.
Firstly the method used for the identification and separation of demand and sup-
ply shocks is presented. The method used is a SVAR as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1993) with the following structural model:
xt =
∞∑
i=0
LiAiωt (4.23)
In Eq.(4.23) xt is a vector of variables, which in our case contains the logarithmic
change in output ∆yt and prices ∆pt, and these are an MA(∞) of a vector of shocks,
ωt, consisting of aggregate demand shocks ωD,t and aggregate supply shocks ωS,t.
Therefore x′t = [∆yt ∆pt] and ω
′
t = [ωD,t ωS,t]. Ai, the impulse response function,
represents the parameters of the reaction of output and prices to the demand and
supply shocks. While the underlying macroeconomic theoretical impact of aggregate
demand and supply shocks was shown in the previous section, we can use the derived
impact to formalize the structure of the impulse response matrix:
∞∑
i=0
LiAi =
∞∑
i
Li
[
a11,i a12,i
a21,i a22,i
]
ωt (4.24)
From our theoretical model, we expect that aggregate demand shocks will have no
permanent impact on output, so that
∞∑
i=0
a11,i = 0 (4.25)
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where a11,i is the parameter of demand shocks in the output equation. In addition
to the exclusion of the permanent effect of demand shocks on output, the theoret-
ical model implies that demand and supply shocks have opposite effects on price.
However, in the application of the SVAR, these restrictions are not imposed on the
structural parameters. They could serve instead to see if the shocks have been ap-
propriately identified. However, we do not know the parameter values of Ai or ωt,
but need to extract this information from the information we have, which is the
realization of output and prices in the sample period. Subsequently, based on these
realizations, we can construct a reduced form of the model
xt = B1xt−1 + B2xt−2 + ...+ Bixt−i + et (4.26)
which rewritten in the form of a MA process using lag polynomial become
xt =
∞∑
i=0
Diet−i (4.27)
where et is a vector of true output and price shocks. The invertible MA represen-
tation, as pointed out by Funke (1998) and Funke and Hall (1998), assumes that
nonfundamental representation does not exist, which therefore circumvents the issue
raised by Lippi and Reichlin (1993) on the topic on noninvertible process.
Eq.(4.26) represents the reduced form of our structural model on which the
VAR estimation will be run to obtain estimates of the demand and supply shocks,
with eˆt−i being the residual vector of the (4.26) VAR estimation consisting of the
estimated output and price shocks.26 For simplicity, it is assumed that et−i = eˆt−i,
i.e. that the true output and price shocks have been appropriately identified and
represented by the output and price shocks derived by the VAR estimation.
However, a further step is necessary since, et, the residual of the estimated
output and price equations, does not allow us to differentiate aggregate demand
from supply shocks. To do so, we stipulate that
et = Cωt (4.28)
and we say the variance
ete
′
t = Cωtω
′
tC
′ (4.29)
While we already know the elements on the left hand side (since the residual was
obtained from the estimated VAR), we do not know the elements on the right hand
side. This means we know three elements on the left hand side, whereas the right
26The appropriate lag length of the VAR given by the length of Bixt−i and other aspects of
estimating the actual SVAR will be discussed later on.
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hand side includes seven unknown elements from the C matrix and ωt vector. This
means the system can not be identified in its current form. To be able to identify
it we need to impose restrictions; to be precise, we need at least four restrictions to
identify the system. A common and to some extent obvious restriction is that we
assume that the demand and supply shocks are independent of each other. Further-
more, we assume the common restriction of the variance of demand and the variance
of supply shocks to be 1, effectively meaning that the demand and supply shocks are
i.i.d. N(0, 1). Effectively, the 2 × 2 variance-covariance matrix of ωt is an identity
matrix whose variance’s diagonal is equal to 1:
ωtω
′
t =
[
1 0
0 1
]
(4.30)
This imposes three restrictions, and we need one more restriction to identify the
system. In this case we come back to the theoretical conclusion that demand shocks
have no permanent effect on output. Consequently, when inserting for et = Cωt,
we stipulate that:27
∞∑
i=0
DiC =
[
d11,i d12,i
d21,i d22,i
][
c11 c12
c21 c22
]
=
[
0 .
. .
]
(4.31)
With these four restrictions the system is just-identified and the SVAR can be
estimated. Specifically, these four restrictions allows us to uniquely identify the C
matrix in ete
′
t = Cωtω
′
tC
′ as we need solve[
ey,tey,t ey,tep,t
ep,tey,t ep,tep,t
]
=
[
c11 c12
c21 c22
][
1 0
0 1
][
c11 c21
c12 c22
]
(4.32)
where the left hand side is the known variance and covariance of the residual from
the estimated VAR, output and price shocks, and where c11,i is known based on
the linear restriction imposed in Eq(4.31). Having uniquely identified the C matrix
then allows us to solve Eq. (4.28), C−1et = ωt , for demand and supply shocks,
ω′t = [ωD,t ωS,t], which written out is:[
c11 c21
c12 c22
]−1 [
ey,t
ep,t
]
=
[
ωD,t
ωS,t
]
(4.33)
In this entire process, we did not impose any restriction on the parameters of
demand and supply shocks on price. This allows us to use impulse response functions
to test whether the impact of shocks on price follow the predicted effect, i.e. demand
27In essence, this translates into saying that a demand shock has no permanent impact on output.
However, it allows for some impact which, over time, approaches zero.
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shocks have a positive effect and supply shocks have a negative effect. If this is the
case, one can take it as a sign that one has correctly identified aggregate demand
and supply shocks. Furthermore, to appropriately specify the reduced form model
and estimate the residuals, it is necessary to find the appropriate lag length. The lag
length for the underlying VAR is chosen to be 2 for each country. We have followed
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) in applying a uniform lag length to preserve the
symmetry of estimation and to allow a more natural comparison and the use of
the obtained structural errors. The actual lag length is based on the Akaike and
Schwarz IC, which identifies either one or two lags to be used for the countries in
the sample.
Before proceeding with the actual risk-sharing estimation, the structure of the
derived demand and supply shocks will be described. Table (4.9) and Fig. (4.3)
show the properties of the above SVAR derived demand and supply shocks for the
24 OECD countries. Table (4.9) demonstrates that both demand and supply shocks
have a mean of 0 and a variance of 1. These properties are further supported by Fig.
(4.3), which shows that the shocks are well approximated by the density function of
a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1, indicated by the solid
black line. Additionally, a range of normality tests failed to reject the hypothesis
of normal distribution. However, this should not come as much of a surprise, since
the underlying reduced errors were estimated by SVAR methods which imposes the
errors to be i.i.d. N(0, 1). And so when calculating the structural errors from
reduced errors using scalar and linear transformation, the structural errors should
have a similar distribution as the underlying reduced form errors.
Shock Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Ag.Demand 0.000 1.0006 -3.6598 4.1029
Ag.Supply 0.000 1.0006 -3.7876 3.2659
Supply and demand shock derived from the SVAR for 24 OECD countries over the period
1970-2007.
Table 4.9: Estimated aggregate supply and demand shocks descriptive statistics
Now that we have obtained the supply shocks we can move to estimating the
risk-sharing. This is done using a standard IV-estimation. The estimation relies for
its asymptotic properties on fixed N and large T. The underlying estimation is the
same Eq. (4.17) or Eq. (4.19) except that ∆y is instrumented with Z, an NT ∗ 1
vector consisting of the derived supply shocks εS. This is exactly identified IV as
there is one endogenous variable, y, and one instrument, εS.
28
28While using this process provides one IV, the supply shock, to test the exogeneity of regressors
requires over-identification – i.e. the amount of IVs has to exceed the amount of endogenous
regressors which in this case means at least two IVs are needed for over-identification. One solution,
is to use the same instruments as in the FD2SLS, either ∆yt−2 or yt−2, which would provide a
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of aggregate demand and supply shocks
4.5.2 Estimation results
The results of the risk-sharing estimation using derived supply shocks in an IV-GMM
estimation are displayed below in Table (4.10). The standard errors shown in Table
(4.10) are arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelated robust standard errors.
Additionally, as the shocks might have lower variance around zero towards the 1990’s
and onwards as a result of active business cycle management, separate estimates of
aggregate supply shocks were done: one in which the supply shocks were derived from
one SVAR on the entire sample period and one in which the supply shocks for 1970-
1990 and 1991-2007 were derived from two SVARs on these sub-periods. Whereas
the top half of Table (4.10) refers to the risk-sharing estimates using aggregate
supply shocks obtained from the SVAR over the entire sample period, the bottom
half refers to the risk-sharing estimates utilizing aggregate supply shocks obtained
from the two sub-sample SVARs.
It is apparent from Table (4.10) that risk-sharing has risen by about 8 percentage
points from 28% in 1973-2007 to 36% in 1991-2007. However, caution should be
taken as the risk-sharing expansion is found to be not significant.29 Nonetheless, the
risk-sharing estimates obtained from instrumenting using aggregate supply shocks
second instrument without the instrument proliferation of the dGMM. The estimation using both
the supply shocks and FD2SLS style instrument can be found in appendix (D.4).
29The test whether risk-sharing changed between 1973-1990 and 1991-2007 follows the same
methodology as introduced in the previous chapter and used throughout this chapter. The test is
based on testing the parameter of an interactive dummy term from a estimation over the entire
period, with the dummy being 0 prior to and including 1990 and 1 thereafter. Specifically, the
parameter of interest is βu,D2 as shown in the last column of Table (4.10). The test tests H0 :
βu,D2 = 0 using a two-sided t-test with 5% significance level. If H0 is not rejected than risk-
sharing did not change between 1973-1990 and 1991-2007 –up nor down. The H0 of no change
is not rejected in case of the IV-estimation where the supply shocks are derived from one SVAR
over the entire period with the p-value being 0.555. In case of the IV-estimation where the supply
shocks are derived from sub-period SVAR estimations the H0 is rejected at a 5% significance level
but not at a 1% significance level.
76
Variable 1973-2007 1973-1990 1991-2007 Dummy:1973-2007
βu 0.6848
∗∗∗ 0.7151∗∗∗ 0.6363∗∗∗
βu SE() (0.0591) (0.0753) (0.1106)
βu 95% CI [0.569, 0.801] [0.568, 0.863] [0.420, 0.853]
βu,D1 0.7151
∗∗∗
βu,D1 SE() (0.0753)
βu,D1 95% CI [0.568, 0.863]
βu,D2 -0.0789
βu,D2 SE() (0.1335)
βu,D2 95% CI [-0.341, 0.183]
U-ID KP LM χ2 85.541 55.480 27.837 27.837
U-ID KP LM p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
W-ID CD Wald F 295.840 152.283 136.470 140.503
W-ID KP Wald F 140.130 96.405 45.199 22.603
AR weak-iv robust CI [0.565, 0.800] [0.569, 0.867] [0.352, 0.816]
subperiod SVARs
βu 0.9410
∗∗∗ 1.1442∗∗∗ 0.6810∗∗∗
βu SE() (0.0902) (0.1553) (0.1184)
βu 95% CI [0.764, 1.118] [0.840, 1.449] [0.449, 0.913]
βu,D1 1.1442
∗∗∗
βu,D1 SE() (0.1553)
βu,D1 95% CI [0.840, 1.449]
βu,D2 -0.4632
∗∗
βu,D2 SE() (0.1956)
βu,D2 95% CI [-0.847 -0.080]
U-ID KP LM χ2 44.667 20.884 28.119 20.884
U-ID KP LM p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
W-ID CD Wald F 74.688 30.220 53.854 29.337
W-ID KP Wald F 59.323 25.204 48.414 12.60
AR weak-iv robust CI [0.773, 1.137] [0.8920, 1.581] [0.4044, 0.8920]
Significance levels: ∗ denotes 10%, ∗∗ 5%, and ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%. The IV estimations and the Anderson
and Rubin (1949) confidence intervals were constructed using the Stata commands ivreg2 and
weakiv by Baum et al. (2010) and Finlay et al. (2013). Empty cell means the row is not
applicable for the respective column.
Table 4.10: IV-Estimation using aggregate supply shocks
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are of a similar extent to the Level-approach estimates of 20% for 1970-2007, 19% for
1970-1990, and 37% for 1991-2007, and the dGMM estimates of 27% for 1970-2007,
24% for 1970-1990, and 43% for 1991-2007. Of course there are differences in the
point estimates, but the results from Level estimation, dGMM and SVAR-IV show
the same outcome: a similar increase in risk-sharing from 1970-1990 to 1990-2007
with a similar albeit different extent of risk-sharing. Caution should be exercised
here in concluding an increase in risk-sharing occurred as the increase wasn’t found
to be substantial. However, the rejection of a substantial increase in risk sharing is
because the change is very imprecisely estimated with a change anywhere from -0.8
to +0.2. This wide range makes it difficult to draw a strong conclusion about the
extent and significance of the change in risk-sharing between the two sub-periods.
Also, it is very important to recognize that both the underidentification and weak
identification tests are clear that the estimations in Table (4.10), unlike the FD2SLS,
neither suffer from under- nor weak identification. In addition, the Anderson and
Rubin (1949) confidence interval is clearly defined within the -2 and 2 range and,
with the exception of two instances, is clearly defined by values near or between 0
and 1 and is much narrower than in the case of the dGMM or FD2SLS. In short,
it appears that the SVAR-IV estimates are consistent as they, unlike the FD2SLS
or dGMM, do not suffer from under- nor from weak identification, despite output
being unit-root or being close to it. Thus, as the results from the SVAR-IV appear
more reliable than the FD2SLS or dGMM results, it could be concluded that the
strategy of constructing instruments via an SVAR estimation was more successful
in generating more reliable instruments than was FD2SLS or dGMM.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has set out to ease the assumption of exogeneity in case of risk-sharing
model estimation. In that attempt the chapter has looked at various estimators
on top of the methods employed in literature; Anderson and Hsiao (1981, 1982)
FD2SLS estimator, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) dGMM estimator and a instrumental
variable estimation based on Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) SVAR. These ad-
ditional estimators were presented based on the underlying endogeneity of output
and the subsequent bias in risk-sharing point estimates. That is, these additional
estimators should, under certain circumstances, be robust to endogeneity bias that
arises due to the causality of demand shocks originating in consumption running to
output. Also an extensive part of the discussion of robust estimates centered on the
Level approach, which should be robust if non-stationary.
When comparing the results to the Classical approach, where no rise in risk-
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sharing is found, the alternative approaches indicate some rise in risk-sharing. While
the Level approach is potentially inconsistent, the presence of similar results in the
dGMM and SVAR-IV method, gives further credence to the conclusion that risk-
sharing has indeed increased. However, both the FD2SLS and the dGMM appear to
suffer either from under- or from weak identification, which is likely related to output
being close to a unit root process or being I(1), and therefore their estimates are
potentially inconsistent. The SVAR-IV on the other hand does not appear to suffer
from under- nor from weak identification and its results in comparison to the Level
estimation appear reasonable. Overall, this supports the conclusion that the SVAR-
IV approach is more successful -in that it generates a much stronger instrument-
in providing consistent risk-sharing parameter that are considerably more reliable
than the FD2SLS and dGMM in the context of risk-sharing estimates.
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Chapter 5
Risk-sharing and endogeneity: a
Monte Carlo Study
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter presented various alternative risk-sharing estimation methods
that under certain circumstances are robust to the endogeneity of output. These al-
ternative estimators led to the conclusion that risk-sharing was higher and increasing
compared to the findings of the Classical approach estimated in the third chapter.
However, it should be noted that the coefficients for the two subsamples were not
precisely estimated, and in most cases the null that no change in risk-sharing could
not be rejected. In this chapter a Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) is employed to
analyse the risk-sharing estimation performance of the various approaches intro-
duced in the preceding chapters. On the one hand this will demonstrate to what
extent the Classical approach is biased when output is endogenous, and on the other
hand identify which alternative approach performs best in estimating risk-sharing.
The various risk-sharing estimation methodologies have unique strengths and
weaknesses which affect their ability to estimate risk-sharing. For example, besides
suffering from endogeneity, the small sample has implications for the use of the Clas-
sical method. In estimating using the Classical method, the third chapter applied a
correction for cluster-based heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent errors.
This approach in estimating the cluster-robust covariance relies for its asymptotic
properties on the number of clusters, determined by the cross-section of the panel
data, to go to infinity. However, in our panel data the cross section with 24 countries
is not close to infinity, or even large. Meanwhile, the Level method requires a non-
stationary output and consumption series for consistency. In contrast, the dGMM
method requires stationarity and suffers from increasingly weak instrument bias as
80
output approaches I(1). Therefore, while both the Level and dGMM methods dis-
play similar results in the previous chapters, only one can be valid. Furthermore,
dGMM is an asymptotic estimator designed for a large cross-section and a short
time period. However, in our case the panel consist of similar seized time series and
cross-section with both being far from infinity. Lastly, the IV estimation using de-
rived supply shocks requires an intermediate estimation in which the supply shocks
are derived, leaving this approach more prone to mis-specifications, of which the
likeliest is that demand shocks are falsely identified as supply shocks.
The panel structure of the MCS will be the same as panel structure of the data
used in the preceding chapters: a cross-section of 24 and time series of 37. In
addition, the endogeneity of output in the risk-sharing estimation will be explicitly
modeled.
The results presented below show that in the case of endogeneity bias the Clas-
sical estimation method underestimates risk-sharing by about 23% and more, while
the alternative methods tend to generate estimates that are closer to the true risk-
sharing parameter. Also, as the severity of the endogeneity bias increases, almost
all the methods diverge from the true parameter with exception of the level and the
supply shock based IV methods.
5.2 Data generating processes
This section presents underlying structure common to all the data generating pro-
cesses (DGPs) which underlie the MCS. The DGPs discussion starts with outlining
the underlying common structure to all DGPs.
To reflect the data set used in the previous chapters, the DGPs are defined in
terms of a panel data set with a cross-section of 24 and a time series of 37. The DGPs
define three variables for the MCS to be applied to for each of the proposed risk-
sharing estimation methodologies: consumption per capita (c), output per capita
(y), and price (p). All three variables will be modeled in logs. Also, as in in
the fourth chapter, all variables are defined as matrices and vectors such that, for
example, c is a (24 ∗ 37 × 1) vector of consumption, with ct being a (24 × 1) sub-
vector of c that contains all the cross sections in time period t and ci being a (37×1)
sub-vector of c that contains all the time periods for cross-section i.
The variation in the DGPs is driven by two exogenous shocks: supply (Si,t) and
demand shocks (Di,t).
1 The supply and demand shocks, based on the fourth chapter’s
1S and D are the (24 ∗ 37× 1) vectors containing the stacked Si,t and Di,t respectively.
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SVAR estimation, will be modeled as:
Di,t, 
S
i,t ∼ i.i.d. N (0, 1) (5.1)
5.2.1 Output
Given the supply and demand shocks, the functional form of output is defined as:
yt = yt−1α + Dt ψ + 
S
t (5.2)
which states that output is an AR(1) process driven by demand and supply shocks.
In its current form, Eq. (5.2) excludes a time trend. However, for reasons that will
become clear later, including a time trend is a trivial matter as it does not affect
the risk-sharing estimates beyond whether to include or exclude an intercept in the
risk-sharing estimation, or in the case of the Level methodology whether to include a
time trend. The starting value of each cross section, yi,0, is randomly chosen from a
normal distribution with a mean of 9.25079 and variance of 0.3117286 which reflects
the first period distribution of the panel data used in the previous chapters.2
Since output is modeled as an AR(1) process, supply and demand shocks have
a contemporaneous effect on output and continue to impact output subject to the
nature of the AR(1) coefficient, α. To see this Eq. (5.2) could be expressed as an
MA(∞):
yi = Γ(
D
i ψ + 
S
i ) (5.3)
where Γ is the following matrix
Γ =

α α2 · · · αT
0 α · · · αT−1
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · α
 (5.4)
Eq. (5.3) highlights that output in any period is the sum of all the preceding shocks
subject to α. If |α| = 1 output is a unit root process and Eq. (5.3) and Eq.
(5.2) would be a random walk, i.e. output in any period is the unweighted sum
of all preceding supply and demand shocks. In short, output is modeled as the
equilibrium realization of aggregate supply and aggregate demand driven by supply
and demand shocks.
As a word of caution: as discussed by Chesher and Peters (1994) and Davidson
2Although the choice has little impact on the dynamics of output and therefore has no mean-
ingful impact on the results of the risk-sharing estimation.
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and MacKinnon (1993), the estimators examined and the associated (finite-sample)
results rely on the regressor’s distribution, specifically whether or not the regressors
are symmetrically distributed around a mean. Therefore, the results might have
special properties that might not hold in general.3 This applies to output as defined
in Eq. (5.2), when |α| < 1 as output gravitates toward the demand and supply
shock distributions which are defined as being symmetrically distributed around a
mean of zero. However, in the fourth chapter, it was discussed at length that a
symmetric distribution of D and S is an appropriate choice.
Two conceptually distinct versions of the DGPs will be constructed: one in which
output is explicitly assumed to be exogenous and one in which output is endogenous.
When modeling output as exogenous, ψ in Eq. (5.2) will be zero, which implies that
output is solely driven by supply shocks. That does not mean demand shocks are
not occurring, but rather that they are not affecting output. This exogenous output
scenario is used to provide a base case for a risk-sharing estimation in which output
is not exogenous.
When output is modeled as endogenous, ψ in Eq. (5.2) will take a value above
zero and up to and including one, 0 < ψ <= 1. In other words, ψ captures the
severity of the endogeneity and limits the contemporaneous impact of a demand
shock on output. The closer ψ is to zero, the less severe the endogeneity bias, and
vice versa when ψ approaches one. Combined with the autoregressive coefficient α
in Eq. (5.2), ψ implies that demand shocks die out faster than supply shocks if α
and ψ are smaller than one. In case where α = 1 but ψ < 1 then, for similar demand
and supply shocks, output varies more strongly with supply than demand shocks.
Also, ψ is defined as being constant across the panel series, i.e. ψi = ψj ∀i 6= j.
This is done to avoid unnecessary complexity, especially since the panel estimation
would reflect the average of the country individual time-series with the point esti-
mates being equivalent to the mean of the chosen distribution if ψ is symmetrically
distributed. At the same time however, it would increasingly obscure the conclusion
as the results would become subject to an additional changing factor, which would
increase the combinations of MCS results. Furthermore, the variance of the point
estimates would be increased beyond the variance due to the asymptotic properties
of the estimators employed. In other words, the point estimates are expected to
be the same with greater variance. Therefore, since we are interested in the point
estimate, there is no gain in introducing this additional complexity. Note that ψ 6= 0
by itself does not imply output is endogenous but the presence of demand shocks in
consumption directly creates the simultaneity bias in the risk-sharing estimation.
3That is, if the MSC regressors are symmetrically distributed around a mean, the employed
estimator tends to have special properties which do not hold for most other distributions. This
means the results of a MCS using symmetrically distributed random regressors could be misleading,
especially if the real world regressors are not symmetrical distributed around a mean.
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Autoregressive parameter α
α < 1 α = 1
Endogeneity
parameter ψ
ψ = 0 stationary ex-
ogenous
unit-root ex-
ogenous
ψ > 0 stationary en-
dogenous
unit-root en-
dogenous
Table 5.1: Individual DGPs
In summary, each DGP’s output time series is driven by supply and demand
shocks, and by two parameters: output autocorrelations parameter α and demand
shock parameter ψ. Table (5.1) summarizes the properties of output for the various
combinations of α and ψ. If α < 0 output, is stationary, and unit-root when α = 1.
Meanwhile, if ψ = 0 output is exogenous, and if ψ > 0 output is endogenous. This
creates four possible states: i) output is stationary and exogenous when α < 1 and
ψ = 0, ii) output is unit-root and exogenous when α = 1 and ψ = 0, iii) output
is stationary and endogenous when α < 1 and ψ = 1, iv) output is unit-root and
endogenous when α = 1 and ψ = 1.4
5.2.2 Consumption and price
Consumption will be be driven by output and demand shocks:
c = βuy + 
D (5.5)
where βu measures to what extent consumption is driven by output. In other words,
βu is the unshared risk coefficient we want to compare across the various risk-sharing
estimation approaches. Demand shocks, D, appear both in consumption Eq. (5.5)
and in output Eq. (5.2) and are the element that causes output to be endogenous in
Eq. (5.5). In effect, Eq. (5.5) is the MCS basic risk-sharing model to be estimated
and is equivalent to Eq. (2.18) and (4.2) in the preceding chapters.
Given Eq. (5.5), the endogeneity of output can be stated as the covariance of the
shock experienced by GDP and consumption. If we define egdpi,t as the error in the
GDP Eq. (5.2), such that egdpi,t = 
S
i,t+ψ
D
i,t, and e
c
i,t to be the error in the consumption
Eq. (5.5), such that eci,t = 
D
i,t, then we can state that
( egdpi,t
eci,t
) ∼ (( 00 ),V). It
follows that V, the variance-covariance matrix, is equal to
( σ2gdp σsd
σsd 1
)
, where σsd
is the Cov(egdpi,t , e
c
i,t) and σsd = 0 if output is exogenous. Otherwise, if output is
endogenous then σsd ≡ Cov(Di,t, si,t + ψDi,t) = ψ. σ2gdp is the variance of the output
shock, which is a composite of the variance of demand and supply shocks, that is
4The actual values of α and ψ and the various DGP which arise from the choices is discussed
later on.
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σ2gdp = V ar(
s
i,t + ψ
d
i,t) = V ar(
s
i,t) + V ar(
d
i,t) + Cov(
s
i,t, 
d
i,t) = 1 + 1 + 0.
5
The price variable is needed to identify the supply shocks in the SVAR estimation
approach. Following the analysis of the fourth chapter, price is modeled with demand
shocks having a permanent positive impact on price, and supply shocks having a
permanent negative impact:
pt = pt−1 + Dt − St (5.6)
In Eq. (5.6) price is defined as random walk, but since the SVAR estimation is
exclusively in first differences, Eq. (5.6) collapses to
∆pt = 
D
t − St (5.7)
5.2.3 Time and cross-section fixed effects
The previous chapters used cross-sectional demeaned and first differenced variable
to account for the time and cross-section fixed effects.
Cross-section fixed effects have not been explicitly modeled given that the vari-
ous risk-sharing estimation approaches, apart from the Level approach, are in first
differences, which makes it redundant to model cross-section fixed effects explicitly.
To see this take Eq. (5.5) and add cross-section fixed effects such that we get
ct = at + ytβu + 
D
t (5.8)
where a is the vector containing the cross-section fixed effects which vary over the
cross-section, ai 6= aj, but do not vary over time, at = at−1. When taking first
difference Eq. (5.8) collapses to
∆ct = ∆ytβu + ∆
D (5.9)
because ∆at = 0. For the Level estimation, since this estimation relies on non-
stationary variables and the associated superconsistency, modeling cross-section
fixed effects has no impact on the unshared risk estimate as cross-section fixed
effects are stationary and therefore unrelated to the non-stationary variables.
Like cross-section fixed effects, time fixed effects have not been explicitly mod-
5The endogeneity of output from abroad is reflected in the aggregate demand shocks which
capture consumption shifts abroad via export shifts. As will be discussed below, since consumption
and output are demeaned in the risk-sharing regression using aggregate measure of consumption
and output based on weighted sum of country individuals consumption and output, a measurement
of aggregate area demand shock will be featured, as part of the demeaning process, in the risk-
sharing regression.
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eled. This is because the variables in the estimation, apart from the SVAR, have to
be demeaned, regardless of whether or not time fixed effects are present. Thereby,
any time fixed effects are filtered out regardless of whether or not they are modeled.
The demeaning is applied to account for the mean output shift in each period, which
with a balanced portfolio cannot be insured against. In other words, mean output
variation needs to be filtered out to ascertain a country’s idiosyncratic shocks.
The demeaning is done using a weighted sum, as the theoretical standard risk-
sharing model stipulates that a country’s share in a balanced portfolio of state
contingent assets is subject to the country’s GDP size relative to the aggregate area.
Consequently, the weights provide an indication of the relative size of the country’s
output, with the weights summing to one (
∑N
i=1wi,t = 1 ∀t = 1, 2, 3, ..., T ). Since
output in our DGPs is a randomly generated measurement of GDP per capita, the
output variable does not contain a distinguishable measurement of countries’ relative
size of GDP. In other words, the actual weights assigned to the countries in this MCS
can be randomly assigned to reflect relative seize with the only requirement being
that the weights sum to one. Subsequently, the weights used in the actual empirical
estimation can be used in the DGPs without impacting the MCS results. This means
that the weights are generated by
wi =
GDPi∑N
i=1 GDPi
(5.10)
where GDP denotes the actual GDP of the 24 OECD countries used in the previous
chapters, while wi is a (37 × 1) vector of weights which varies both over time and
cross-section.6 The mean measure is therefore given by
x¯ =
N∑
i=1
wixi (5.11)
such that a demeaned variable is
x˜ = x− x¯ (5.12)
To see why the demeaning would have filtered out time fixed effects take once again
Eq. (5.5) and this time add a time fixed effect vector such that we get the following
ci = q + yiβu + 
D
i (5.13)
where q is the 37×1 time fixed effect vector that is constant across cross-section,qi =
6It is worth highlighting that in the previous chapters, when output per capita was endogenous,
than the weights, constructed using output, were endogenous too. However, for simplicity, and
given that the weights are determined exogenously to the DGPs, the weights in the MCS are
exogenous.
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qj, but varies over time, qt 6= qt−1. If we apply the demeaning from Eq. (5.12) to
Eq. (5.13) we get
ci −
N∑
i=1
wici = q−
N∑
i=1
wiq + (yi −
N∑
i=1
wiyi)βu + 
D
i −
N∑
i=1
wi
D
i (5.14)
which collapses to
ci −
N∑
i=1
wici = yi −
N∑
i=1
wiyiβu + 
D
i −
N∑
i=1
wi
D
i (5.15)
because
∑N
i=1 wiq = q. In short, time fixed effects are implicitly nested in the
DGPs in the non-demeaned consumption-output functional relationship, but since
the relationship is stated in demeaned form, they drop out. Going forward we
will drop the demeaning notation and treat all variables as demeaned except when
explicitly stated otherwise, or in the case of the SVAR estimation where output and
price are not demeaned.
To summarize, the general set up of the DGP for consumption and production is
structured in the demeaned and first differences form, which is equivalent to model-
ing both consumption and output with both fixed effects explicitly and demeaning
them and taking first difference in every draw. For the DGP to be equivalent be-
tween both options and applicable for our purpose – since the Level application
does not take first differences, the only requirements are that the cross-section fixed
effects are stationary.
5.2.4 Data Generating Processes verification
It is essential to confirm that the common underlying structure of DGPs generates
the needed information for the various risk-sharing estimation approaches. More
precisely, we must confirm whether the three data formats used in the empirical
estimation are supported by the DGPs: first differences, levels, and SVAR.
For the risk-sharing estimation in first differences, since output and consumption
are generated in levels, we need to verify that the conversion from level into first
difference does not alter the outcome of the risk-sharing estimation by showing that
the estimation equation in first difference in the MCS is the same as Eq. (2.18) and
(4.2). To do so, we start with taking first difference of Eq. (5.5), which gives us
∆c = ∆yβu + ∆
D (5.16)
Eq. (5.16) is essentially the same as Eqs. (2.18) and (4.2) except for the general
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error in Eqs. (2.18) and (4.2), υ, that could contain various factors that directly
influence consumption. Essentially, in Eq. (5.16) the general error which is υ in
Eqs. (2.18) and (4.2) is limited to demand shocks, D. Nonetheless, estimating
Eq. (5.16) using OLS would yield the same consistent unshared risk estimate of
βu, the variance covariance of output and consumption, if there is no endogeneity,
and an inconsistent estimate if endogeneity is present, as when estimating Eqs.
(2.18) and (4.2) using OLS. In addition, the common structure of DGPs also allows
for endogeneity bias in first difference. To see this take Eq. (5.2) and apply first
difference such that we get
∆y = y(α− 1) + (Dψ + S) (5.17)
Given that D is still present in Eq. (5.17), output is still not independent of the
error, D, in Eq. (5.16) such that E(yD) 6= 0.
In regards to the Level-method, we need to verify that in Eq. (5.5) both c and
y, even after having being demeaned, have the potential to be non-stationary. To
verify that unit root is possible we start with the output Eq. (5.2):
yt = yt−1α + y (5.18)
where, for simplicity, demand and supply shocks are combined in y such that y =
ψD + S. The equivalent of Eq. (5.18) for the mean output is given by
y¯t = wyt = w(yt−1α + y) (5.19)
such that if we demean Eq. (5.18) by subtracting Eq. (5.19) we get
yt − y¯t = (yt−1 − y¯t−1)α + y − ¯y (5.20)
so that if |α| = 1, the question becomes how (yt − y¯t−1) behaves. In other words,
the question is whether the demeaned consumption and output term for individual
countries converges to zero or whether it diverges from zero.
The answer to the question lies in the weighting process. Let us start, for sim-
plicity, by assuming that the weights are identical for all countries: wi = wj. Also,
given that y = ψD + S and both D and S are i.i.d. N (0,1) then it follows
that y ∼ i.i.d. N (0, 1). So that when taking the average across the countries, the
weighted mean tends to converge, as the sample of countries is increased, to the cho-
sen mean of the symmetrically distributed errors, the supply and demand shocks,
which is zero, i.e. limN→∞ N
−1∑N
i=1 
y = E(y) = 0. This implies that the aggregate
of output shocks is close to zero in each period. Thus y¯t grows potentially more
slowly than output for individual countries, as in each period the weighted mean
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shock tends more towards zero compared to country individual shocks, and thereby
providing potential for unit-root in the demeaned variable for some of the 24 coun-
tries. On the other hand, the weights in the DGPs are not identical for each country
and the panel dimension is limited to 24, which means that the weighted mean of
the shocks does not have to be equal or converge to the mean of the symmetric
distribution from which the supply and demand shocks are randomly chosen, but
rather be close to the shocks experienced by the largest countries.7 Nonetheless unit
roots can exist for some countries as the common structure of the DGPs does not
prohibit some countries growing faster or more slowly than the mean growth rate.
This implies that if we ran country individual level estimation, the possibility exists
that some countries would have unit roots and thus we could get consistent country
individual level estimates, while for other countries there wouldn’t be a unit root and
thus least square estimation using the levels of variables would provide inconsistent
risk-sharing parameter estimates. Thus the panel Level estimate can, but does not
have to, give consistent estimates when |α| = 1. Alternatively, if |α| 6= 1, then there
is no potential for a unit root, whether in ratio or not.
Last but not least, we need to verify that output allows for the SVAR to identify
supply and and demand shocks. To see whether the SVAR identifies the shocks, we
need to ensure that the the contemporaneous impact of supply and demand shocks
can be appropriately identified, subject to the long run restriction and the impact
of lagged endogenous variables. Thus we need to verify:8
C = (I−A1 −A2)−1A−10 B
where A1 and A2 are the (2 × 2) coefficient matrices of the lagged endogenous
variables, A0 is the (2 × 2) matrix of contemporaneous effect of the endogenous
variables (which we assumed is a I-matrix in the empirical application), and B
is the contemporaneous impact of supply and demand shock on output and price
matrix (2 × 2). Even though we know that all countries will be an AR(1) process
(given the DGPs), the reason that we have an AR(2), is that an AR(2) process
has been uniformly applied to capture the serial correlation for all countries in the
actual empirical application in the previous chapter. Therefore, the application of
an AR(2) process reflects the empirical application, and it is in this spirit that the
MCS applies an AR(2) condition. Rewritten, we get9
(I−A1 −A2)C = B
7This does not mean that as N, the sample of countries, increases and the weight of each country
drops that the mean would not converge to zero, although in our case N is not large enough for
that to hold.
8A good overview and derivation of the long run restriction matrix can be found in Lu¨tkepohle
(2005).
9As A−10 = I, it follows that A
−1
0 B = IB = B
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when writing out the matrices([
1 0
0 1
]
−
[
a111 a
1
12
a121 a
1
22
]
−
[
a211 a
2
12
a221 a
2
22
])[
c11 c12
c21 c22
]
= B
where, given the long-run restriction of demand shocks having no impact on output,
c11 = 0, we get([
1 0
0 1
]
−
[
a111 a
1
12
a121 a
1
22
]
−
[
a211 a
2
12
a221 a
2
22
])[
0 c12
c21 c22
]
= B
which implies that
B =
[
c21(−a112 − a212) c12(1− a111 − a211) + c22(−a112 − a212)
c21(1− a122 − a222) c12(−a121 − a221) + c22(1− a122 − a222)
]
where b11, the contemporaneous effect of demand shocks on output, is equal to
c21(−a112 − a212).
Effectively, the contemporaneous effect of demand shock on output depends on
the coefficient of price in the output estimation and the long run impact of demand
shock on price. However, as output was defined independently of price, the coeffi-
cients a112 and a
2
12 will be equal to zero, and so that b11 = 0.
10 This implies that
demand shocks do not affect output contemporaneously, or rather that that demand
shocks cannot be separately identified from supply shocks. So, given the common
structure of the DGPs process, the SVAR would not be able to properly identify
supply and demand shocks due to the lack of interaction of output and price in the
DGPs.
This leaves two options: re-define the DGPs or use a B-model SVAR. The first
option entails making the common structure of the DGPs more dynamic by introduc-
ing greater interaction between the price and output, rendering the interpretation
of the MCS more elusive.11 Alternatively, since we know the actual interaction
between the supply and demand with output and price, we could define the contem-
poraneous relationship matrix B. It should be noted that when using the C-SVAR,
as we do when choosing matrix B, we choose a C matrix with imposed restrictions
that, based on theoretical conclusion, are assumed to be true. While the first option
would allow the estimator to be tested along the lines of the empirical application
in the fourth chapter, the second option does not increase the complexity of the
10Actually, all AR(2) coefficients, including a212, will be zero, as neither output nor price were
modeled as AR(2) processes.
11If the interaction of price and output were explicitly modeled, this would impact on the per-
formance of the remaining estimators which do not account for price in the risk-sharing estimate.
On the other hand, if a specific output process is used solely for the SVAR-IV estimation, this
would prohibit the cross-comparison of the estimators performance.
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dynamics behind the DGPs which facilitates the interpretation of the MCS results.
And so, the SVAR will be a B-model structure, where the true B matrix is known
and supplied to the estimator, which in turn allows us, with the DGP’s at hand, to
run SVARs that appropriately identify and separates output shocks into supply and
demand shocks.12 The B-matrix is defined as
B =
[
ψ 1
1 −1
]
(5.21)
5.2.5 Summary of the employed DGPs
Before proceeding with the MCS findings it is worth summarizing the DGPs. There
are several key underlying assumptions that are common to each DGP. Firstly, de-
mand and supply shocks drive consumption, output, and price. They are assumed to
be identically and independently normally distributed. This distribution was chosen
to mimic the characteristic of the supply and demand shocks that were derived using
the SVAR in chapter 4 and essentially means that we do not have heteroskedasticity,
serial correlation, or cross-sectional dependence. Output is both driven by demand
and supply shocks and is modeled as an AR(1) with the same AR parameter across
all cross-sections. Moreover, the unshared risk parameter is identical for all cross-
sections. Consumption is modeled as being driven by output and demand shocks.
No time fixed or cross-section fixed effects have been explicitly modeled. The aggre-
gate shock is calculated using a weighted average with the weights being the same as
those used in chapters 3 and 4. Also, the cross-section dimension has been fixed to
24 countries, while the time series is limited to 37. A relatively small and balanced
panel was chosen to mimic the data used in chapter 3 and 4. And while this means
the MCS is primarily geared towards risk-sharing, it does have wider implication
for literature that deals with simultaneity bias in a relatively small balanced panel,
as is common in many dimensions of annual international cross-country empirical
analysis.
So far the discussion has been around the general structure that underlies each
DGP, and before preceding with the MCS, it is also worth highlighting the various
individual DGPs. There are three parameters that vary and therefore uniquely
identify each DGP: βu the unshared risk parameter, α output’s autocorrelation
parameter, and ψ the parameter which sets out the extent demand shocks feed into
output.
12The SVAR allows for the construction of three different valid supply shock instruments; non-
demeaned supply shock, unweighted cross-sectionally demeaned supply shock, and weighted cross-
sectionally demeaned supply shock. All three would be exogenous and correlated with output.
We use weighted cross-section demeaned supply shock as it is more intuitively in line with the
risk-sharing literature which uses weighted cross-sectionally demeaned output.
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βu α ψ DGP Y I(1) Y endogenous Biased estimators Weak instruments or underidentified
0 1 No No
0.5 0.5 2 No Yes Classical, Level
1 3 No Yes Classical, Level
0 4 No No FD2SLS, dGMM
0.8 0.95 0.5 5 No Yes Classical, Level FD2SLS, dGMM
1 6 No Yes Classical, Level FD2SLS, dGMM
0 7 Yes No FD2SLS, dGMM
1 0.5 8 Yes Yes Classical FD2SLS, dGMM
1 9 Yes Yes Classical FD2SLS, dGMM
0 10 No No
0.5 0.5 11 No Yes Classical, Level
1 12 No Yes Classical, Level
0 13 No No FD2SLS, dGMM
0.6 0.95 0.5 14 No Yes Classical, Level FD2SLS, dGMM
1 15 No Yes Classical, Level FD2SLS, dGMM
0 16 Yes No FD2SLS, dGMM
1 0.5 17 Yes Yes Classical FD2SLS, dGMM
1 18 Yes Yes Classical FD2SLS, dGMM
Table 5.2: Individual DGPs
In terms of actual parameter values chosen, α is varied between 0.5, 0.95, and
1. The values for α that are bordering 1 are interesting because in that region both
the dGMM and FD2SLS suffers from weak instruments and the Level-method is
not consistent. ψ will be varied between 0, 0.5, and 1. This wide range is chosen
to show how the estimators preform under a wide range of degree of endogeneity,
while the wide steps of 0.5 are chosen to keep the MCS of a manageable seize. The
unshared risk coefficient, βu, will take the values of 0.6 and 0.8 so that 40% and 20%
of risk-sharing is taking place respectively. These values roughly correspond to the
range of risk-sharing estimated by the alternative estimation methods in the fourth
chapter and the medium run Level estimation in the third chapter.
Table (5.2) lays out each individual DGP as a combination of the three parame-
ters. In total there are 18 individual DGPs. In addition, in the column labeled as ‘Y
I(1)’, Table (5.2) summarizes the extent to which DGP is believed to have the pos-
sibility of non-stationary output and by extension consumption, and in the column
labeled as ‘Y endogenous’ the extent to which DGP’s output is endogenous. The
second to last column labeled as ‘Biased estimators’, Table (5.2) highlights for each
DGP which estimation approach suffers from endogeneity bias. In the final column
labeled as ‘Weak instruments or underidentified’, Table (5.2) summarizes which es-
timation approach is expected to suffer from weak or uncorrelated instruments for
each DGP .
In summary, the Classical approach should be inconsistent in each DGP except
when ψ = 0, because in that particular case output is not affected by demand
shocks and thus should be exogenous. The Level approach, when ψ > 0, should
only be consistent when α = 1. Finally the FD2SLS and the dGMM suffer from
weak instruments when α = 0.95 and from uncorrelated instruments when α = 1.
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5.3 Monte Carlo Simulation results
Before proceeding with the detailed presentation of the MCS findings, the four main
findings that emerge from the MCS are highlighted and summarized:
Main findings
1 The Classical approach over-estimates unshared risk by 23 to 48 percentage points
when ψ > 0. This finding relates to Table (5.3), although similar findings are
presented in Tables (5.4), (5.7), (5.8), (E.2), and (E.3).
2 The Classical approaches together with the Level approach have the lowest stan-
dard deviation of unshared risk parameter estimates. This relates to the results
presented in Tables (5.5), (5.9), (5.13) and (E.4), with similar results presented
in Tables (E.1), (E.5), and (E.7).
3 Overall, the SVAR-IV is the best performing alternative approach, for the follow-
ing reasons:
a The SVAR-IV mean and median estimate of the unshared risk parameter
is close to the true value for higher values of α, output’s autocorrelation
parameter, in particular when α = 1. This relates to Tables (5.3), (5.4),
(5.7), (5.8), (E.2), and (E.3).
b The SVAR-IV’s standard deviation of estimated unshared risk parameters,
together with Classical and Level approaches, is one of the lowest. This
finding relates to Tables (5.5), (5.9), (5.13) and (E.4.)
c The SVAR-IV estimator is the best performing estimator in terms of test
size, i.e. correctly not rejecting the true unshared risk value. This finding
relates to the results presented in Tables (5.6), (5.10), (5.14), and (E.6).
d Apart from the Classical and Level approaches, the SVAR-IV is also one
of the best performing estimator in terms of test power, i.e. rejecting
the false hypothesis of no rise in risk-sharing, making it one of the best
performing estimator in identifying whether risk-sharing changed. This
finding relates to Table (5.15).
4 The FD2SLS and dGMM perform poorly, especially the FD2SLS which appears
to suffer from being exactly identified. This is a reoccurring theme through
out the MCS results below.
The first key finding is that for varying degrees of output autocorrelation and
endogeneity bias, the Classical approach overestimates unshared risk by anywhere
from 23 to 48 percentage points. Applying this finding to the Classical estimation of
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around 27% risk-sharing in Table (3.1), this would suggest that actual risk-sharing
could be between 50% to 75%. The second key finding confirms the fourth chapter
in the conclusions that the alternative approaches for the most part are impre-
cisely estimated compared to the Classical approach. The third and fourth key
finding confirm the fourth chapter in the conclusion that the SVAR-IV approach is
more successful in generating a stronger instrument and thus in providing consistent
risk-sharing parameters that are considerably more reliable than the FD2SLS and
dGMM.
Classical Level FD2SLS dGMM SVAR-IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
α = 0.5
ψ = 0 0.8007 0.8003 0.8001 0.7993 0.7948 0.7982 0.8002 0.9915
ψ = 0.5 1.1747 1.1814 1.0002 0.7939 0.7564 0.9295 0.8003 0.9530
ψ = 1 1.2753 1.2836 1.0503 0.7927 0.7149 0.9620 0.8002 0.9284
α = 0.95
ψ = 0 0.8007 0.8003 0.7999 0.7994 0.6749 0.7994 0.8004 0.8343
ψ = 0.5 1.0519 1.0795 0.8200 0.7947 -0.9117 0.8673 0.7988 0.8241
ψ = 1 1.1511 1.1811 0.8251 0.7937 1.3819 0.8846 0.7982 0.8205
α = 1
ψ = 0 0.8007 0.8003 0.8000 1.3302 5.5998 0.8010 0.8229 0.8000
ψ = 0.5 1.0277 1.0603 0.8000 1.0961 -0.3554 0.9369 0.9127 0.7992
ψ = 1 1.1262 1.1608 0.8001 0.9119 1.6519 0.9716 0.9280 0.7985
The MCS is based on 10,000 simulations.
Table 5.3: Mean estimated unshared risk parameters when βu = 0.8.
Table (5.3) presents the mean of the estimated βu, the unshared risk coefficients,
over 10,000 simulations for a selection of risk-sharing estimation approaches. The
true βu in Table (5.3) is 0.8 which is equivalent to 20% risk-sharing. The first two
column (I)-(II) present two variations of the Classical estimation; the first is the
standard Classical estimation using a feasible GLS with an AR(1) correction (I)
and the second is the Classical estimation using the panel corrected standard errors
(PCSE) estimation approach (II). The next column is the Level approach without
(III) country fixed effects.13 This is followed by the two versions of the FD2SLS
estimation, one using a two period lagged level of output as an instrument (IV)
13Given that no country fixed effects were modeled in the level of output or consumption, the
Level estimation of unshared risk with fixed effects, referred to in the 3rd chapter as the medium
run risk-sharing estimation, and the estimation without fixed effects, referred to as long run risk-
sharing estimation in the 3rd chapter, would be the same. That is, the Level approach with
country fixed effects would contain N-1 insignificant coefficients, the impact of which is that it has
fewer degrees of freedom and thus is less efficient. Since we are more interested in the bias of the
estimators and as the parameter estimates should be the same between the two Level approaches,
we only present the Level estimates without country fixed effects.
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and one where the instrument is a two period lagged first differenced output (V).
This is then followed by two dGMM estimations with one using a non-collapsed two
period lagged output (VI), and one using a collapsed two and three period lagged
output (VII). The final column (VIII) shows the results for the SVAR derived IV
risk-sharing estimation.
The first three rows present the results when the autocorrelation parameter, α,
is equal to 0.5, the next three rows present the results when output is close to a unit-
root, α = 0.95, and the last three rows present the results when output is a unit root
process, α = 1. In each case the endogeneity parameter, ψ, takes a different value:
the first case is when output is exogenous, ψ = 0 , the second and third allow output
to be affected by demand with ψ taking values of 0.5 and 1 respectively. The first
row for each autocorrelation value, when ψ = 0, represents the benchmark, in which
the Classical approach provides consistent estimates because output is exogenous.
It is hardly surprising that when ψ = 0 the Classical approach provides an
approximately unbiased estimate of the unshared risk parameter of 0.8. However, as
output becomes endogenous, the mean of the Classical approach parameter estimates
quickly deviate from 0.8. The Classical GLS estimation, for example, overestimates
unshared risk by 23 percentage points on average in the case of α = 1 and ψ = 0.5,
and by 48 percentage points on average in the case of α = 0.5 and ψ = 1. For a
given endogeneity parameter, the bias is negatively correlated with α, the output
autocorrelation parameter.
The Level, FD2SLS and dGMM also have mean point estimates close to 20%
risk-sharing when ψ = 0 and α = 0.5. The Level approach, although clearly suffering
from bias when ψ > 0 and α < 1, obtains a mean point estimate of 20% risk-sharing
when output is a unit-root process. This is unsurprising as the Level approach
benefits from superconsistency when output is a unit-root process.
The FD2SLS in (V), which uses first differenced two period lagged output, pro-
vides close to unbiased results of 0.8 when α is low and ψ = 0. However, when
α is high, the instrument of the FD2SLS in (V) become inappropriate because the
instrument becomes white noise which is uncorrelated with the endogenous variable,
the first differenced output. Meanwhile, the instrument used in FD2SLS in column
(IV), which is the level of lagged two period output, continues to provide reasonably
unbiased estimates of βu when α is high, as the instruments remain correlated with
first differenced output. However, both FD2SLS perform terribly in estimating βu
when α = 1, as both the level and first differenced two period outputs are no longer
valid instruments due to lack of correlation with the endogenous variable.
The non-collapsed two period lagged output dGMM in column (VI) suffers from
bias as output is allowed to be endogenous regardless of the value α takes. This
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could potentially be due to over-fitting as the instruments falsely pick up elements
of output that are actually endogenous.14
In contrast, the dGMM using the second and third collapsed lagged level of out-
put in column (VII) performs adequately in providing unbiased estimates of βu when
α < 1, but suffers from bias as α = 1. Again this is expected as the instruments be-
come increasingly weakly and eventually uncorrelated with the endogenous variable
as α approaches or is equal to 1.
Meanwhile, the SVAR-IV estimation performs poorly when α = 0.5, with the
mean estimate being greater than 0.8. However, the performance of SVAR-IV im-
proves as α increases. This indicates that for the SVAR to work we need persistence
in output, i.e. if α is very low, the SVAR has limited explanatory power as all
the shocks appear as white noise and the SVAR cannot split demand from supply
shocks. To this end the question is how high does α have to be for the SVAR-IV
estimation to perform well in providing unbiased estimate of βu. Table (5.3) shows
that in the case of α = 0.95, the SVAR-IV still provides biased estimates, but when
α = 1, the SVAR appears to provide unbiased estimates, indicating that α has to
be very close to 1 for the SVAR to work. 15
For completeness, but also because IV estimators like FD2SLS have no moments,
including the mean, when, as is the case here, they are exactly identified, Table (5.4)
presents the median of the estimated unshared risk parameters.16 For the most part,
the results in Table (5.4) mirror those in Table (5.3). Interestingly the median for
the FD2SLS is closer to 0.8. For one, the FD2SLS in (IV) does have a median
estimate close to 0.8 when α = 1 but ψ = 0. Furthermore, the FD2SLS in (V),
while still suffering bias when α is high, appears to have a median that is more in
14The large amount of instruments used relative to the sample dimension can have an impact
on the point estimate. More precisely, as presented in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) (page
222-223), as the number of instruments increases, holding the sample size fixed, the finite-sample
bias in the IV estimator approaches that of the biased OLS estimator. This occurs as the instru-
mented variables increasingly resembles the endogenous variable due to the instrumented variable
increasingly also including the endogenous elements as more is explained of the endogenous vari-
ables. Hahn and Hausman (2002) provide an explicit expression for the finite-sample bias of the
IV estimator including the case where the bias is increasing in the number of instruments.
15Further impacting the performance of the SVAR is the autoregressive process imposed on the
underlying VAR. That is, an AR(2)-process is uniformly imposed for all countries, even though the
actual DGPs is an AR(1). Furthermore, price is used to estimate output and vice versa, even though
neither price nor output have an impact on each other in the DGP. Combined with that, since both
price and output are driven by same normal distributed shocks, the VAR, therefore, might pick up a
spurious relationship. These effects cause the reduced form residual to be incorrectly identified and
thus provide an imperfect identification of the structural residual based on the correct B-matrix.
That is, as e, the reduced form residuals, are not correctly estimated, then because e = Bω the
structural ω are not appropriately estimated either. In short, the SVAR is being over-fitted which
can have an impact on the risk-sharing point estimates. Similar, Lu¨tkepohl (1985) and Lu¨tkepohle
(2005) found that over-fitting an AR-process causes the forecasting error to increase.
16For a more detailed exposition of 2SLS estimator including its properties when exactly iden-
tified please see Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) chapter 7.5
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Classical Level FD2SLS dGMM SVAR-IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
α = 0.5
ψ = 0 0.8006 0.8002 0.8000 0.7989 0.7983 0.7976 0.7985 0.9913
ψ = 0.5 1.1748 1.1816 1.0000 0.7978 0.7997 0.9315 0.8025 0.9536
ψ = 1 1.2754 1.2834 1.0504 0.7997 0.8022 0.9653 0.8047 0.9294
α = 0.95
ψ = 0 0.8011 0.8003 0.7999 0.7989 0.7882 0.7988 0.8003 0.8346
ψ = 0.5 1.0511 1.0789 0.8199 0.7975 1.0010 0.8681 0.8024 0.8252
ψ = 1 1.1507 1.1805 0.8251 0.7984 1.0594 0.8853 0.8018 0.8223
α = 1
ψ = 0 0.8007 0.8004 0.8000 0.8002 0.8159 0.8020 0.8006 0.8004
ψ = 0.5 1.0269 1.0594 0.7999 0.8227 1.1897 0.9287 0.8472 0.8004
ψ = 1 1.1259 1.1601 0.8001 0.8280 1.2907 0.9643 0.8548 0.8004
The MCS is based on 10,000 simulations.
Table 5.4: Median of estimated unshared risk parameters when βu = 0.8.
line with other estimators. In fact, that the results for the FD2SLS in the Table (5.4)
appear more reasonable than in Table (5.3) is in line with the FD2SLS being exactly
identified. That is, since the mean for the FD2SLS does not exist, large outliers can
make the mean behave erratically. Meanwhile, the FD2SLS median exists and in the
MCS results appears sensible. In fact, exactly identified IV estimators are median-
unbiased which means that the median is approximately unbiased.17
The findings in Table (5.3) are reinforced by Table (5.5) which shows the cor-
responding standard deviation of the estimated unshared risk parameters. In line
with the instrument of the FD2SLS in column (V) becoming weak- or uncorrelated
with the endogenous variable when α approaches or is equal to 1, the standard devi-
ations of the estimated unshared risk parameter increases with α, and are amongst
the highest in Table (5.5) when α = 0.95 or α = 1. Meanwhile, the instrument of the
FD2SLS in column (IV), which is the level of lagged two period output, continues
to provides reasonable estimates of unshared risk with limited standard deviation
when α = 0.95. However, both FD2SLS estimations show a very large degree of
dispersion in estimating βu when α = 1, as both the level and first differenced
lagged two period outputs are no longer valid instruments due to lack of correlation
with the first differenced output, leading to high standard deviation in estimated
unshared risk parameters. This is not surprising because, as previously mentioned
the FD2SLS is exactly identified and has no moments. This would suggest that the
FD2SLS estimator would have poor finite-sample properties when exactly identified,
17For a more detailed exposition see Angrist and Pischke (2009) section 4.6.4.
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Classical Level FD2SLS dGMM SVAR-IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
α = 0.5
ψ = 0 0.04091 0.03978 0.04935 0.12792 0.49559 0.11663 0.10268 0.04021
ψ = 0.5 0.03464 0.03325 0.03919 0.11519 1.74061 0.09779 0.09205 0.03472
ψ = 1 0.02383 0.02231 0.02457 0.09169 0.89016 0.06776 0.07293 0.03129
α = 0.95
ψ = 0 0.03604 0.03663 0.01535 0.11630 54.30505 0.10186 0.09557 0.03991
ψ = 0.5 0.03499 0.03358 0.01242 0.10531 238.1200 0.08737 0.08606 0.03938
ψ = 1 0.03000 0.02728 0.00773 0.08373 31.75176 0.06470 0.06823 0.03897
α = 1
ψ = 0 0.03438 0.03561 0.00988 27.30229 377.6000 0.15269 1.79173 0.04035
ψ = 0.5 0.03470 0.03330 0.00803 28.67869 137.6437 0.13746 1.57278 0.04040
ψ = 1 0.03090 0.02794 0.00500 28.03776 40.74899 0.11108 1.09527 0.04057
The MCS is based on 10,000 simulations.
Table 5.5: Standard deviation of the estimated unshared risk parameters when
βu = 0.8.
as found by Nelson and Startz (1990a,b).18
Both dGMMs tend to have some of the largest variances in estimating βu apart
from the FD2SLS estimators. This is not surprising given that the dGMM is an
asymptotic estimator intended for a panel with a large cross-section and a small time
dimension. In the case in which α = 1 both dGMMs have their highest standard
deviation in estimating unshared risk parameters due to underidentification, because
the instruments are no longer correlated with first differenced output.
Meanwhile, the Classical, the Level, and the SVAR-IV estimators have low stan-
dard deviations, with the Level unshared risk parameter standard deviation falling
as α increases. For completeness, the Table containing the mean squared error for
the estimated unshared risk parameters when βu = 0.8 can be found in appendix
E.1. It echoes the results found in Table (5.5).
Table (5.6) shows the test size for each estimator: the rejection rate for a two
sided t-test with a 5% significance level when the H0 : βu = 0.8 versus HA : βu 6=
0.8. The rejection of H0 implies that the estimator falsely concludes that βu 6=
0.8 although βu = 0.8 in the underlying DGPs, i.e. the higher the rejection rate
the worse the estimator is in estimating the unshared risk. Given that the chosen
significance level is 5%, a correctly-sized test implies that the H0 should be rejected
around 5% of the times.
The GLS estimator has a poor performance, with its rejection rate remaining
18For a more detailed exposition see Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) (pages 221-222).
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Classical Level FD2SLS dGMM SVAR-IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
α = 0.5
ψ = 0 40.29% 7.58% 37.22% 1.67% 2.83% 3.57% 7.44% 99.02%
ψ = 0.5 100% 100% 100% 2.11% 4.87% 23.21% 7.38% 95.95%
ψ = 1 100% 100% 100% 2.48% 7.2% 54.69% 7.79% 91.41%
α = 0.95
ψ = 0 32.58% 4.57% 35.52% 0% .03% 3.29% 6.23% 4.49%
ψ = 0.5 100% 100% 76.65% 0% .75% 9.39% 6.42% 3.32%
ψ = 1 100% 100% 98.73% 0% 3.08% 19.6% 6.46% 3.23%
α = 1
ψ = 0 30.85% 4.08% 34.74% 0% .02% 2.93% 1% 1.15%
ψ = 0.5 100% 100% 34.64% 0% .23% 11.46% 1.38% 1.16%
ψ = 1 100% 100% 34.56% 0% 1.78% 26.31% 2.37% 1.19%
The MCS is based on 10,000 simulations. Two-sided t-test with 5% significance level.
Table 5.6: Test size: rejection rate for 5% significance level when testing H0 : βu =
0.8.
well above 5% in every case, even when it provides unbiased parameter estimates
in the case of ψ = 0. This could be due to the GLS over fitting the errors given
that the GLS, as applied here, adjusts for an AR(1) even though the errors are not
AR(1) which can impact the standard errors.19
Meanwhile, the PCSE in (II) performs well when ψ = 0, with the nominal rejec-
tion rate close to 5%. Even though the PCSE, like the GLS, corrects for elements
in the error which are not present in the DGP, it does it in a way that allows the
PCSE to reduce the error to the correct form of homoskedasticity and no serial cor-
relation. As ψ 6= 0 the rejection rate of the PCSE estimator increases in line with
its estimates becoming biased.
The rejection rate of the Level estimation is too high as it remains well above 5%
in every case, even when it provides unbiased estimate in case of α = 1. However,
caution needs to be taken when considering the rejection rate of the Level estimator
as the hypothesis test in Table (5.6) is not valid if consumption and output are unit
root.
The rejection rate of the FD2SLS estimators are too low, as they under reject the
H0. This is due to the FD2SLS standard error being so large that the 95% confidence
ranges are sufficiently large to continuously include 0.8. This is not surprising,
19A reminder, when ψ > 0, the GLS and PCSE estimation approaches provide biased parameter
estimates.
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Figure 5.1: Distribution function of the FD2SLS, Level, and SVAR-IV estimators
since, as mentioned above, the FD2SLS is exactly identified and accordingly suffers
from poor finite-sample properties. Furthermore, in the case of α = 0.95 or α =
0.1, the FD2SLS estimators suffer from weak identification and underidentification
respectively.
The dGMM estimations have a low rejection rate, especially when α is high,
which is not surprising given that like FD2SLS, dGMM should suffer from weak
identification or underidentification and consequently have large standard errors.
Meanwhile, the SVAR-IV performs best in Table (5.6) when α = 0.95 with a rejec-
tion rate close to 5%. However, the SVAR-IV performs best in providing unbiased
estimates when α = 1.
Looking at all the tables combined, it is quite clear that the FD2SLS suffers
from extreme outliers, which as mentioned above, is related to poor small sample
performance combined with weak identification when α = 0.95 or underidentification
when α = 1. To visualize the extent of the poor performance, Fig. (5.1) shows the
distribution function of the FD2SLS Zfd estimator and in comparison those of the
SVAR-IV and Level when βu = 0.8, α = 1, and ψ = 1. In the 10,000 replications,
the FD2SLS estimator estimated a maximum coefficient of 3108 and a minimum
of -1362. Consequently, the view is limited to the range of 0.8 ± 0.2 as otherwise
the extreme values of the FD2SLS estimator would dominate the scale, rendering
it largely unreadable for the SVAR-IV and Level distribution. From Fig. (5.1) it
is quite clear that FD2SLS suffers from extreme outliers and is fairly imprecise,
while both the Level and SVAR-IV estimators suffer less from extreme outliers than
FD2SLS and are tightly grouped around 0.8, the value of βu.
The MCS was also run for the entire time period with βu = 0.6. For the most
part the results were similar to the MCS with βu = 0.8. Also, the bias of the
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estimators in over-estimating unshared risk in percentage points was also similar to
the βu = 0.8 case. For example the Classical GLS over-estimated unshared risk by
23% on average in the case of α = 1 and ψ = 0.5, and by 48% on average in the
case of α = 0.5 and ψ = 1.20 The tables for the MCS with 40% risk-sharing can be
found in Appendix (E.2).
5.3.1 MCS and sub-period estimation
In addition to the MCS for the entire time series, the MCS was also run using a
shorter period of 20 time periods; this is equivalent to the 1970-1990 sub-period
in the previous chapters.21 Given that some of these alternative estimators rely
on asymptotic properties, running the estimation approaches on smaller samples
highlights to what extent the estimators performance is impacted on by a shorter
sample. The DGP, for the 20 time period MCS, have a true unshared risk parameter
of 0.8, βu = 0.8.
Classical Level FD2SLS dGMM SVAR-IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
α = 0.5
ψ = 0 0.8008 0.8007 0.7990 0.8005 0.7682 0.7968 0.8004 0.9923
ψ = 0.5 1.1818 1.1849 1.0000 0.7880 0.6522 0.9301 0.8004 0.9528
ψ = 1 1.2842 1.2881 1.0502 0.7845 0.6176 0.9627 0.8004 0.9276
α = 0.95
ψ = 0 0.8003 0.8004 0.7994 0.8447 -0.6767 0.7999 0.8087 0.8348
ψ = 0.5 1.0724 1.0885 0.8198 0.7942 -8.4303 0.9056 0.8042 0.8238
ψ = 1 1.1737 1.1916 0.8249 0.7697 -4.7786 0.9328 0.8062 0.8193
α = 1
ψ = 0 0.8003 0.8004 0.7995 0.1976 -60.404 0.7997 0.7981 0.8002
ψ = 0.5 1.0483 1.0681 0.7999 1.0469 0.2387 0.9927 0.9402 0.7986
ψ = 1 1.1498 1.1702 0.7999 1.6185 3.0652 1.0432 0.9975 0.7970
The MCS is based on 10,000 simulations.
Table 5.7: Mean estimated unshared risk parameters for when βu = 0.8 and time is
limited to 20 periods.
Following the same structure as Table (5.3), Table (5.7) shows the results when
the time dimension is limited to 20 and βu = 0.8. Unsurprisingly, when output is
20That is when α = 1 and ψ = 1, and βu = 0.8 the Classical GLS has a mean estimate of 1.1262,
and 0.9262 when βu = 0.6. In both case unshared risk is overestimated by around 0.33.
21We forgo presenting results for MCS that like the sub-period 1990-2007 has 18 period as the
conclusions are the same as for 20 periods.
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exogenous, the Classical approach, together with most other estimators, appropri-
ately finds on average unshared risk to be 0.8. And much like the case in Table (5.3),
as output becomes endogenous the Classical approach overestimates unshared risk.
This time the Classical approach overestimates the unshared risk by 25 percentage
points on average in the case of α = 1 and ψ = 0.5, and by 49 percentage points
on average in the case of α = 0.5 and ψ = 1, which is around 3 percentage points
higher at the lower end than in Table (5.3). This could be an effect of the shorter
time period.
Classical Level FD2SLS dGMM SVAR-IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
α = 0.5
ψ = 0 0.8011 0.8005 0.7990 0.7993 0.7998 0.7966 0.8013 0.9912
ψ = 0.5 1.1821 1.1852 0.9998 0.8007 0.8141 0.9352 0.8082 0.9539
ψ = 1 1.2842 1.2880 1.0508 0.8013 0.8122 0.9693 0.8111 0.9298
α = 0.95
ψ = 0 0.8002 0.8003 0.7993 0.8043 0.7972 0.8002 0.8022 0.8350
ψ = 0.5 1.0717 1.0877 0.8197 0.8033 1.0932 0.9021 0.8114 0.8249
ψ = 1 1.1734 1.1908 0.8251 0.7987 1.1519 0.9282 0.8123 0.8223
α = 1
ψ = 0 0.8002 0.8002 0.7997 0.7870 0.8089 0.8011 0.7924 0.8000
ψ = 0.5 1.0476 1.0672 0.8000 0.8339 1.2040 0.9788 0.8780 0.8000
ψ = 1 1.1490 1.1698 0.8001 0.8492 1.3098 1.0305 0.8986 0.8001
The MCS is based on 10,000 simulations.
Table 5.8: Median of estimated unshared risk parameters when βu = 0.8 and time
is limited to 20 periods.
For completeness, Table (5.8) presents the median and Table (5.9) the standard
deviations of the estimated unshared risk parameter when βu = 0.8 and time is
limited to 20 periods. Table (5.8) and Table (5.9) in line with Table (5.7), show
similar results to the MCS run for βu = 0.8 and over 38 periods with differences
being driven by the shorter time period. The associated mean squared error Table
can be found in appendix E.3.
Table (5.10) shows the percentage share of t-tests rejecting the H0 : βu = 0.8 in
favor of HA : βu 6= 0.8 for the sub-period MCS restricted to 20 time periods. For the
most part, the findings in Table (5.10) are the same as in Table (5.6), apart from
the fact that the rejection rates are higher, which reflects the shorter time period of
20 units in comparison to 38 in Table (5.6), leading to larger standard errors.
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Classical Level FD2SLS dGMM SVAR-IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
α = 0.5
ψ = 0 0.05611 0.05650 0.06961 0.19269 2.78145 0.16700 0.15490 0.06787
ψ = 0.5 0.04691 0.04707 0.05561 0.17495 3.52830 0.14216 0.13945 0.05937
ψ = 1 0.03189 0.03171 0.03521 0.14101 7.24057 0.09998 0.11063 0.05412
α = 0.95
ψ = 0 0.05052 0.05262 0.02521 2.88327 94.2059 0.18503 0.55620 0.06926
ψ = 0.5 0.04863 0.04793 0.02045 1.87699 936.6776 0.16273 0.33709 0.06846
ψ = 1 0.04122 0.03863 0.01283 0.40674 492.0937 0.12352 0.34850 0.06796
α = 1
ψ = 0 0.04798 0.05086 0.01964 24.24639 5892.612 0.26654 1.77714 0.06995
ψ = 0.5 0.04878 0.04738 0.01598 166.1939 123.8111 0.23713 1.85229 0.07007
ψ = 1 0.04288 0.03956 0.00995 50.35804 108.8950 0.18450 1.64953 0.07055
The MCS is based on 10,000 simulations.
Table 5.9: Standard deviation of estimated unshared risk parameters when βu = 0.8
and time is limited to 20 periods.
Classical Level FD2SLS dGMM SVAR-IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
α = 0.5
ψ = 0 70.09% 8.14% 48.61% 1.34% 1.3% 8.02% 6.96% 77.7%
ψ = 0.5 100% 100% 99.7% 1.99% 4.78% 22.9% 7.38% 67.42%
ψ = 1 100% 100% 100% 2.85% 8.87% 45.32% 8.18% 60.23%
α = 0.95
ψ = 0 65.21% 5.31% 45.44% 0% .06% 7.6% 3.43% 5.67%
ψ = 0.5 100% 100% 62.97% .02% .84% 13.93% 3.51% 5.13%
ψ = 1 100% 100% 87.91% .02% 2.97% 24.6% 4.34% 5.19%
α = 1
ψ = 0 62.99% 4.69% 44.51% 0% .01% 6.38% 1.21% 3.34%
ψ = 0.5 100% 100% 45.04% 0% .31% 14.67% 1.73% 3.27%
ψ = 1 100% 100% 45.11% 0% 1.76% 27.62% 2.79% 3.4%
The MCS is based on 10,000 simulations. Two-sided t-test with 5% significance level.
Table 5.10: Sub-period Test seize: rejection rate for 5% significance level when
testing H0 : βu = 0.8.
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5.3.2 MCS and identifying an increase in risk-sharing
To validate the finding of increasing risk-sharing in previous chapters, in this section
we look at how well the alternative estimation approaches perform in estimating
increasing risk-sharing.
Specifically, to test how each estimator performs in estimating a increase in risk-
sharing, Eq. (5.5) was modified to have 0.8 unshared risk for the first 20 periods and
0.6 unshared risk thereafter such that Eq. (5.5) was modified to have the format:
c = βu,1y + βu,2dy + 
D (5.22)
where βu,1 = 0.8, βu,2 = −0.2, and d is a vector consisting of 0 when t < 21 and 1
when t > 20.
Classical Level FD2SLS dGMM SVAR-IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
α = 0.5
ψ = 0 -0.2009 -0.2013 -0.1980 -0.2016 0.0696 -0.2007 -0.1980 -0.2008
ψ = 0.5 -0.2048 -0.2051 -0.1992 -0.2056 0.4756 -0.1950 -0.1963 -0.2007
ψ = 1 -0.2069 -0.2066 -0.1994 -0.2060 -0.4457 -0.1930 -0.1966 -0.2007
α = 0.95
ψ = 0 -0.2001 -0.2002 -0.1993 -0.2012 0.1470 -0.1983 -0.1995 -0.2008
ψ = 0.5 -0.2165 -0.2143 -0.1997 -0.2042 -9.0001 -0.1875 -0.1970 -0.2006
ψ = 1 -0.2217 -0.2178 -0.1999 -0.2052 2.9339 -0.1847 -0.1961 -0.2004
α = 1
ψ = 0 -0.1999 -0.1998 -0.1996 -0.2519 0.6584 -0.1993 -0.1983 -0.2003
ψ = 0.5 -0.2189 -0.2151 -0.1998 -0.5061 -2.3954 -0.2014 -0.1921 -0.2001
ψ = 1 -0.2242 -0.2190 -0.2000 -0.1440 1.1050 -0.2017 -0.1880 -0.1999
The MCS is based on 10,000 simulations.
Table 5.11: Mean of estimated unshared risk parameter βu,2.
Table (5.11) presents the mean estimated βu,2 parameters. For the most part
results are similar to the results in preceding sections. The Classical estimators
in (I) and (II) perform well in estimating unbiased parameter when ψ = 0, but
provide biased estimates as ψ increases. The Level estimator in (III) performs best
in estimating unbiased βu,2 when α = 1. The FD2SLS in (V) appears yet again
to perform badly in any case, while the FD2SLS in (IV) performs reasonably well
till α = 1. Interestingly, the dGMM in (VI) performs better than the dGMM in
(VII) when α = 1. Also interesting to note, the SVAR-IV, beside having its best
performance in providing unbiased parameter estimates when α=1, in almost all
case it is also the best performing estimator.
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Classical Level FD2SLS dGMM SVAR-IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
α = 0.5
ψ = 0 -0.2010 -0.2020 -0.1985 -0.2032 -0.2069 -0.2024 -0.1959 -0.2027
ψ = 0.5 -0.2040 -0.2048 -0.1979 -0.2004 -0.1993 -0.1935 -0.1946 -0.2024
ψ = 1 -0.2068 -0.2064 -0.1987 -0.1991 -0.2057 -0.1934 -0.1942 -0.2022
α = 0.95
ψ = 0 -0.2000 -0.2003 -0.1994 -0.1988 -0.2248 -0.1995 -0.1992 -0.2011
ψ = 0.5 -0.2165 -0.2144 -0.1999 -0.1997 -0.1359 -0.1886 -0.1961 -0.2012
ψ = 1 -0.2221 -0.2180 -0.1997 -0.1995 -0.1435 -0.1856 -0.1942 -0.2012
α = 1
ψ = 0 -0.1999 -0.1995 -0.1998 -0.1988 -0.2088 -0.2001 -0.1991 -0.2012
ψ = 0.5 -0.2189 -0.2149 -0.2001 -0.1963 -0.1779 -0.2011 -0.1968 -0.2011
ψ = 1 -0.2242 -0.2188 -0.1999 -0.1967 -0.2094 -0.2012 -0.1953 -0.2009
The MCS is based on 10,000 simulations.
Table 5.12: Median of estimated unshared risk parameter βu,2.
Table (5.12) presents the median for estimated βu,2 parameters. As is the case
in the previous section, although still biased, the FD2SLS appears more in line with
the the other estimators. Also in comparison, the dGMM in (VI) and the SVAR-
IV appear to perform equally well when α = 1 and ψ > 0. Moreover, the Level
estimator, when α is equal to 0.95 and 1, is the best performing estimator.
For completeness, Table (5.13) presents the standard deviation of the estimated
βu,2 parameters. The findings in Table (5.13) are in line with the standard deviations
in the previous section; for example, the FD2SLSs and dGMMs estimators have the
largest variances.
Table (5.14) presents the rejection rate for a two-sided t-test with a 5% signif-
icance level and H0 : β2 = −0.2 versus HA : βu,2 6= −0.2. The findings in Table
(5.14) are the same as in the previous section apart from the PCSE performing well
with rejection rate near the acceptable 5%, despite providing biased estimates of
βu,2 when ψ > 0. Moreover, the SVAR-IV is one of the best performing estimators
in all cases with near 5% rejection rate, although still performing the best when
α = 0.95.
Finally, Eq. (5.22) allows us to test the performance of the estimators in identi-
fying increases in risk-sharing by testing βu,2 with the H0 : βu,2 = 0. This is in line
to the parameter test introduced in the 3rd chapter to test whether the unshared
risk parameter changed between 1970-1990 and 1991-2007 period. Given that we
know H0 : βu,2 = 0 is false, we are testing whether the estimators falsely do not
reject the null hypothesis, and thus do not identify an expansion in risk-sharing.
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Classical Level FD2SLS dGMM SVAR-IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
α = 0.5
ψ = 0 0.08194 0.07846 0.10112 0.27180 19.61504 0.23401 0.22000 0.10604
ψ = 0.5 0.06748 0.06458 0.08118 0.24669 63.48419 0.19655 0.19888 0.09379
ψ = 1 0.04559 0.04264 0.05082 0.19845 14.95547 0.13856 0.15819 0.08612
α = 0.95
ψ = 0 0.05467 0.05493 0.03296 0.29718 277.1697 0.10472 0.12586 0.11080
ψ = 0.5 0.05021 0.04853 0.02692 0.13748 1186.235 0.09210 0.10755 0.10952
ψ = 1 0.04071 0.03746 0.01686 0.12314 255.4530 0.07170 0.08726 0.10919
α = 1
ψ = 0 0.04187 0.04265 0.02270 11.51990 267.5036 0.09839 0.17712 0.11245
ψ = 0.5 0.03947 0.03834 0.01857 33.13100 211.9364 0.08540 0.14574 0.11292
ψ = 1 0.03288 0.03035 0.01166 5.80391 167.7534 0.06904 0.15483 0.11418
The MCS is based on 10,000 simulations.
Table 5.13: Standard deviation of estimated unshared risk parameter βu,2.
Classical Level FD2SLS dGMM SVAR-IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
α = 0.5
ψ = 0 41.1% 7.76% 36.71% 1.53% 1.46% 3.25% 7.08% 6.39%
ψ = 0.5 38.93% 7.19% 36.27% 1.3% 1.28% 2.98% 6.78% 6.35%
ψ = 1 36.36% 5.67% 37.06% .72% .51% 2.73% 6.32% 5.96%
α = 0.95
ψ = 0 33.24% 5.08% 35.69% .01% .04% 3.02% 6.02% 6.04%
ψ = 0.5 32.95% 5.47% 37.5% 0% .01% 3.27% 6.07% 5.93%
ψ = 1 32.2% 5.57% 37.18% 0% .05% 3.76% 6.56% 5.72%
α = 1
ψ = 0 30.67% 4.96% 36.54% 0% 0% 2.74% 2.12% 6.14%
ψ = 0.5 32.63% 5.91% 37.55% 0% 0% 2.76% 2.09% 6.02%
ψ = 1 34.83% 7.03% 36.89% 0% .01% 3.26% 2.52% 5.58%
The MCS is based on 10,000 simulations.
Table 5.14: Test size: rejection rate for 5% significance level when testing H0 : βu,2 =
−0.2.
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Classical Level FD2SLS dGMM SVAR-IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
α = 0.5
ψ = 0 96.12% 85.67% 88.08% 12.29% 5.58% 16.71% 26.47% 63.16%
ψ = 0.5 99% 95.05% 95.29% 13.22% 4.79% 19.62% 29.83% 71.48%
ψ = 1 99.98% 99.89% 99.88% 18.26% 4.63% 30.84% 40.35% 77.44%
α = 0.95
ψ = 0 99.65% 97.39% 100% 5.58% .44% 61.63% 62.55% 59.28%
ψ = 0.5 99.93% 99.53% 100% 7.18% .53% 65.49% 68.84% 60.18%
ψ = 1 100% 100% 100% 15.25% .79% 75.38% 82.92% 60.77%
α = 1
ψ = 0 99.95% 99.61% 100% 3.95% .15% 75.09% 59.22% 58.29%
ψ = 0.5 100% 100% 100% 7.44% .27% 76.12% 62.58% 57.99%
ψ = 1 100% 100% 100% 18.87% .46% 81.09% 71.05% 57.6%
The MCS is based on 10,000 simulations. One-sided t-test with 5% significance level.
Table 5.15: Test power: rejection rate for a 5% significance level.
Table (5.15) presents the rejection rate for a one sided t-test with 5% significance
level testing the H0 : βu,2 ≥ 0 versus the HA : βu,2 < 0. The higher the rejection rate
the better the estimation approach is in validating an increase risk-sharing. Both
the GLS in (I) and the PCSE in (II) have a high rejection rate which means they
appropriately identify an increase in risk-sharing, which is in line with the test size
which suggest these they reject practically everything, all the time, whether true or
not, including rejecting a false null. However, one needs to be cautious in that the
estimates for both GLS and PCSE are biased when ψ > 0. Meanwhile, the Level
approach also tends to reject the H0, especially when α is high. However, once
again one needs be cautious when considering the Level hypothesis test. The Level
approach only provides consistent estimate when consumption and output are non-
stationary in which case the hypothesis tests are invalid. The low rejection rate for
the FD2SLS to reject the H0 : βu,2 ≥ 0 is not surprising given the wide confidence
intervals. Meanwhile, the dGMMs tends to have more than 50% rejection rate but
only when α = 0.95 or α = 1. However, when α = 0.95 or α = 1 the dGMMs
suffer from weak identification or underidentification respectively. The SVAR-IV
performance meanwhile shows high rejection of the H0 : βu,2 ≥ 0 when α = 0.5 and
even though the rejection rate falls as α increases it remains above 50%.
Combining the results in Table (5.14) and (5.15) it can be concluded that the
best performing estimator for estimating an change in risk-sharing is the SVAR-IV
estimator. The SVAR-IV nominal rejection rate in Table (5.14) is close to 5% for
all values of α and ψ, while having a decent rejection rate of a false null hypothesis
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in Table(5.15). Additionally, SVAR-IV provides means and medians that are close
to the appropriate -0.2 in Tables (5.11) and (5.12).
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter set out to consolidate the hypothesis of the third and fourth chapters
that the Classical approach suffers from bias due to endogeneity while validating
the alternative approaches, and in so doing confirming the second, third, and fourth
chapters that an actual rise in risk-sharing occurred.
The following conclusions can be drawn from the MCS. Firstly, based on Tables
(5.3), (E.2), (5.7), and (5.11), the performance of the estimators across varying ψ
and α is independent of the value of βu. For one this would indicate that the risk-
sharing findings in the Classical literature, which do not account and correct for the
endogeneity, are equally bias and independent of the extent of the risk-sharing. This
would also suggest that some correction mechanisms can be developed to correct for
the bias in the Classical literature results.
Furthermore, the MCS highlights that the Classical estimation is prone to un-
derestimating the actual risk-sharing by 23 to 48 percentage point when output
is endogenous and where the bias is positively correlated with the ψ, and nega-
tively correlated with α. Moreover, based on Table (5.15), the Classical approach
even though provides bias estimates when ψ > 0, it does in most cases identify an
increase in risk-sharing.
In regards to the performance of the alternative approaches, when α is high and
ψ > 0, the Level and SVAR-IV estimators in general perform the best in estimating
unshared risk, while the FD2SLS performs the worst.22 However, for the SVAR-
IV to provide an unbiased estimates of βu, α needs to be very close to 1, and
SVAR-IV best performance in test size is when α = 0.95. This bring us to the
key question of whether the Level or SVAR-IV is the best suited to estimate risk-
sharing. The SVAR-IV looks at current shocks regardless of their permanent nature,
while the Level estimation, as argued in the second and third chapters, looks at long
run relationships between consumption and output. The DGPs did not explicitly
distinguish between permanent and temporal supply and demand shocks beyond
whether demand and output has perfect or diminishing memory. However, for the
sake of monetary union and aspect of risk-sharing, the interest would be with the
22That is the FD2SLS mean appears erratic. However, this is a consequence of FD2SLS being
exactly identified and having no mean and having large tails in distribution of the parameter
estimate. However, as the FD2SLS is exactly identified it does benefit from approximate median
unbiasedness.
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aspect of the extent to which temporal shocks are insured which makes the SVAR-IV
the optimal choice for risk-sharing estimation. Furthermore, in case of identifying
changing risk-sharing, the SVAR-IV performed the best based on one of the best
combination of size and power properties. That is, the SVAR-IV nominal rejection
rate close to 5% and has a decent rejection rate of the false null hypothesis of no
increase in risk-sharing.
The general structure of the DGPs offers opportunities for future research ex-
pansions. For one, the interactivity between output and price can be enhanced to
allow for the C-Matrix SVAR to be used. The modeling of the interactivity would
not directly impact the results of the Classical, Level, FD2SLS,or dGMM, as the
relationship would not impact the relationship between consumption and output on
which the risk-sharing estimation depends. So, while adding more complexity, it
would be a marginal extension to the current DGPs. The second opportunity is to
explore the concept of memory in the output process. In the current setup, shocks
are modeled as i.i.d. This can be extended to allow shocks to be correlated across
time and cross-section. That is, a positive shock in the previous period would in-
crease the probability of a positive shock the current period, and similarly a positive
shock in a neighboring country increases the probability of a positive shock at home.
However, this was not done as it would increasingly obscure the DGPs process and
thus would loose the clarity of interpretation.
Moreover, the MCS has been set up with the express purpose of simulating the
circumstances that the international risk-sharing literature, including this thesis,
commonly face. For example, the dimensions of the cross-section and time series
were chosen to reflect the time dimension of the data used in chapter 3 and 4. Future
research can allow for wider varying sample sizes to allow for greater in-depth anal-
ysis of the performance of the asymptotic estimators in smaller or greater samples
or differently balanced time series versus cross-sections. However, that is not to say
that the MCS as applied here does not have applications beyond the risk-sharing
literature. For one, it reinforces the finding that the exactly identified IV-estimation
–FD2SLS, is subject to wide dispersion in estimating parameters, but is still median-
unbiased. It also contributes to the wider literature that uses similar data, that is
research looking at estimation using OECD data, and relatively small and balanced
panel data. In this context the MCS reinforces the fact that while asymptotic es-
timators can provide consistent results in the presence of simultaneity bias, this
comes at the cost of increasingly imprecise estimation which hinders the interpre-
tation of shifts in parameters. Moreover, the MCS supports the interpretation that
in relatively small and balanced panels, the SVAR-IV with one good instrument,
the supply shock, is a better choice compared to the many, but potentially weak
instruments put forward by the dGMM.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Risk-sharing looks at the correlation between a countries idiosyncratic output fluctu-
ations and its idiosyncratic consumption movements. The importance of risk-sharing
for any monetary union is that a high risk-sharing renders a collective monetary
policy more appropriate as it increasingly mimics the country’s individual monetary
policies. The literature has developed two distinct empirical approaches to quantify
the extent of risk-sharing amongst a group of countries: the Classical (or ASY)
approach and the Level approach. Both approaches have their differences but es-
sentially investigate the correlation of idiosyncratic consumption with idiosyncratic
output. The third chapter applied these two approaches to a sample of 24 OECD
countries and found that between 1970-1990 and 1991-2007 the Classical approach
yielded no rise in risk-sharing with risk-sharing of around 27% between 1970-1990
and 23% between 1991-2007. This result is analogous to the findings of the Classical
empirical literature. However, when the Level method was applied we found rising
risk-sharing, as is common in the Level literature, going from 19% in 1970-1990
to 37% for 1991-2007. The estimations in the third chapter were undertaken as a
stepping stone for the fourth chapter where the same data was used. That is, it
was important to show that similar results to those found in the literature can be
obtained with the data, such that any difference in results in the fourth chapter are
due to the methods employed.
The fourth chapter set out to ease the commonly imposed assumption of exo-
geneity in case of risk-sharing estimation. In addition to a discussion of the impact
on risk-sharing estimation when output is endogenous, the fourth chapter presented
various estimators that should provide consistent results in the presence of simul-
taneity bias. The alternative estimators presented were: Anderson and Hsiao (1981,
1982) FD2SLS estimator, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) dGMM estimator and an IV-
estimation based on instruments derived from Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993)
SVAR (SVAR-IV). The fourth chapter found that when comparing the results to
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the Classical approach, where no rise in risk-sharing was found, the dGMM and the
SVAR-IV approaches, like the Level approach in the third chapter, estimated rising
risk-sharing. However, for the most part, the SVAR-IV and dGMM risk-sharing
parameters were estimated imprecisely, leading to the increase in risk-sharing being
found to be insignificantly different from zero. This makes it impossible to provide
a conclusive argument for or against a rise in risk-sharing. This is interesting since
the literature’s Classical estimates presented in the second chapter tend to be pre-
cisely estimated, supporting the idea that the robustness comes at a price; estimates
can either be imprecise but consistent estimate or precise but inconsistent. In ad-
dition, the fourth chapter concluded that the SVAR-IV risk-sharing estimates are
considerably more reliable than FD2SLS and dGMM, mainly because the strategy
of constructing an instrument using the SVAR approach generated a much stronger
instrument.
The fifth chapter set out to consolidate the findings of the fourth chapter by using
a Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) to demonstrate the extent of the bias the Classical
approach estimates suffer when output is endogenous, and identify, under various
condition, which alternative approach is the best suited for risk-sharing estimation.
The fifth chapter concluded that the Classical approach can underestimate risk-
sharing by 23 to 48 percentage points, which if applied to the Classical findings for
the period 1970-2007 in the third chapter, means that risk sharing could between
51% and 76% instead of the 28%. Furthermore, the fifth chapter concluded that the
Level estimation performed well, but due to differences in the nature of the shock
the Level methodology investigates, as discussed in the second, third and fourth
chapters, that the SVAR-derived IV estimation is the best suited for risk-sharing
estimation.
Overall, the thesis makes two main contributes to the literature. The first is the
explicit discussion of the presence of simultaneity bias that affects the risk-sharing
estimation approach as commonly applied in the literature, and accordingly the
presentation of alternative approaches from other parts of the economic literature
that should provide robust estimates. Of these alternative approaches, the most
novel approach and a unique contribution to the literature, as well as best performing
estimator in estimating risk-sharing, is an IV-estimation that utilizes an instrument
derived from a SVAR model.
The second contribution is the quantification of the bias inherent in the risk-
sharing approaches commonly applied in the literature, and in the investigation
of the performance of the proposed alternative approaches in estimating the risk-
sharing. As mentioned above, the bias inherent in the Classical approach due to
the ignoring of output endogeneity could lead to underestimating of risk-sharing by
23 to 48 percentage points, while the best alternative estimator is found to be the
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SVAR-IV.
Furthermore, the MCS results provide a wider contribution to the empirical anal-
ysis of fairly balanced panels consisting of small cross-sections and small time series,
as are common for studies using OECD data. The overall results show that even
though OLS estimations provide inconsistent estimates when simultaneity bias is
present, they do provide precise estimates. Meanwhile, the alternative estimators,
which have primarily an asymptotic justification, provide consistent estimates but
are widely dispersed, especially in the case of FD2SLS and dGMM. Moreover, while
both the FD2SLS and SVAR-IV estimation are exactly identified, the FD2SLS suf-
fers extensively from finite sample bias in comparison to the SVAR-IV estimation.
These results reinforce established findings and provide it in the context of small
balanced macro-economic samples. Nonetheless, the MCS was geared towards to
the circumstance this thesis faced in estimating risk-sharing in the third and fourth
chapters and thus the MCS could be enhanced to provide a more comprehensive
contribution around more general estimators behaviors beyond the restricted risk-
sharing estimation; this is left to future research. Such improvements could include
a wider variance in the small sample and in the relative sizes of the cross-section and
time series, as well as a loosening of the assumption of standard normal symmetric
distribution of the errors that underlined the MCS. The latter assumption is partic-
ularly potent and provides significant future research opportunities on that grounds
that the results, subject to the regressors being symmetrically distributed around a
mean, might have special properties that might not hold in general, as discussed by
Chesher and Peters (1994) and Davidson and MacKinnon (1993).
Lastly, the thesis contributes to the literature’s debate around whether risk-
sharing has expanded or not. However, the precision of the estimates were too
poor to make any conclusion around rising risk-sharing. Hence, a future research
opportunity lies in improving the precision of estimates, in particular around the
estimation of the variance-covariance matrix.
Overall, the aim of the thesis was to contribute to the conversation around mon-
etary union by consistently estimating risk-sharing in the presence of simultane-
ity bias. That is, by ignoring the endogeneity bias the risk-sharing literature has
over-estimated unshared risk which in turn has signaled to, for example, Euro-zone
countries, that there is a higher cost associated with joining the European Monetary
Union than was actually the case. In terms of how much risk-sharing is sufficient
for joining a monetary union under the Optimal Currency Area theory, the answer
is the higher the risk-sharing the better as it minimizes the cost of monetary union.
However, the exact quantification of the optimal level of risk-sharing for a monetary
union is left to others to stipulate as this is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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Appendix A
(Chapter 1)
A.1 List of Abbreviations
This appendix contains a comprehensive list of abbreviations used in the entire
thesis.
AB-AR
Arellano and Bond (1991)’s serial correlation test
AD
Aggregate Demand
ADF
Augmented Dickey Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Hamilton (1994))
AH
Artis and Hoffmann (2007a,b, 2008)
AR(x)
x order Autoregressive model/process
AS
Aggregate Supply
ASY
Asdrubali et al. (1996)
C
Total consumption
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CCE
(spatial) Common Correlated Effects
CD
Pesaran (2015) Cross-section Dependence test
CI
Confidence Interval
CLR
Conditional Likelihood Ratio
CLR Weak ID robust CI
Weak Identification robust Confidence Interval using the Kleibergen (2002,
2005) extension of the Moreira (2003)’s Conditional Likelihood ratio statistic
to the non-i.i.d. case
Conf. Inter.
see CI
CRRA
Constant Relative Risk Aversion
dGMM
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) dynamic Generalized Method of Moments
DGP
Data Generating Process
DOLS
(pooled) Dynamic Optimal Least Squares
EMU
European Monetary Union
Eq.
Equation
EU
European Union
EU-25
see EU
115
EU-8
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and
United Kingdom
EU-15
The pre-2004 15 European Union members (excluding the EU enlargement
countries)
FD
First Difference
FD2SLS
Anderson and Hsiao (1981, 1982) First-Difference Two Stage Least Square
FDI
Foreign Direct Investment
FE
Fixed Effect(s)
FGLS
Parks (1967) Feasible Generalized Least Squares
FMOLS
Fully Modified Optimal Least Squares
GDOLS
Group-mean Dynamic Optimal Least Squares
GDP
Gross Domestic Production (per capita)
GFMOLS
Group-mean Fully Modified Optimal Least Squares
GLS
Generalized Least Squares
GMM
Generalized Method of Moments
GNDI
Gross National Disposable Income
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GNI
Gross National Income
H0
Null Hypothesis
HA
Alternative Hypothesis
HA
Home Absorption
HLM
Hadri (2000) Lagrange Multiplier unit-root test
I(1)
Integrated of order 1
i.i.d.
Independent and Identically Distributed
IC
Information Criterion
IPS
Im et al. (2003) Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test
IV
Instrumental Variables
LHS
Left Hand Side
LLC
Levin et al. (2002) Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test
LR
Long Run
LRAS
Long Run Aggregate Supply
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MA(x)
Moving Average of order x
Max
Maximum
MCS
Monte Carlo Simulation
MG
Mean Group
Min
Minimum
MW
Maddala and Wu (1999) unit-root test
OECD
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLS
Ordinary Least Squares
OLS(cluster)
cluster-robust Optimal Least Squares estimation
OLS(HAC)
Optimal Least Squares estimation with standard errors corrected for arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
P
Price
PCADF
Pesaran (2007) cross-sectionally augmented Dickey Fuller unit roost test
PCSE
Beck and Katz (1995) Panel-Corrected Standard Errors estimation
plim
probability limit
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PMG
Pesaran et al. (1997, 1999)’s Pooled Mean Group estimator
PPeron
Phillips and Perron (1988) unit root test
PPP
Purchasing Power Parity
RHS
Right Hand Side
RS
Risk-Sharing
SE
Standard Error(s)
SR
Short Run
Std.Dev.
Standard Deviation
SVAR
Structural Vector Autoregressive
SVAR-IV
IV-estimations using instruments derived from a Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1993) style SVAR
U-ID KP p-value
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) underidentification Lagrange Multiplier p-value
U-ID KP LM χ2
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) underidentification Lagrange Multiplier χ2 test
statistics
UK
United Kingdom
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US
United States of America
VAR
Vector Autoregressive
W-ID KD Wald F
Kleibergen and Paap (2006)’s Wald F weak identification test statistics
W-ID CD Wald F
Cragg and Donald (1993)’s Wald F weak identification test statistics
Y
see GDP
A.2 List of Symbols
This appendix contains a comprehensive list of symbols used in the thesis.
(1− βu)
The proportion of idiosyncratic output shocks that are shared, i.e. the risk-
sharing.
Ai
Vector of the coefficients for aggregate demand and supply shocks.
α
Output’s AR(1) coefficient in Chapter 5.
Bt
Vector of the coefficients for output and price in period t.
βc
Captures the covariance of foreign borrowing and lending, or the use of the
trade balance, with output to buffer consumption.
βk1
Captures the covariance of the international net income from abroad with
output as a proportion of the overall variance of output and signifies the ex-
ante income insurance channel.
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βk2
Captures the covariance of international net transfers with output and mea-
sures the international country equivalent of federal government transfer pay-
ments. What Sørensen and Yosha (1998) cite as βτ .
βs
Captures the covariance of domestic savings behavior with output, i.e. the
consumption buffer against idiosyncratic output shocks achieved via variation
in domestic savings.
βu
The proportion of idiosyncratic output shocks that are not shared, i.e. the
unshared risk.
βu,D1 and βu,D2
The proportion of idiosyncratic output shocks that are not shared, i.e. the
unshared risk, when the estimation includes an interactive dummy term.
βLRu
The proportion of idiosyncratic output shocks that are not shared, i.e. the
unshared risk, in the Level estimation.
βLRu,D1 and β
LR
u,D2
The proportion of idiosyncratic output shocks that are not shared, i.e. the un-
shared risk, in the Level estimation when the estimation includes an interactive
dummy term.
βp,1 and βp,0
The coefficients of the leads and lags of output in the Level estimation.
Bn1
Risk-less bond.
Ci,t
The consumption of country i in period t.
log(Ct)
The cross-sectional average of consumption in period t.
Cm,t
The consumption of country m in period t.
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Cn1
The consumption of country n in period one. This notation is used in section
2.2 and is done to align the notation with Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) Ch.5.3.
In subsequent part of the thesis, the equivalent is stated by Ci,1.
Cn2 (s)
The consumption of country n in period two, subject to exogenous shock s.
This notation is used in section 2.2 and is done to align the notation with
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) Ch.5.3. In subsequent part of the thesis, the
equivalent is stated by Ci,2.
Cn,t
The consumption of country n in period t.
C
Long run restriction matrix of an SVAR.
Di
Vector of coefficient for output and price shocks.
δi
Are cross-section fixed effects, also referred to as country fixed effects.
D
The demand shocks in the Chapter 5.
S
The supply shocks in the Chapter 5.
Y
The output shocks in the Chapter 5. Y consists of supply and demand shocks.
ηt
Are time fixed effects, also referred to as time dummies.
fi,t
The term consisting of weighted regressors and regressand. Together with γi,
fi,t forms the common correlated effects.
γi
The coefficients of the variables in fi,t. Together with fi,t, γi forms the common
correlated effects.
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GNDIi,t
Gross National Disposable Income of country i in period t.
GNIi,t
Gross National Income of country i in period t.
HAi,t
Home Absorption of country i in period t.
ι
The standard time preference factor.
µn
Country n’s consumption as a proportion of aggregate output.
νi,t
The disturbance or error term. νi,t appears with various subscripts or super-
scripts to differentiate between the error term of various equations.
νt
The cross-sectional average of the error in period t.
ωt
Vector of aggregate demand and supply shocks.
ωD,t
Aggregate demand shocks.
ωS,t
Aggregate supply shocks.
pi(s)
The probability of shock s occurring.
$
Is used to denote a constant or intercept term.
Li
Lag polynomial.
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pt
Price in period t. Another variation is pi,t which is price of country n in period
t.
ψ
The parameter which sets out the extent to which demand shocks feed into
output in Chapter 5.
(1 + r)
Return on riskless bond in the second period.
ρ
The relative risk aversion coefficient.
S
Efficient GMM weighting matrix.
Un
Country n’s lifetime utility.
u(Cn1 )
The utility of consumption of country n in period one.
u(Cn2 (s))
The utility of consumption of country n in period two subject to exogenous
shock s.
V n1
Period one market value of the second period state contingent output of coun-
try n.
κ
Output’s AR(1) coefficient.
%i,t
The disturbance or error term in the Common Correlated Effect estimation
which contains both the standard error νi,t and the common correlated effects
γift.
W
Potentially inefficient GMM weighting matrix.
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Xt
Vector consisting of output and price in period t.
et
Vector consisting of output and price shocks.
ξi
Are cross-section fixed effects, also referred to as cross-section dummies.
xnm
Country n’s share of country m’s future output.
Yi,t
The output of country i in period t.
log(Yt)
The cross-sectional average of output in period t.
Y m2 (s)
The output of country m in period two subject to exogenous shock s. This
notation is used in section 2.2 and is done to align the notation with Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1996) Ch.5.3. In subsequent parts of the thesis, the equivalent is
stated by Yi,2.
Y n1
The output of country n in period one. This notation is used in section 2.2
and is done to align the notation with Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) Ch.5.3. In
subsequent parts of the thesis, the equivalent is stated by Yi,1.
Y n2 (s)
The output of country n in period two subject to exogenous shock s. This
notation is used in section 2.2 and is done to align the notation with Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1996) Ch.5.3. In subsequent parts of the thesis, the equivalent is
stated by Yi,2.
Y W1
The global output in period one. This notation is used in section 2.2 and
is done to align the notation with Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) Ch.5.3. In
subsequent parts of the thesis, the equivalent is stated by YW,1.
125
Y W2 (s)
The global output in period two subject to exogenous shock s. This notation is
used in section 2.2 and is done to align the notation with Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1996) Ch.5.3. In subsequent parts of the thesis, the equivalent is stated by
YW,2
YW,t
The global output in period t.
Z
Set of instrumental variables. For example, Zlevel is the instrument set for
the FD2SLS consisting of two period lagged level of the endogenous variable,
while ZFD is the instrument set for the FD2SLS using two period lagged first
differences of the endogenous variable.
126
Appendix B
(Chapter 2)
B.1 Fixed-Effects
Here we illustrate in more depth the existence of the two-way fixed effect model in
the (panel) Eq.(2.18) and how the fixed effects are dealt with.
The time fixed effect is present as every year the whole economic-zone experiences
a common shock (the weighted sum of individual country shocks). This common
shock is, as the name suggests, common to all countries and should be accounted for
to obtain the country’s idiosyncratic output movement and thus risk-sharing. This
follows from Eq.(2.10), where consumption movement, in the presence of perfect
risk-sharing, is subject only to the world output movement and independent of
country idiosyncratic output movement. The cross-section fixed effect, or country
fixed effect, is based on the idea that each country has certain unique characteristics,
such as the way capital is raised and its impact on consumption smoothing. For
identification of cross-section and time fixed effects, it is necessary to assume that
they are constant either over time and vary over cross-section (cross-section FE),
or constant over countries and vary over time (time FE). That is, we start with an
estimation equation of:
log(Ci,t) = log(Yi,t)βu + νi,t + ξi + ηt
where ξi is a country specific effect which is constant over time, and ηt is a time
fixed effect and is constant for all countries in period t (the common shock of the
aggregate economic area). Now if one takes the first difference, the unobserved
cross-section fixed effect drops out, ξi − ξi = 0, and for that matter, any variable
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which is constant over time drops out, be it observed or unobserved.1
∆log(Ci,t) = ∆log(Yi,t)βu + ∆(νi,t) + ∆(ηt)
The time fixed effect (common shock) is still present in the equation. One possible
step to avoid the time-fixed effect entering the error term is to use time dummies.
However, this requires the estimation of T coefficients, where T stands for the time
span in the panel. Alternatively, the variables can be cross-sectionally demeaned,
which is constant for each cross-section and varies over time:
∆log(Ci,t − Ct) = ∆log(Yi,t − Yt)βu + ∆(νi,t − νt)
where Xt denotes the cross-section average in period t. This demeaning filters
out the time fixed effect since the time fixed effect is the same across countries.
Therefore, the cross-section average for the time fixed effect is the same as the time
fixed effect experienced by each country and subsequently the demeaned time fixed
effect is zero.
In the empirical application, the construction of the average to demean the out-
put and consumption variable was done using a weighted sum of the countries in the
sample. The weight used is based on the annual proportional share of each country
of the summed real GDP. When one demeans, the βu is still the weighted average
of panel units. However, an exception does occur since due to the application of
weight, greater importance is given to the proportionally larger OECD countries’
output shock as being part of the common shock.2 It should also be noted that
when demeaning, the degrees of freedom need to be adjusted to account for es-
timating the cross-sectional mean, which is not commonly done by the statistical
program.3 As demeaning is done by weights, with the sum of weights equal to one,
the time fixed effect is still filtered out and achieves the equivalent result to the
unconditional/unweighted mean being taken.
As mentioned above, one obtains the formulation of Eq.(2.18) relative to Eq.(2.17)
as the result of how the filtering out the fixed effects is done. The approach used in
Eq.(2.17) is referred to as the ‘Least Square Dummy Variables’ estimator and the
approach in Eq.(2.18) as ‘Fixed-Effect’ or ‘Within’ estimator. Effectively the βu is
an equally weighted average of each time series of the panel.
1It should be noted that if one is content with assuming, or has already tested, that the cross-
section fixed effects are orthogonal to the included exogenous regressors, one could use a Random
Effects estimator.
2The implication being that less of a shock is counted as idiosyncratic shock. Where as a small
country’s consumption has to be uncorrelated with output in level for risk-sharing, larger countries
to some extent gain risk-sharing by having less of their output counted as idiosyncratic shocks.
3For a more intuitive and detailed explanation please refer to Angrist and Pischke (2009).
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Appendix C
(Chapter 3)
C.1 GMDOLS individual country risk-sharing pa-
rameter estimates.
This appendix contains the country individual estimates used for the GMDOLS
unshared risk estimate presented in chapter 3. Table (C.1) contains the individual
country estimates which are used to compile the mean estimate of the GMDOLS in
chapter 3. Interesting to note is the wide range of parameter estimates, including
some estimates that are above 1, implying negative risk-sharing. As mentioned be-
fore, though it is not impossible to find negative risk-sharing, it is very unlikely and
cast doubt about the estimates. This doubt is compounded by the wide 95% confi-
dence intervals, given large standard error estimates, which make it hard to reach a
conclusion on the extent of risk-sharing taking place in individual countries. More-
over, some country estimates are found to be insignificant, for example Canada’s
1991-2007 estimate. However, it is important to keep in mind that the standard
errors might be invalid since this estimation utilizes, potentially, non-stationary
output and consumption.
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Country 1970-2007 1970-1990 1990-2007 Country 1970-2007 1970-1990 1990-2007
Australia .791∗∗∗ .783∗∗∗ .771∗∗∗ Japan 1.053∗∗∗ 1.106∗∗∗ .701∗∗∗
(.077) (.133) (.105) (.079) (.074) (.093)
Austria .821∗∗∗ 1.319∗∗∗ -2.083∗∗∗ S. Korea .800∗∗∗ .686∗∗∗ .596∗∗∗
(.302) (.133) (.503) (.019) (.029) (.040)
Belgium 1.473∗∗∗ 1.371∗∗∗ -1.911∗∗∗ Mexico .950∗∗∗ .911∗∗∗ 1.625∗∗∗
(.210) (.166) (.708) (.037) (.041) (.230)
Canada 1.292∗∗∗ 1.817∗∗∗ -.002 Netherlands 1.062∗∗∗ 1.173∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗
(.147) (.284) (.105) (.117) (.123) (.082)
Denmark 1.718∗∗∗ .480 1.050 New Zealand .969∗∗∗ 1.097∗∗∗ .823∗∗∗
(.232) (.435) (.962) (.043) (.078) (.179)
Finland .576∗∗∗ 1.415∗∗∗ .380∗∗∗ Norway .572∗∗∗ .650∗∗∗ .746∗∗∗
(.117) (.135) (.047) (.059) (.059) (.157)
France .727∗∗∗ .755∗∗∗ .493 Portugal 1.258∗∗∗ 1.561∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗
(.097) (.252) (.700) (.096) (.459) (.116)
Germany 1.896∗∗∗ 1.640∗∗∗ 1.964∗∗∗ Spain 1.080∗∗∗ .828∗∗∗ .940∗∗∗
(.206) (.287) (.287) (.122) (.101) (.066)
Greece .154 .894∗∗∗ .525∗∗∗ Sweden 1.133∗∗∗ 1.173∗∗∗ -.156∗
(.107) (.265) (.152) (.116) (.167) (.084)
Iceland .863∗∗∗ .934∗∗∗ .898∗∗∗ Switzerland 1.014∗∗∗ 1.082∗∗∗ 1.163∗∗∗
(.088) (.118) (.095) (.032) (.111) (.343)
Ireland .454∗∗∗ -.167 .601∗∗∗ UK .967∗∗∗ .681∗∗∗ 1.132∗∗∗
(.034) (.457) (.024) (.200) (.237) (0.033)
Italy 1.367∗∗∗ 1.293∗∗∗ 1.211∗∗∗ US .980∗∗∗ 1.095∗∗∗ .772∗∗∗
(.140) (.214) (.090) (.111) (.231) (.094)
Significance levels: ∗ denotes 10%, ∗∗ 5%, and ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%. Each country was estimated using
country specific lag-length. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table C.1: GMDOLS individual country risk-sharing parameter estimates.
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Appendix D
(Chapter 4)
D.1 Country individual unit-root tests.
This appendix presents in Tables (D.1) and (D.2) the results of the country individ-
ual consumption and output unit-root tests. Two unit-root tests have been applied:
the Augmented Dickey Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Hamilton (1994))
and the Phillips and Perron (1988) unit root test. Both tests were done using a
country’s individual selected lag length and include a trend. Tests without a trend
were also done but are not presented here as the results remained similar. The
lag length selection was done based on IC. For most countries the appropriate lag
length was identified to be 1, although in some cases the appropriate lag length was
identified to be 3. In both Tables, the second column contains for each country the
lag length that was used. For simplicity of exposition, a one in the last six columns
indicates that the null hypothesis of unit-root is not rejected and a zero means the
null hypothesis is rejected at a 5% significance level.
For the most part, the two tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of unit-root.1
However, there are some instances where the two tests come to the opposite con-
clusion or in the case of German and Canadian output over the period 1991 to
2007, Australian and US consumption over 1991-2007, and Swiss consumption over
1970-2007 both the ADF and PPeron test reject the null of a unit-root process.
1Note that some rejections of a null hypothesis that is true is what is expected for a test that
is correctly sized.
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Variable Lag() 1970-2007 1970-1990 1990-2007
ADF PPerron ADF PPerron ADF PPerron
Austria 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
Australia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Finland 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
France 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Greece 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
Iceland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
S. Korea 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mexico 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
New Zealand 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Norway 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sweden 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
Switzerland 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
United Kingdom 2 1 1 1 1 1 0
United States 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table D.1: Country individual GDP unit-root tests
Variable Lag() 1970-2007 1970-1990 1990-2007
ADF PPerron ADF PPerron ADF PPerron
Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Australia 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Belgium 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Finland 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
France 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Greece 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
Iceland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
S. Korea 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mexico 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
New Zealand 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
Norway 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Switzerland 3 0 0 1 1 1 1
United Kingdom 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
United States 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Table D.2: Country individual consumption unit-root tests
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D.2 dGMM with collapsed two period lagged out-
put level as instrument
This appendix presents the dGMM results for the case when the instruments set Z
in Eq. (4.19) is limited to the collapsed instrument of two period lagged output,
yt−2. The risk-sharing estimates in Table (D.3), like the results in Table (4.7), show
1970-2007 1970-1990 1991-2007 Dummy:1970-2007
βu 0.7846
∗∗∗ 0.8745∗∗∗ 0.7058∗∗∗
βu SE() (0.1230) (0.2823) (0.0962)
βu 95% CI [0.543, 1.026] [0.321, 1.428] [0.517, 0.894]
βu,D1 0.6389
βu,D1 SE() (0.1034)
βu,D1 95% CI [0.436, 0.842]
βu,D2 -0.0442
βu,D2 SE() (0.0257)
βu,D2 95% CI [-0.094, 0.006]
AB-AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.001
AB-AR(2) p-value 0.681 0.287 0.769 0.613
U-ID KP LM χ2 1.48 0.67 3.64 6.66
U-ID KP LM p-value 0.2234 0.4117 0.0566 0.0099
AR Weak ID robust CI [..., ...] [..., ...] [..., 0.955]
Significance levels: ∗ denotes 10%, ∗∗ 5%, and ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%. Standard errors shown are arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelated robust standard errors. The dGMMs and the Anderson
and Rubin (1949) confidence intervals were constructed using the Stata commands xtabond2 and
weakiv by Roodman (2006) and Finlay et al. (2013). A ‘...’ means that the limit, be it upper or
lower, was not found to be between -2 and 2. The critical value for χ20.01 with 1 degree of freedom
is 6.635, for χ20.05 3.841, and for χ
2
0.1 2.706. Empty cell means the row is not applicable for the
respective column.
Table D.3: dGMM with collapsed instrument set limited to two period lagged output
rising risk-sharing from 13% in the period of 1970-1990 to 29% during 1991-2007.
However, like in the case Table (4.7), a significant change in risk-sharing could not
be confirmed.
The change in risk-sharing was tested using a interactive dummy term in an
estimation spanning the entire time period, where the dummy is 0 prior to and
including 1990 and 1 thereafter. The results of this dummy estimation is shown in
the last column of Table (D.3). The test applies to the parameter of the interactive
dummy term, βu,D2, with the null hypothesis testing whether the parameter is equal
to zero H0 : βu,D2 = 0 using a two sided t-test with 5% significance level. The null
hypothesis in effect states that there is no significant rise in risk-sharing between
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1970-1990 and 1991-2007. The H0 fails to be rejected with the p-value being 0.085.
Furthermore, apart from the dummy estimation, the Kleibergen and Paap (2006)
underidentification test fails to reject the null hypothesis of full column rank of
E(∆ytZ), where Z = yt−2, suggesting that the results suffers from underidentifica-
tion and thus might be inconsistent. As discussed in the fourth chapter, this should
not be surprising if output is in fact integrated of the order 1.
Finally, the Anderson and Rubin (1949) confidence interval has been applied
since the model is exactly identified; however the confidence intervals were not found
to be in the bounds of -2 and 2 –apart from the upper bound of the 1991-2007 sub-
period estimation–, further supporting the conclusions that the results in Table
(D.3) suffer some bias and thus no clear conclusion can be drawn on the extent of
risk-sharing taking place nor whether it has expanded over time.
D.3 System GMM
The system GMM and dGMM estimators are similar in their approach to estimating
risk-sharing. Both use lagged values of output as an exogenous instrument for
output in a risk-sharing estimation. The system GMM, much like dGMM, creates
an instrument for each time period. The difference from the dGMM approach,
which uses lagged levels of the endogenous variable as the instruments in a first
differenced regression, is that in addition the system GMM utilizes lagged differenced
endogenous variables as instruments in a level regression.
Table (D.4) presents the non-collapsed system GMM estimation when the pool of
instruments is restricted to a two period lagged output, while Table (D.5) presents
the system GMM using the collapsed instrument limited to a two period lagged
output. Both show an unshared risk parameter of larger than or close to 1 and
their standard confidence intervals span wide ranges. In essence, these results look
very much like the inconsistent FD2SLS estimations. And much like the FD2SLS
both the collapsed and non-collapsed instruments appear to suffer from various
misspecifications. All three system GMM estimations in Table (D.4) appear to suffer
from too many instruments as the Hansen p-value is close to one, and the instrument
sets are bigger than the respective cross-section. Meanwhile, the system GMMs in
the Table (D.5) appear to suffer from under-identification as in all three cases the null
hypothesis of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) Lagrange Multiplier test (U-ID KP
LM χ2) of under-identification is not rejected. This is not unexpected as, given the
similarity in constructing the system GMM instrument set to dGMM and FD2SLS,
the system GMM should also suffer from under- or from weak identification, as
output is or is close to being a unit root process. Finally, the Anderson and Rubin
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1970-2007 1970-1990 1991-2007
βu 1.0472
∗∗∗ 0.9926∗∗∗ 1.1579∗∗∗
SE() (0.0793) (0.0566) (0.1036)
95% CI [0.892, 1.203] [0.882, 1.104] [0.955, 1.361]
N-dimension 24 24 24
T-dimension 38 21 17
IV-Count 73 39 35
AB-AR(1) p-value 0.005 0.065 0.008
AB-AR(2) p-value 0.807 0.196 0.459
Hansen p-value 1.000 0.957 0.875
Sargan p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
U-ID KP LM χ2
U-ID KP LM p-value
CLR Weak ID robust CI [..., ...] [..., ...] [..., ... ]
Significance levels: ∗ denotes 10%, ∗∗ 5%, and ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%. Standard errors shown are arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelated robust standard errors. The dGMMs and the Moreira
(2003) CLR confidence intervals were constructed using the Stata commands xtabond2 and
weakiv by Roodman (2006) and Finlay et al. (2013). A ‘...’ means that the limit, be it upper or
lower, was not found to be between -2 and 2.
Table D.4: system GMM with the instrument pool restricted to two period lagged
output
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1970-2007 1970-1990 1991-2007
βu 1.2840
∗∗∗ 1.2286∗∗∗ 0.9187∗∗∗
SE() (0.2775) (.2447) (.2540)
95% CI [0.740, 1.828] [0.749, 1.708] [0.421, 1.417]
N-dimension 24 24 24
T-dimension 38 21 17
IV-Count 3 3 3
AB-AR(1) p-value 0.011 0.042 0.037
AB-AR(2) p-value 0.708 0.425 0.910
Hansen p-value 0.105 0.501 0.128
Sargan p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
U-ID KP LM χ2 3.02 0.97 4.52
U-ID KP LM p-value 0.2205 0.6166 0.1042
AR Weak ID robust CI [..., ...] [..., ...] [..., ...]
Significance levels: ∗ denotes 10%, ∗∗ 5%, and ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%. Standard errors shown are arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelated robust standard errors. The dGMMs and the Anderson
and Rubin (1949) confidence intervals were constructed using the Stata commands xtabond2 and
weakiv by Roodman (2006) and Finlay et al. (2013). A ‘...’ means that the limit, be it upper or
lower, was not found to be between -2 and 2.
Table D.5: system GMM with the instrument pool restricted to collapsed two period
lagged output
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(1949) confidence interval for all six system GMM estimations is not found within
the range of -2 and 2, making it virtually impossible to draw weak identification
robust conclusions about the extent of risk-sharing.
D.4 IV-estimation using supply shocks and FD2SLS
as instruments.
This appendix presents the risk-sharing estimation when output is instrumented
using both SVAR derived supply shocks and FD2SLS style instruments. Similar
to Table (4.10), the estimations are done once for supply shocks derived from the
entire sample, as well as supply shocks derived from sub-sample specific intervals
estimations. The standard errors shown below are arbitrary heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelated consistent standard errors.
Table (D.6) presents the risk-sharing estimation when output is instrumented
using both derived supply shocks and a two period lagged level of output. In line
with results in Table (4.10), Table (D.6) shows rising risk-sharing in both these
cases. However, the gain in risk-sharing between 1973-1990 and 1991-2007 is slightly
smaller in the case of Table (D.6), rising by roughly 7 percentage points from 28% to
34%, compared to Table (4.10), where risk-sharing rose around 8 percentage points
from 28% to 36%. Moreover, in all three cases, the null hypothesis of underiden-
tification is rejected. Also, the null hypothesis of weak identification is rejected in
all instances when using Kleibergen and Paap (2006) Wald F test statistics (Weak
ID KP Wald F) together with Olea and Pflueger (2013) suggested critical values.
This includes the estimation of 1973-1990 when using sub-period derived supply
shocks for higher Nagar bias threshold. However, while the Anderson and Rubin
(1949) confidence interval for this estimate includes values above one, it also clearly
includes values below one, suggesting the possibility of a reasonable level in the
interval [0.758, 1]. Finally, in all instances the Hansen test fails to reject the null
hypothesis that the instruments are valid.
Unlike in Table (D.6), the estimations in Table (D.7) are less harmonious in their
conclusion of rising risk-sharing. When using supply shocks derived from VAR on
the entire sample, risk-sharing remains essentially flat, similar to the dGMM with
a collapsed instrument set limited to two and three period lagged outputs in Table
(4.8). However, when using supply shocks derived from VAR estimations on sub-
periods, the estimations in Table (D.7) show risk-sharing expanding by roughly 18
percentage points between 1973-1990 and 1990-2007, when one restricts the unshared
risk in the 1973-1990 sub-period to 1 rather than allowing negative risk-sharing. The
increase in risk-sharing was tested for its significance by running an estimation with
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Variable 1973-2007 1973-1990 1991-2007
βu 0.7000
∗∗∗ 0.7246∗∗∗ 0.6560∗∗∗
SE() (0.0553) (0.0746) (0.0946)
95% CI [0.592, 0.808] [0.578, 0.871] [0.471, 0.841]
IV-Count 2 2 2
Hansen p-values 0.3701 0.7015 0.3876
U-ID KP LM χ2 91.069 57.337 34.155
U-ID KP LM p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
W-ID CD Wald F 169.781 91.665 73.316
W-ID KP Wald F 82.816 57.533 25.719
AR weak-iv robust CI [0.575, 0.829] [0.544, 0.911] [0.480, .855]
subperiods estimates
βu 0.9110
∗∗∗ 0.9762∗∗∗ 0.7210∗∗∗
SE() (0.0763) (0.1190) (0.0962)
95% CI [0.761, 1.061] [0.743, 1.210] [0.532, 0.909]
IV-Count 2 2 2
Hansen p-values 0.5571 0.4594 0.4304
U-ID KP LM χ2 51.964 24.828 30.080
U-ID KP LM p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
W-ID CD Wald F 52.921 23.352 33.103
W-ID KP Wald F 38.462 16.231 27.391
AR weak-iv robust CI [0.745, 1.132] [0.758, 1.424] [0.451, 0.946]
Significance levels: ∗ denotes 10%, ∗∗ 5%, and ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%. The IV estimations and the Anderson
and Rubin (1949) confidence interval were constructed using the Stata commands ivreg2 and
weakiv by Baum et al. (2010) and Finlay et al. (2013).
Table D.6: IV-Estimation using aggregate supply shocks and FD2SLS-Zlevel
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Variable 1973-2007 1973-1990 1990-2007
βu 0.7225
∗∗∗ 0.7329∗∗∗ 0.7290∗∗∗
SE() (0.0556) (0.0761) (0.0761)
95% CI [0.613, 0.832] [0.584, 0.882] [0.580, 0.878]
IV-Count 2 2 2
Hansen p-values 0.0234 0.1803 0.0488
U-ID KP LM χ2 92.162 57.910 33.620
U-ID KP LM p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
W-ID CD Wald F 169.190 79.830 97.798
W-ID KP Wald F 75.506 49.219 28.228
AR weak-iv robust CI [0.676, 0.773] [0.567, 0.875] [0.666, 0.853]
subperiod SVARs
βu 0.9744
∗∗∗ 1.1502∗∗∗ 0.8224∗∗∗
SE() (0.0820) (0.1501) (0.0795)
95% CI [0.814, 1.135] [0.856, 1.444] [0.667, 0.978]
IV-Count 2 2 2
Hansen p-values 0.5056 0.9134 0.0814
U-ID KP LM χ2 50.283 22.020 34.555
U-ID KP LM p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
W-ID CD Wald F 51.287 17.040 49.491
W-ID KP Wald F 36.841 14.510 28.223
AR weak-iv robust CI [0.796, 1.198] [0.848, 1.758] [0.674, .952]
Significance levels: ∗ denotes 10%, ∗∗ 5%, and ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%. The IV estimations and the Anderson
and Rubin (1949) confidence intervals were constructed using the Stata commands ivreg2 and
weakiv by Baum et al. (2010) and Finlay et al. (2013).
Table D.7: IV-Estimation using aggregate supply shocks and FD2SLS-Zfd
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an interactive dummy term where the dummy is 0 prior to 1990 and 1 thereafter.
The results of this estimation are presented in Table (D.8). More specifically, the
rise in risk sharing was tested using the null hypothesis that no change in risk-
sharing occurred based on the interactive dummy term parameter being equal to
zero, H0 : βu,D2 = 0. Based on a two sided t-test with 5% significance level, the
null is not rejected, but when the significance level is chosen to be 10% the null is
rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis which is that a change in risk-sharing
occurred.
Moreover, much like in Table (D.6), all six estimations in Table (D.7) reject the
null of underidentification, while the 1973-1990 estimation using sub-period derived
supply shocks fails to reject the null hypothesis of weak-identification at higher
levels of precision. But as in Table (D.6), the Anderson and Rubin (1949) 95%
confidence interval allows for the possibility that unshared risk lies in the reasonable
range of [0.848;1]. Also interesting to note is that in some instances, contrary to
the unanimous conclusion in Table (D.6), the Hansen test in Table (D.7) rejects
the null hypothesis of valid instruments at 95% confidence level –apart from the
1991-2007 sub period estimation using supply shocks derived from a SVAR on the
entire sample.
Variable 1973-2007
subperiod SVARs
βu,D1 1.1502
∗∗∗
βu,D1 SE() (0.1501)
βu,D1 95% CI [0.8559, 1.444]
βu,D2 -0.3277
∗
βu,D2 SE() (.1699)
βu,D2 95% CI [-0.661, 0.005]
IV-Count 2
Hansen p-values 0.2174
U-ID KP LM χ2
U-ID KP LM p-value
W-ID CD Wald F
W-ID KP Wald F
Significance levels: ∗ denotes 10%, ∗∗ 5%, and ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%. The IV estimations were constructed
using the Stata commands ivreg2 and weakiv by Baum et al. (2010).
Table D.8: IV-Estimation with interactive dummy term and using aggregate supply
shocks and FD2SLS-Zfd
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Appendix E
(Chapter 5)
E.1 Mean squared error of the estimated unshared
risk parameter when βu = 0.8
Classical Level FD2SLS dGMM SVAR-IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
α = 0.5
ψ = 0 0.00167 0.00158 0.00244 0.01636 0.24561 0.01361 0.01054 0.03830
ψ = 0.5 0.14163 0.14661 0.04161 0.01330 3.03133 0.02634 0.00847 0.02463
ψ = 1 0.22652 0.23438 0.06327 0.00846 0.79955 0.03084 0.00532 0.01747
α = 0.95
ψ = 0 0.00130 0.00134 0.00024 0.01352 2948.759 0.01037 0.00913 0.00277
ψ = 0.5 0.06466 0.07925 0.00055 0.01112 56698.41 0.01216 0.00741 0.00213
ψ = 1 0.12420 0.14594 0.00069 0.00705 1008.412 0.01134 0.00466 0.00194
α = 1
ψ = 0 0.00118 0.00127 0.00010 745.6217 142590.5 0.02331 3.21049 0.00163
ψ = 0.5 0.05304 0.06886 0.00006 822.4726 18945.22 0.03764 2.48610 0.00163
ψ = 1 0.10735 0.13098 0.00003 786.0499 1661.04 0.04177 1.21589 0.00165
The MCS is based on 10,000 simulations.
Table E.1: Mean squared error of the estimated unshared risk parameter when
βu = 0.8.
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E.2 MCS when unshared risk is 0.6
Classical Level FD2SLS dGMM SVAR-IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
α = 0.5
ψ = 0 0.6007 0.6003 0.6001 0.5993 0.5948 0.5982 0.6002 0.7915
ψ = 0.5 0.9747 0.9814 0.8002 0.5939 0.5564 0.7295 0.6003 0.7530
ψ = 1 1.0753 1.0836 0.8503 0.5927 0.5149 0.7620 0.6002 0.7284
α = 0.95
ψ = 0 0.6007 0.6003 0.5999 0.5994 0.4749 0.5994 0.6004 0.6343
ψ = 0.5 0.8519 0.8795 0.6200 0.5947 -1.1117 0.6673 0.5988 0.6241
ψ = 1 0.9511 0.9811 0.6251 0.5937 1.1819 0.6846 0.5982 0.6205
α = 1
ψ = 0 0.6007 0.6003 0.6000 1.1302 5.3998 0.6010 0.6229 0.6000
ψ = 0.5 0.8277 0.8603 0.6000 0.8961 -0.5554 0.7369 0.7127 0.5992
ψ = 1 0.9262 0.9608 0.6001 0.7119 1.4519 0.7716 0.7280 0.5985
The MCS is based on 10,000 simulations.
Table E.2: Mean estimated unshared risk parameters for when βu = 0.6.
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Classical Level FD2SLS dGMM SVAR-IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
α = 0.5
ψ = 0 0.6006 0.6002 0.6000 0.5989 0.5983 0.5976 0.5985 0.7913
ψ = 0.5 0.9748 0.9816 0.8000 0.5978 0.5997 0.7315 0.6025 0.7536
ψ = 1 1.0754 1.0834 0.8504 0.5997 0.6022 0.7653 0.6047 0.7294
α = 0.95
ψ = 0 0.6011 0.6003 0.5999 0.5989 0.5882 0.5988 0.6003 0.6346
ψ = 0.5 0.8511 0.8789 0.6199 0.5975 0.8010 0.6681 0.6024 0.6252
ψ = 1 0.9507 0.9805 0.6251 0.5984 0.8594 0.6853 0.6018 0.6223
α = 1
ψ = 0 0.6007 0.6004 0.6000 0.6002 0.6159 0.6020 0.6006 0.6004
ψ = 0.5 0.8269 0.8594 0.5999 0.6227 0.9897 0.7287 0.6472 0.6004
ψ = 1 0.9259 0.9601 0.6001 0.6280 1.0907 0.7643 0.6548 0.6004
The MCS is based on 10,000 simulations.
Table E.3: Median of estimated unshared risk parameters when βu = 0.6.
Classical Level FD2SLS dGMM SVAR-IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
α = 0.5
ψ = 0 0.04091 0.03978 0.04935 0.12792 0.49559 0.11663 0.10268 0.04021
ψ = 0.5 0.03464 0.03325 0.03919 0.11519 1.74061 0.09779 0.09205 0.03472
ψ = 1 0.02383 0.02231 0.02457 0.09169 0.89016 0.06776 0.07293 0.03129
α = 0.95
ψ = 0 0.03604 0.03663 0.01535 0.11630 54.30504 0.10186 0.09557 0.03991
ψ = 0.5 0.03499 0.03358 0.01242 0.10531 238.1201 0.08737 0.08606 0.03938
ψ = 1 0.03 000 0.02728 0.00773 0.08373 31.75176 0.06470 0.06823 0.03897
α = 1
ψ = 0 0.03438 0.03561 0.00988 27.30229 377.6001 0.15269 1.79173 0.04035
ψ = 0.5 0.03470 0.03330 0.00803 28.67869 137.6437 0.13746 1.57278 0.04040
ψ = 1 0.03090 0.02794 0.00500 28.03776 40.74901 0.11108 1.09527 0.04057
The MCS is based on 10,000 simulations.
Table E.4: Standard deviation of the estimated unshared risk parameters when
βu = 0.6.
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Classical Level FD2SLS dGMM SVAR-IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
α = 0.5
ψ = 0 0.00167 0.00158 0.00244 0.01636 0.24561 0.01361 0.01054 0.03830
ψ = 0.5 0.14163 0.14661 0.04161 0.01330 3.03133 0.02634 0.00847 0.02463
ψ = 1 0.22652 0.23438 0.06327 0.00846 0.79955 0.03084 0.00532 0.01747
α = 0.95
ψ = 0 0.00130 0.00134 0.00024 0.01352 2948.758 0.01037 0.00913 0.00277
ψ = 0.5 0.06466 0.07925 0.00055 0.01112 56698.46 0.01216 0.00741 0.00213
ψ = 1 0.12420 0.14594 0.00069 0.00705 1008.412 0.01134 0.00466 0.00194
α = 1
ψ = 0 0.00118 0.00127 0.00010 745.6219 142590.6 0.02331 3.21049 0.00163
ψ = 0.5 0.05304 0.06886 0.00006 822.4726 18945.22 0.03764 2.48610 0.00163
ψ = 1 0.10735 0.13098 0.00003 786.0500 1661.042 0.04177 1.21589 0.00165
The MCS is based on 10,000 simulations.
Table E.5: Mean squared error of the estimated unshared risk parameter when
βu = 0.6.
Classical Level FD2SLS dGMM SVAR-IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
α = 0.5
ψ = 0 40.29% 7.58% 37.22% 1.67% 2.83% 3.57% 7.44% 99.02%
ψ = 0.5 100% 100% 100% 2.11% 4.87% 23.21% 7.38% 95.95%
ψ = 1 100% 100% 100% 2.48% 7.2% 54.69% 7.79% 91.41%
α = 0.95
ψ = 0 32.58% 4.57% 35.52% 0% .03% 3.29% 6.23% 4.49%
ψ = 0.5 100% 100% 76.65% 0% .75% 9.39% 6.42% 3.32%
ψ = 1 100% 100% 98.73% 0% 3.08% 19.6% 6.46% 3.23%
α = 1
ψ = 0 30.85% 4.08% 34.74% 0% .02% 2.93% 1% 1.15%
ψ = 0.5 100% 100% 34.64% 0% .23% 11.46% 1.38% 1.16%
ψ = 1 100% 100% 34.56% 0% 1.78% 26.31% 2.37% 1.19%
The MCS is based on 10,000 simulations.
Table E.6: Test size: rejection rate for 5% significance level when testing H0 : βu =
0.6.
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E.3 Mean squared error of the estimated unshared
risk parameter when βu = 0.8 and time series
is 20 periods
Classical Level FD2SLS dGMM SVAR-IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
α = 0.5
ψ = 0 0.00315 0.00319 0.00485 0.03712 7.73668 0.02790 0.02399 0.04158
ψ = 0.5 0.14800 0.15038 0.04311 0.03075 12.46951 0.03715 0.01944 0.02689
ψ = 1 0.23542 0.23923 0.06382 0.02012 52.45387 0.03647 0.01224 0.0192
α = 0.95
ψ = 0 0.00255 0.00277 0.00064 8.31440 8876.045 0.03423 0.30940 0.00600
ψ = 0.5 0.07655 0.08555 0.00081 3.52278 877362.4 0.03763 0.11363 0.00525
ψ = 1 0.14132 0.15485 0.00079 0.16634 242163.1 0.03288 0.12148 0.00499
α = 1
ψ = 0 0.00230 0.00259 0.00039 588.1914 34700000 0.07104 3.15790 0.00489
ψ = 0.5 0.06402 0.07412 0.00026 27617.71 15327.96 0.09336 3.45030 0.00491
ψ = 1 0.12417 0.13865 0.00010 2536.348 11862.06 0.09317 2.75969 0.00499
The MCS is based on 10,000 simulations.
Table E.7: Mean squared error of the estimated unshared risk parameter when
βu = 0.8 and time is limited to 20 periods.
145
Bibliography
Afonso, A. and D. Furceri. 2007. “Business cycle synchronization and insurance
mechanisms in the EU”. European Central Bank Working Paper Series 884.
Anderson, T. W. and C. Hsiao. 1981. “Estimation of dynamic models with error
components”. Journal of the American Statistical Association 76, pp. 598–606.
— 1982. “Formulation and estimation of dynamic models using panel data”. Journal
of Econometrics 18, pp. 47–82.
Anderson, T. W. and H. Rubin. 1949. “Estimation of the parameters of single
equation in a complete system of stochastic equations”. Annals of Mathemat-
ical Statistics 20, pp. 46–63.
Andrews, D. W. K. and J. H. Stock. 2005. “Inference with weak instruments”.
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1530.
Angrist, J.D. and J.-S. Pischke. 2009. Mostly harmless econometrics: an empiricist’s
companion. Princeton Univeristy Press.
Arellano, M. 2010. Panel data econometrics: advanced texts in econometrics. Oxford.
Arellano, M. and S. Bond. 1991. “Some tests of specification for panel data: monte
carlo evidence and an application to employment equations”. The Review of
Economic Studies 58, pp. 277–97.
Arellano, M. and O. Bover. 1995. “Another look at the the instrumental variables
estimation of error-components models”. Journal of Econometrics 68, pp. 29–51.
Arreaza, A., B.E. Sørensen, and O. Yosha. 1998. “Consumption smoothing through
Fiscal Policy in OECD and EU countries”. NBER Working Papers 6372.
Artis, M.J. and M. Hoffmann. 2007a. “a The home bias and capital income flows
between countries and regions”. IEW - Working Papers 316.
— 2007. b. “Declining home bias and the increase in international risk sharing:
lessons from european integration”. CEPR Discussion Paper 6617.
— 2008. “Financial globalization, international business cycles and consumption
risk sharing”. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 110.3, pp. 447–471.
— 2012. “The home bias and capital income flows between countries and regions and
improved long-term consumption risk sharing between industrialized countries”.
International Finance 14 (3), pp. 481–505.
146
Asdrubali, P. and S. Kim. 2000. Dynamic risk sharing in the United States and
Europe. Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1621.
Econometric Society.
Asdrubali, P., B.E. Sørenson, and O. Yosha. 1996. “Channels of interstate risk shar-
ing : United States 1963-1990”. Quaterly Journal of Economics 11, pp. 1081–
1110.
Backus, D., P. Kehoe, and F. Kydland. 1992. “International real business cycle”.
Journal of Political Economy 100.4, pp. 745–775.
Bai, Y. and J. Zhang. 2012. “Financial integration and international risk sharing”.
Journal of International Economics 86.1, pp. 17–32.
Bailey, N., G. Kapetanios, and M.H. Pesaran. 2012. “Exponent of Cross-sectional
Dependence: Estimation and Inference”. Institute for the Study of Labor Discus-
sion Papers 6318.
Balli, F. and E. Pierucci. 2015. “Globalization and international risk-sharing: do
political and social factors matter more than economic integration?” CAMA
Working Paper 4/2015.
Barro, R.J. and X. Sala-i-Martin. 1991. “Convergence across states and regions”.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, pp. 107–182.
— 1992. “Convergence”. Journal of Political Economy 100, pp. 223–251.
Baum, C.F., M.E. Schaffer, and S. Stillman. 2007. “Enhanced routines for instru-
mental variables/generalized method of moments estimation and testing”. The
Stata Journal 7.4, pp. 465–506.
— 2010. “ivreg2: Stata module for extended instrumental variables/2SLS, GMM
and AC/HAC, LIML and k-class regression”.
Baumol, W. 1986. “Productivity growth, convergence, and welfare”. American Eco-
nomic Review 76, pp. 1072–1085.
Baxter, D. and M. J. Crucini. 1995. “Business cycle and the asset structure of foreign
trade”. International Economic Review 36, pp. 821–853.
Bayoumi, T. 1992. “The effects of the ERM on participating economies”. IMF Staff
papers 39.
Bayoumi, T. and B. Eichengreen. 1993. “Shocking aspects of European monetary
integration”. Adjustment and growth in the European Monetary Union. Ed. by
Francisco Torres and Francesco Giavazzi. Cambridge University Press. Chap. 7,
pp. 193–235.
Bayoumi, T. and P. Masson. 1995. “Fiscal flows in the United States and Canada:
lessons for monetary union in Europe”. European Economic Review 39, pp. 253–
274.
Beck, N. and J.N. Katz. 1995. “What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-
section data”. American Political Science Review 89.3, pp. 634–647.
147
Becker, S. and M. Hoffmann. 2006. “Intra- and international risk-sharing in the short
run and long run”. European Economic Review 50, pp. 777–806.
Bhattacharjee, A. 2015. “PhD quantitative methods - Advanced panel data econo-
metrics”. Heriot-Watt University, PhD Advanced Training Course, Lectures 1-3.
Bhattacharjee, A. and S. Holly. 2013. “Understanding Interactions in Social Net-
works and Committees”. Spatial Economic Analysis 8.1, pp. 23–53.
Blanchard, O. and D. Quah. 1989. “The dynamic effects of aggregates demand and
supply disturbances”. American Economic Review 79, pp. 655–673.
Blundell, R. and S. Bond. 1998. “Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dy-
namic panel data models.” Journal of Econometrics 87, pp. 115–143.
Bound, J., D. Jaeger, and R. Baker. 1995. “Problems with instrumental variable
estimation when the correlation between instruments and the endogenous ex-
planatory variables is weak”. Journal of the American Statistical Association 90,
pp. 443–450.
Carlson, M., J. Lyhagen, and P. O¨sterholm. 2008. “Testing for purchasing power
parity in cointegrated panels”. IMF Working Paper WP/07/287.
Chernozhukov, V. and C Hansen. 2005. “The reduced form: a simple approach to in-
ference with weak instruments”. Working paper, University of Chicago, Graduate
School of Business.
Chesher, A. and S. Peters. 1994. “Symmetry, regression design, and sampling dis-
tributions”. Econometric Theory 10, pp. 116–129.
Chong, Y., O`. Jorda´, and A.M. Taylor. 2010. “The Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson hy-
pothesis: real exchange rates and their long-run equilibrium”. NBER Working
Paper 15868.
Chudik, A., M.H. Pesaran, and E. Tosetti. 2011. “Weak and strong cross-section
dependence and estimation of large panels”. The Econometrics Journal 14.1,
pp. C45–C90.
Cochrane, J.H. 1991. “A simple test of consumption insurance”. Journal of Political
Economy 99.5, pp. 957–976.
Cragg, J.G. and S.G. Donald. 1993. “Testing indifiability and specification in in-
strumental variables models”. Econometric Theory 9, pp. 220–240.
Davidson, R. and J. G. MacKinnon. 1993. Estimation and inference in econometrics.
Oxford University Press.
De Hoyos, R.E. and V. Sarafidis. 2006. “Testing for cross-sectional dependence in
panel-data models”. The Stata Journal 6.4, pp. 482–496.
DeLong, J.B. 1988. “Productivity growth, convergence, and welfare: comment”.
American Economic Review 78.5, pp. 1138–54.
Demyanyk, Y., C. Ostergaard, and B.E. Sørenson. 2008. “Risk sharing and portfolio
allocation in EMU”. European Economy Economic Papers 334.
148
Devereux, M. B., A. W. Gregory, and G. W. Smith. 1992. “Realistic cross-country
consumption correlations in a two-country, equilibrium, business cycle model”.
Journal of International Money and Finance 11.1, pp. 3–16.
Dickey, D. A. and W. A. Fuller. 1979. “Distribution of the estimators for autoregres-
sive time series with a unit root”. Journal of the American Statistical Association
74, pp. 427–431.
Dowrick, S. and D.-T. Nguyen. 1989. “OECD comparative economic growth 1950-85:
catch-up and convergence”. American Economic Review 79.5, pp. 1010–30.
Driscoll, J. and A.C. Kraay. 1998. “Consistent covariance matrix estimation with
spatially dependent data”. Review of Economics and Statistics 80, pp. 549–560.
Dufour, J.M. and J. Jasiac. 2001. “Finite sample limited information inference meth-
ods for structural equations and models with generated regressors”. International
Economic Review 42, 815–843.
Dufour, J.M. and M. Taamouti. 2005. “Projection-based statistical inference in linear
structural models with possibly weak instruments”. Econometrica 73, 1351–1367.
Finlay, K., L.M. Magnusson, and M.E. Schaffer. 2013. “weakiv: Weak-instrument-
robust tests and confidence intervals for instrumental-variable (IV) estimation of
linear, probit and tobit models.”
Fuleky, P., L. Ventura, and Q. Zhao. 2015a. “Common correlated effects and inter-
national risk sharing”. Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Depart-
ment of Economics.
— 2015. b. “International risk sharing in the short and long run under country
heterogeneity”. 21st International Panel Data Conference.
Funke, M. 1998. “Aggregate demand and aggregate supply in UK regions”. Discus-
sion Paper 01-98.
Funke, M. and S. Hall. 1998. “Aggregate demand and aggregate supply in UK re-
gions”. Journal of Economic Studies 25.4, pp. 260–276.
Hadri, K. 2000. “Testing for stationarity in heterogeneous panel data”. The Econo-
metrics Journal 3, pp. 148–161.
Hagen, J. von. 1998. “Fiscal policy and intranational risk-sharing”. Zentrum fu¨r
Europa¨ische Integrationsforschung Working Paper B98-13.
Hahn, J. and J. Hausman. 2002. “Notes on bias in estimators for simultaneous
equation models”. Economics Letters 75.2, pp. 237–241.
Hamilton, J. D. 1994. Time series analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hayashi, F. 2000. Econometrics. Princeton University Pres.
Hoechle, D. 2007. “Robust standard errors for panel regressions with cross-sectional
dependence”. Stata Journal 7.3, pp. 281–313.
Hoffmann, M. 2008. “The lack of international consumption risk sharing: can infla-
tion differentials and trading costs help explain the puzzle?” Open Economies
Review 19.2, pp. 183–201.
149
Holtz-Eakin, D., W. Newey, and H.S. Rosen. 1988. “Estimating vector autoregres-
sion with panel data”. Econometrica 56, pp. 1371–13957.
Im, K.S., M.H. Pesaran, and Y. Shin. 2003. “Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous
panels”. Journal of Econometrics 115, pp. 53–74.
Kao, C. and M.-H. Chiang. 2001. “On the estimation and inference of a cointegrated
regression in panel data”. Advances in Econometrics 15, pp. 179–222.
Kleibergen, F. 2002. “Pivotal statistics for testing structural parameters in instru-
mental variables regression”. Econometrica 70, pp. 1781–1803.
— 2004. “Testing Subsets of Structural Parameters in the Instrumental Variables
Regression Model”. Review of Economics and Statistics 86, pp. 418–423.
— 2005. “Testing Parameters in GMM Without Assuming that They Are Identi-
fied”. Econometrica 73, pp. 1103–1123.
Kleibergen, F. and R. Paap. 2006. “Generalized reduced rank tests using the singlu-
arvalue decomposition”. Journal of Econometrics 127, pp. 97–126.
Kose, M. A., E. S. Prasad, and M. E. Terrones. 2009. “Does financial globalization
promote risk sharing?” Journal of Development Economics 89.2, pp. 258–270.
Kovandzic, T.V. et al. 2015. “Police, crime and the problem of weak instruments:
revisiting the “more police, less crime” thesis”. Journal of Quantitative Crimi-
nology 3, pp. 1–26.
Leibrecht, M. and J. Scharler. 2008. “Reconsidering consumption risk sharing among
OECD Countries: some evidence based on panel cointegration”. Open Economic
Review 19, pp. 493–505.
Levin, A., C.-F. Lin, and C-S. J. Chu. 2002. “Unit root tests in panel data: asymp-
totic and finite sample properties”. Journal of Econometrics 108, pp. 1–24.
Lippi, M. and L. Reichlin. 1993. “The dynamic effects of aggregate demand and
supply disturbances: comment”. American Economic Review 83.3, pp. 644–52.
Lu¨tkepohl, H. 1985. “Comparison of criteria for estimating the order of a vector
autoregressive process”. Journal of Time Series Analysis 6.1, pp. 35–52.
Lu¨tkepohle, H. 2005. New introduction to multiple time series analysis. Springer.
Mace, B. 1991. “Full insurance in the presence of of aggregate uncertainty”. Journal
of Political Economy 99.5, pp. 928–956.
Maddala, G.S. and S. Wu. 1999. “A comparative study of unit root tests with panel
data and a new simple test”. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 61,
pp. 631–652.
Mankiw, N.G., D. Romer, and D.N. Weil. 1992. “A contribution to the empirics of
economic growth”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, pp. 407–437.
Martin, X. Sali-i and J. Sachs. 1991. “Fiscal federalism and optimum currency areas:
evidence for Europe from United States”. NBER Working Paper 3855.
150
Me´litz, J. and F. Zumer. 1999. “Interregional and international risk-sharing and
lessons for EMU”. Carnegie-Rochester Confernce series on Public Policy 51,
pp. 149–188.
— 2002. “Regional redistribution and stabilization by the center in Canada, France,
the UK and the US: a reassessment and new tests”. Journal of Public Economics
86, pp. 263–286.
Milesi-Ferretti, G.M. and P.R. Lane. 2003. International financial integration. The
Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp03.
IIIS.
— 2005. A global perspective on external positions. IMF Working Papers 05/161.
International Monetary Fund.
— 2006. The external wealth of nations mark II: revised and extended estimates of
foreign assets and liabilities, 1970-2004. IMF Working Papers 06/69. Interna-
tional Monetary Fund.
Moreira, M. J. 2003. “A conditional likelihood ratio test for structural models”.
Econometrica 71, 1027–1048.
Nelson, C. and C. Plosser. 1982. “Trends and random walks in macroeconomic time
series”. Journal of Monetary Economics 10, pp. 139–162.
Nelson, C.R. and R. Startz. 1990a. “Some Further Results on the Exact Small
Sample Properties of the Instrumental Variable Estimator”. Econometrica 58.4,
pp. 967–76.
— 1990. b. “The distribution of the instrumental variables estimator and Its t-ratio
when the instrument is a poor one”. Journal of Business 63.1, pp. 125–40.
Obstfeld, M. 1994. Are industrial-country consumption risks globally diversified?
NBER Working Papers 4308. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoff. 1996. Foundation of international macroeconomics.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Olea, J.L.M. and C. Pflueger. 2013. “A robust test for weak instruments”. Journal
of Business and Economic Statistics 31.3, pp. 358–369.
Parks, R. 1967. “Effcient estimation of a system of regression equations when dis-
turbances are both serially and contemporaneously correlated”. Journal of the
American Statistical Association 62, pp. 500–509.
Pedroni, P. 2000. “Fully-Modified OLS for heterogeneous cointegrated panels”. Ad-
vances in Econometrics 15, pp. 93–130.
— 2001. “Purchasing power parity tests in cointegrated panels”. The Review of
Economics and Statistics 83.4, pp. 727–731.
Perron, P. 1989. “The great crash, the oil price shock, and the unit root hypothesis”.
Econoemtrica 57, pp. 1361–1401.
Pesaran, M. H. and R. Smith. 1995. “Estimating long-run relationships from dy-
namic heterogeneous panels”. Journal of Econometrics 68.1, pp. 79–113.
151
Pesaran, M.H. 2004. “General diagnostic tests for cross section dependence in pan-
els”. CESifo Working Paper Series 1229.
— 2006. “Estimation and Inference in Large Heterogeneous Panels with a Multi-
factor Error Structure”. Econometrica 74.4, pp. 967–1012.
— 2007. “A simple panel unit root test in the presence of cross-section dependence”.
Journal of Applied Econometrics 22.2, pp. 265–312.
— 2015. “Testing Weak Cross-Sectional Dependence in Large Panels”. Econometric
Reviews 34.6-10, pp. 1089–1117.
Pesaran, M.H. and E. Tosetti. 2011. “Large panels with common factors and spatial
correlation”. Journal of Econometrics 161.2, pp. 182–202.
Pesaran, M.H., Y. Shin, and R.P. Smith. 1997. “Estimating long-run relationships in
dymanic heterogenous panels”. DAE Working papers Amalgamated Serues 9721.
— 1999. “Pool mean group estimation of dymaic heterogenous panels”. Journal of
the American Statsitical Associtation 94, pp. 621–634.
Phillips, P. C. B. and B. E. Hansen. 1990. “Statistical inference in instrumental vari-
ables regression with I(1) processes”. Review of Economic Studies 57.1, pp. 99–
125.
Phillips, P. C. B. and P. Perron. 1988. “Testing for a unit root in time series regres-
sion”. Biometrika 75, pp. 335–346.
Pierucci, E. and L. Ventura. 2009. “Risk sharing: a long run issue?” Open Economic
Review 43, pp. 35–59.
Qiao, Z. 2010. “Cross-country consumption risk sharing, a long-run perspective”.
IMF Working Paper WP/10/64.
Romer, D: 2006. Advanced macroeconomics. 3rd. McGrw-Hill/Irwin.
Roodman, D. 2006. “How to do xtabond2: an introduction to ”Difference” and
”System” GMM in Stata”. Center for Global Development Working Paper 103.
— 2009. “A note on the theme of too many instruments”. Oxford Bulletin of Eco-
nomics and Statistics 71.1, pp. 135–158.
Schaffer, M.E. 2010. “xtivreg2: Stata module to perform extended IV/2SLS, GMM
and AC/HAC, LIML and k-class regression for panel data models.”
Shiller, R.J. 1993. Macro markets: creating institutions for managing society’s largest
economic risks. Clarendon Press Oxford.
Smith, R. P. and A.-M. Fuertes. 2010. Panel time-series. cemmap course April 2010.
Sørensen, B. A. and O. Yosha. 1998. “International risk sharing and European mon-
etary unification”. Journal of International Economics 45, pp. 211–238.
Sørensen, B.A. et al. 2007. “Home bias and international risk sharing: twin puzzles
separated at birth”. Journal of International Money and Finance 26.
Staiger, D. and J.H. Stock. 1997. “Instrumental variables regression with weak in-
struments”. Econometrica 65.3, pp. 557–586.
152
Stock, J. H. and J. H. Wright. 2000. “GMM with weak identification”. Econometrica
68, 1055–1096.
Stock, J. H., J. H. Wright, and M. Yogo. 2002. “A survey of weak instruments and
weak identification in generalized method of moments”. Journal of Business and
Economic Statistics 20.4, pp. 518–529.
Stock, J.H. and M.W. Watson. 2008. “Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for
fixed-effects panel data regression”. Econometrica 76.1, pp. 155–174.
Stock, J.H. and M Yogo. 2005. “Testing for weak instruments in linear IV regression”.
Identification and inference for econometric models: essays in Honor of Thomas
Rothenberg. Ed. by D.W.K. Andrews and J.H. Stock. 284. Cambridge University
Press, pp. 80–108.
Stockman, A.C. and L. Tesar. 1995. “Tastes and technology in a two-country model
of the business cycle: explaining international co-movements”. American Eco-
nomic Review 85, pp. 168–185.
Taylor, M.P. and L. Sarno. 1998. “The behavior of real exchange rates during the
post-Bretton Woods period”. Journal of International Economics 46, pp. 281–
312.
Tesar, L. L. 1993. “International risk-sharing and non-traded goods”. Journal of
International Economics 35.1-2, pp. 69–89.
— 1995. “Evaluating the gains from international risk-sharing”. Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy 42.1, pp. 95–143.
Townsend, R. 1994. “Risk and insurance in village India”. Econometrica 62, pp. 539–
591.
Windmeijer, F. 2005. “A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient
two-step GMM estimators.” Journal of Econometrics 126, pp. 25–51.
Zivot, E., R. Startz, and C. R. Nelson. 1998. “Valid confidence intervals and infer-
ence in the presence of weak instruments”. International Economic Review 39,
pp. 1119–1144.
153
